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Summary 
Traditionally, the common law rule as interpreted by South African case law required that 
mutual consent be obtained in order to relocate a specified servitude of right of way. Since 
the Linvestment judgment, the legal position pertaining to the unilateral relocation of a 
specified servitude of right of way is that the location of an existing specified servitude of 
right of way may be altered unilaterally by the owner of the servient tenement. Unilateral 
relocation of a specified servitude of right of way will only be allowed if strict requirements 
are met, namely that the servient owner will be materially inconvenienced in the use of his 
property if the status quo is maintained; that the relocation will not prejudice the owner of 
the dominant tenement; and that the servient owner pays all costs incurred in the 
relocation of the servitude. 
In order to justify the departure from the common law, the court in Linvestment relied on 
historical argument, comparative law, and policy arguments to reach the conclusion that a 
servitude may be relocated unilaterally if it is in the interest of fairness, equity and justice. 
The court relied on section 173 of the Constitution, which entitles the courts to develop the 
common law. 
This decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal has far-reaching implications. A servitude is 
a limited real right to the property of another person which grants the holder of that right 
specific entitlements. South African law requires that registration in the deeds registry take 
place in terms of section 63(1) of the Deeds Registries Act 47 of 1937 as soon as a limited 
real right in immovable property is created or transferred. Once the servitude is registered, 
it will be enforceable against the owner of the servient tenement and all his successors in 
title. When the servient owner is allowed to relocate the servitude unilaterally, it will have 
the effect of undermining the limited real right that the dominant owner holds in the 
property in question. 
This thesis evaluates the extent to which the courts may change common law principles on 
the basis of fairness, justice and equity. The conclusion is that the policy grounds on which 
the court based its decision are convincing, as the law cannot remain rigid and needs to be 
continually changed in order to meet changing conditions. However, the comparative and 
historical reasons provided for the decision are insubstantial and unconvincing. The thesis 
points out that there are no historical grounds for the decision, but that more extensive and 
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contextual comparative research does support the decision. This thesis considers the 
constitutional implications of a flexible legal approach to the unilateral relocation of a 
specified servitude of right of way and concludes that an approach that allows for unilateral 
relocation will not amount to an expropriation and will not establish an arbitrary deprivation 
either, provided that the requirements set out in the decision are applied strictly and that a 
court order is required for the relocation. 
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Opsomming 
Die tradisionele gemeenregtiglike beginsel rakende die verlegging van „n gespesifiseerde 
reg van weg het vereis dat wannneer „n roete eers vasgestel is, die eienaar van die 
dienende erf dit nie mag verander nie tensy hy toestemming  verkry het van die eienaar 
van die heersende erf. Sedert die uitspraak in Linvestment, is die regsposisie dat die 
eienaar van die dienende erf wel die ligging van „n serwituut eensydig mag verander. Die 
eienaar van die dienende erf sal slegs gemagtig wees om die servituut te verskuif onder 
omstandighede waar die huidige ligging van die serwituut wesenlike materiële nadeel vir 
hom meebring, die verskuiwing van die serwituut geen nadeel vir die eienaar van die 
heersende erf sal veroorsaak nie en mits die eienaar van die dienende erf die kostes wat 
verband hou met die verskuiwing van die serwituut sal dra. 
Die hof het op historiese, regsvergelykende en beleidsoorwegings gesteun om die 
gevolgtrekking te staaf dat „n serwituut verkuif kan word, selfs al is dit teen die wens van 
die eienaar van die heersende erf. Die hof het ook beslis dat die howe die inherente 
bevoegdheid het om die gemenereg te ontwikkel ingevolge artikel 173 van die Grondwet. 
Die beslissing het verreikende implikasies. „n Serwituut is „n beperkte saaklike reg op die 
saak van iemand anders wat aan die reghebbende bepaalde genots- en 
gebruiksbevoegdhede ten aansien van daardie saak verleen. Artikel 63(1) van die 
Registrasie van Aktes Wet 47 van 1937 vereis dat „n beperkte saaklike reg ten aansien 
van onroerende goedere geregistreer moet word sodra „n beperkte saaklike reg gevestig 
word. Indien die serwituut geregistreer word, sal dit afdwingbaar wees teen die eienaar 
van die dienende erf asook sy regsopvolgers. Indien die genoemde eienaar gemagtig is 
om die serwituut eensydiglik te verskuif, sal dit inbreuk maak op die eienaar van die 
heersende erf se beperkte saaklike regte ten aansien van die dienende erf. 
Die doel van hierdie tesis is om te evalueer tot watter mate howe daartoe in staat is om die 
gemenereg te verander op grond van billikheid en geregtigheid. Die gevolgtrekking is dat 
die hof se beleidsargumente oortuigend is aangesien die reg voortdurend moet verander 
ten einde te voldoen aan die veranderende omstandighede. Die regsvergelykende en 
historiese gronde vir die hof se gevolgtrekking is egter onoortuigend. Die tesis illustreer dat 
daar geen historiese gronde bestaan vir die beslissing nie asook dat meer ekstensiewe en 
kontekstuele regsvergelykende navorsing wel die hof se beslissing staaf. Hierdie tesis 
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evalueer ook die grondwetlike implikasies van die nuwe reël en kom tot die gevolgtrekking 
dat die toepassing van „n benadering ingevolge waarvan die eienaar van „n dienende erf 
gemagtig word om „n serwituut eensydig te verskuif, nie „n onteiening of „n arbitrêre 
ontneming teweegbring nie op voorwaarde dat die vereistes soos uiteengesit in die 
uitspraak aan voldoen word en dat die verkryging van „n hofbevel „n moontlike voorvereiste 
is vir die verskuiwing van „n serwituut. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
The traditional common law position relating to a praedial servitude of right of way is that 
when the servitude is constituted generally, the entire servient tenement will be subject to 
the servitude.1 In such a case the owner of the dominant land will be entitled to select a 
particular route, provided that he does so civiliter modo.2 Once the owner of the dominant 
tenement has selected a route, he may not change it without the consent of the owner of 
the servient tenement.3 In his commentary, Voet states that if the route chosen by the 
dominant tenement proprietor is burdensome for the owner of the servient tenement, the 
owner of the servient tenement may suggest an alternative route which is equally 
convenient for the dominant tenement.4 However, Voet does not specify whether the 
abovementioned legal principle regarding the relocation of servitudes applies to a specified 
servitude of right of way. Traditionally, the same flexibility did not apply in circumstances 
where the servitude of right of way had been specified.5 Prior to the judgment in 
Linvestment, the South African case law required that mutual consent be obtained in order 
to relocate a specified servitude of right of way.6 In Gardens Estate Ltd v Lewis,7 the court 
drew a clear distinction between a duly constituted servitude and a servitude created in 
                                            
1
 Van Leeuwen RHR 2 21 6 (Van Leeuwen S 1625-1682 Commentaries on Roman-Dutch law edited and 
translated by Decker CW & Kotzé JG (2
nd
 ed 1921)); Nach Investments (Pty) Ltd v Yaldai Investments (Pty) 
Ltd & Another 1987 (2) SA 820 (A). 
2
 D 8 1 9 (Corpus Juris Civilis translated and edited by Scott SP The Civil Law: Including the Twelve Tables. 
The Institutes of Gaius. The Opinions of Paulus. The Enactments of Justinian and the Constitutions of Leo 
(1973)); Voet 8 3 8 (Citations from Voet J Commentarius ad Pandectas (Part II Servitudes Book VIII) 
translated into English by Hoskyns L (1876); Voet J 1647-1713 Commentarius ad Pandectas translated by 
Gane P Commentary on the Pandect (1955-1958)). Laubscher v Rive & Others (1866) 5 Searle 195; 
Landman v Daverin (1881-1882) 2 EDC 18; Divisional Council of Kimberley v Executrix Testamentary of 
Sheasby (1892) 6 HCG 167 at 173; Smit v Russouw & Others 1913 CPD 847; Surveyor-General (Cape) v 
Estate De Villiers 1923 AD 588 at 619; Texas Co (SA) Ltd v Cape Town Municipality 1926 AD 467; Reid v 
Rocher 1946 WLD 294; Nach Investments (Pty) Ltd v Yaldai Investments (Pty) Ltd and Another 1987 (2) SA 
820 (A). 
3
 Van der Merwe CG Sakereg (2
nd
 ed 1989) 483 cites Caepolla De Servitutibus 1 7; Christiniaeus In Leges 
Municipales Mechlinienses 14 50; Fuchs v Lys (1889-1890) 3 SAR 36 at 38; Van Heerden v Coetzee & 
Others 1914 AD 167; Gardens Estate Ltd v Lewis 1920 AD 144 at 150. 
4
 Voet 8 3 8 Allen v Colonial Government (1907) 24 SC 1 at 7; Rubidge v McCabe & Sons and Others, 
McCabe & Sons and Others v Rubidge 1913 AD 433; Smit v Russouw & Others 1913 CPD 847; Reid v 
Rocher 1946 WLD 294 at 300. 
5
 Mostert H, Pope A, Badenhorst P, Freedman W, Pienaar J & Van Wyk J The Principles of the Law of 
Property in South Africa (2010) 245. 
6
 Gardens Estate Ltd v Lewis 1920 AD 144. 
7
 1920 AD 144. 
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general.8 The judge stated that when Voet speaks of the owner of the servient tenement 
having a right to point out another route than that which has been agreed upon, he speaks 
of servitudes created in general.9 
The traditional common law principle pertaining to the unilateral relocation of a specified 
servitude of right of way as interpreted by the South African case law10 was overturned in 
the decision of Linvestment. Since the Linvestment judgment, the legal position pertaining 
to a specified servitude of right of way is that the location of an existing servitude of right of 
way may be altered unilaterally by the servient owner, provided that the servient owner will 
be materially inconvenienced in the use of his property if the status quo is maintained, that 
the relocation will not prejudice the owner of the dominant tenement, and that the servient 
owner pays all costs incurred in the relocation of the servitude.11 The court referred to 
historical and policy considerations and relied on comparative law to reach the conclusion 
that servitudes may be relocated if it is in the interest of fairness, equity and justice.12 
Additionally, the court relied on section 173 of the Constitution to justify its departure from 
the common law.13 
The problem with the Linvestment judgment is that the court made a striking change to the 
common law on the basis of insubstantial historical and comparative argument. The 
historical reasons are insubstantial because Heher AJ relied exclusively on a draft Dutch 
civil code which never formed part of the received Roman-Dutch law, while dismissing the 
authority of Voet and the case law that developed around it.14 The comparative analysis 
can also be regarded as problematic because Heher AJ relied on secondary sources in 
order to support his argument, without discussing their comparative context. Without the 
context it is difficult to assess why and how the relevant foreign jurisdictions relaxed their 
rules regarding relocation of a servitude. 
Furthermore, the court in Linvestment created uncertainty by deciding that a specified 
servitude of right of way can be changed unilaterally, without specifying whether the 
                                            
8
 D 8 1 9. 
9
 Gardens Estate Ltd v Lewis 1920 AD 144 at 150. 
10
 Gardens Estate Ltd v Lewis 1920 AD 144. 
11
 Linvestment CC v Hammersley [2008] 2 All SA 493 (SCA) para 35. 
12
 Linvestment CC v Hammersley [2008] 2 All SA 493 (SCA) paras 23-31. 
13
 S 173 of the Constitution entitles the courts to develop the common law. 
14
 Linvestment CC v Hammersley [2008] 2 All SA 493 (SCA) paras 22-24. 
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relocation is only possible upon the granting of a court order to that effect. A servitude is a 
limited real right to the property of another person which grants the holder of that right 
specific entitlements.15 When creating or transferring a limited real right in immovable 
property, South African law requires that registration in the deeds registry take place in 
terms of section 63(1) of the Deeds Registries Act 47 of 1937. The registered servitude will 
then be enforceable against the owner of the servient tenement and all his successors in 
title. A servitude is registered against the title deed of the servient tenement to serve as a 
notice to the whole world of its existence.16 The purpose and effect of registration is that 
the registered servitude will be enforceable against the owner of the servient tenement and 
all his successors in title. When the servient owner is allowed to tread over the proprietary 
rights of the dominant owner, it will have the effect of eroding the limited real rights that the 
dominant owner holds in the property in question.17 
 
1.2 Research question and hypothesis 
This thesis investigates whether the methodology used and the reasons provided in 
Linvestment CC v Hammersley18 (Linvestment)  to reach the conclusion, namely that 
unilateral relocation of a specified servitude of right of way is possible in South African law, 
are convincing and sufficient. 
In Linvestment,19 the Supreme Court of Appeal decided that in South African law it is 
possible for the owner of the servient tenement to obtain a unilateral relocation of a 
specified servitude of right of way. This decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal has far-
reaching implications. The judgment creates uncertainty in the law and confirms the 
possibility for courts to trump long-established principles. Granting an order which allows 
the unilateral relocation of a servitude will defeat the purpose and effect of registration.20 It 
                                            
15
 Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM & Mostert H Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property (5
th
 ed 2006) 
321. 
16
 Van der Merwe CG “Servitudes and other real rights” in Du Bois F (ed) Wille’s Principles of South African 
Law (9
th
 ed 2007) 591-629 at 612. 
17
 Linvestment CC v Hammersley and Another [2007] 3 All SA 618 (N) para 43. 
18
 [2008] 2 All SA 493 (SCA). 
19
 Linvestment CC v Hammersley [2008] 2 All SA 493 (SCA). 
20
 Linvestment CC v Hammersley and Another [2007] 3 All SA 618 (N) para 41. 
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would also complicate the meaning, interpretation and effect of a real right.21 This research 
aims to evaluate whether the historical, policy, comparative and constitutional reasons 
provided for the decision are convincing in view of the long-standing authority that is 
overthrown in the process. In addition, it will assess the extent to which the courts may 
change common law principles on the basis of fairness, justice and equity. The policy 
grounds on which the court based the decision are welcomed and to a certain extent 
convincing, since the law cannot remain rigid and needs to be continually changed in order 
to meet changing conditions. However, the comparative and historical reasons provided 
for the decision are insubstantial and unconvincing. Although the policy reasons for the 
decision were strong, the court could have provided more comprehensive historical and 
comparative justification.  
The methodology of this thesis will consist of the discussion of the Linvestment case in 
view of the traditional legal position regarding the relocation of a specified servitude, a 
comparative study, a constitutional analysis and a policy analysis. 
 
1.3 Overview of chapters 
Chapter 2 will analyse the impact of the Linvestment judgment on the traditional common 
law principles pertaining to the relocation of a specified servitude of right of way. This 
chapter will give an overview of the traditional common law principles relating to praedial 
servitudes in general, with the emphasis on the common law principles relating to praedial 
servitudes of right of way. Furthermore, chapter 2 will analyse how case law prior to the 
Linvestment judgment interpreted Voet‟s statement of the principle pertaining to the 
relocation of a specified servitude of right of way. Subsequently, the chapter will discuss 
the legal position after the Supreme Court of Appeal‟s judgment in Linvestment. 
The court in Linvestment22 decided the case in line with the international trend to follow a 
more flexible legal approach. The court referred to the Ontwerp of Professor Meijers.23 
                                            
21
 Linvestment CC v Hammersley and Another [2007] 3 All SA 618 (N) para 
22
 [2008] 2 All SA 493 (SCA). 
23
 Meijers EM Ontwerp voor een Nieuw Burgerlijk Wetboek 2 Toelichting (Book 5) (1955) at 428. See 
footnote 32 in Linvestment CC v Hammersley [2008] 2 All SA 493 (SCA) para 27. This research did not focus 
on the Italian, Swiss and Greek law due to the language barrier. The jurisdictions that are investigated in this 
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Professor Meijers stated that the unilateral relocation of a specified servitude of right of 
way is recognised by many foreign codes, including Switzerland, Italy and Greece, 
provided that the servient owner proves that the dominant owner‟s servitutal rights will not 
be reduced.24 Furthermore, the court referred briefly to the Belgian Civil Code and the 
German Civil Code as well as the discussion of the Scots law by Cuisine and Paisley.25 
Even though the arguments based on comparative grounds are convincing, the problem 
with the methodology of this decision is that the court never did a proper, in-depth legal 
background analysis of the foreign law in order to support the argument. Instead of using 
primary sources, the court used only secondary sources, without any discussion of their 
comparative value or context. The aim of chapter 3 is to do a more contextual analysis of 
the Dutch, German, US, Scots and English legal position pertaining to the unilateral 
relocation of a specified servitude of right of way to establish more concretely whether, 
why and how these jurisdictions allow (or prefer not to allow) unilateral relocation of 
servitudes. 
Even though the policy reasons provided by the court to justify its departure from the 
common law are convincing, the court failed to evaluate the constitutional implications of 
the recently developed common law pertaining to the relocation of a specified servitude of 
right of way. When developing the common law, the courts must determine whether the 
common law is inadequate when measured against the objectives of section 39(2). When 
the common law is deficient, the courts have to determine what ought to be done to meet 
those objectives. When giving content to the common law principles, the courts should 
ensure that the common law reflects the spirit, purport and objectives of the Bill of Rights.26 
Chapter 4 will assess the constitutional implications regarding the application of a flexible 
legal approach pertaining to the unilateral relocation of a specified servitude of right of 
way. The constitutional aspect concerns section 25(1) of the 1996 Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa which contains the deprivation provision of the property clause. 
                                                                                                                                                 
thesis provide sufficient results to enable the conclusion that servitudes will in most circumstances be 
subsidiary to society‟s need for flexibility in instances where the original location of the servitude becomes 
too burdensome for the owner of the servient estate, provided that the relocation does not prejudice the 
dominant owner. See Chapter 3 section 3.4. Lovett JA “A new way: Servitude relocation in Scotland and 
Louisiana” (2005) 9 Edin LR 352-394 at 385. 
24
 Linvestment CC v Hammersley [2008] 2 All SA 493 (SCA). 
25
 Linvestment CC v Hammersley [2008] 2 All SA 493 (SCA) para 28-29. 
26
 Midgley JR & Van der Walt JC “Delict” in Joubert WA (ed) LAWSA vol 8(1) (2005) 23. 
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This section provides that no one may be deprived of property except in terms of law of 
general application and no law may permit arbitrary deprivation of property. The test for 
arbitrary deprivation is set out in First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v 
Commisioner, South African Revenue Service; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank 
v Minister of Finance.27 A deprivation of property will be regarded as “arbitrary” in terms of 
section 25 when there is not a sufficient reason for the particular deprivation or it is 
procedurally unfair.28 When applying the test for arbitrary deprivation to Linvestment, it can 
be questioned whether the result of the Linvestment judgment, namely that a servitude can 
be relocated unilaterally constitutes an arbitrary deprivation of property, may be in conflict 
with section 25(1) of the Constitution. A second constitutional aspect of the decision in 
Linvestment is the question whether the decision and the possibility that a specified 
servitude of right of way may be relocated unilaterally could constitute an expropriation of 
property (particularly expropriation of the rights of the owner of the dominant tenement) 
and, if so, whether such expropriation is in conflict with sections 25(2) and 25(3) of the 
Constitution.  
Chapter 5 will evaluate whether it is justifiable for courts to overturn long-established 
common law principles based on the grounds of justice, equity and practicality. This 
chapter will investigate whether the policy reasons provided in Linvestment to reach its 
conclusion, namely that unilateral relocation of a specified servitude of right of way is 
possible in South African law, are convincing and sufficient.29 The issue is to determine 
which legal approach is the correct one, namely to adhere to the traditional common law 
rule which prohibits the unilateral relocation of the servitude by the owner of the servient 
tenement unless consent has been obtained from the owner of the dominant tenement or 
to adopt the flexible legal approach that allows the unilateral relocation of a servitude.30 In 
the first part of the chapter, the various arguments pertaining to the traditional common law 
                                            
27
 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC). 
28
 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Comissioner, South African Revenue Service; First National 
Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 100. 
29
 Most of the articles cited in the policy analysis chapter are based on the US law regarding the unilateral 
relocation of a specified servitude of right of way. The reason for this is that in the US there are a wide range 
of materials discussing every aspect of rules regulating the relocation of a specified servitude of right of way. 
It seems as if the US law pertaining to the relocation of a specified servitude of right of way is more 
advanced and well developed. 
30
 French S “Relocating easements: Restatement (third), servitudes § 4.8 (3)” (2003) 38 Real Prop Prob & Tr 
J 1-15 at 8. 
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and flexible legal approach will be discussed. Issues that will be addressed are whether a 
choice between the two rules matters, whether decision makers should prefer clear 
“property rules” or muddier “liability rules”31 and the different proposals as to how the rules 
can be improved in order to strike a balance between the interests of the different parties 
to the servitude-creating contract. 
The rest of this chapter will make use of law and economics theory to analyse the legal 
problem pertaining to the right of a servient tenement owner to relocate a servitude 
unilaterally. The economic approach to property law emphasises the role of property law in 
promoting an efficient allocation of resources.32 This chapter aims to assess the on-going 
debate regarding the selection of an appropriate rule from a law and economics point of 
view which will have the effect of creating an efficient outcome for owners of both the 
servient and the dominant tenement. 
 
 
 
                                            
31
 Lovett JA “A bend in the road: Easement relocation and pliability in the new Restatement (Third) of 
Property: Servitudes” (2005) 38 Conn LR 1-77 at 5. See Calabresi G & Melamed AD “Property rules, liability 
rules and inalienablity: One view of the cathedral” (1972) 85 Harv LR 1089-1129 at 1092. 
32
 Miceli TJ “Property” in Backhaus JG (ed) The Elgar Companion to Law and Economics (2005) 246-260 at 
246. 
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Chapter 2: Linvestment CC v Hammersley and South 
African Law 
2.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to focus on the judgment of Linvestment CC v Hammersley1 
(Linvestment) and its effect on the traditional common law principle relating to the 
relocation of praedial servitudes of right of way.  
The traditional common law position relating to a praedial servitude of right of way is as 
follows: If the servitude is constituted generally, the entire servient tenement will be subject 
to the servitude.2 In such a case the owner of the dominant land will be entitled to select a 
particular route, provided that he does so civiliter modo.3 Once the owner of the dominant 
tenement has selected a route, he may not change it without the consent of the owner of 
the servient tenement.4 In his commentary, Voet states that if the route chosen by the 
dominant tenement proprietor is burdensome for the owner of the servient tenement, the 
owner of the servient tenement may suggest an alternative route which is equally 
convenient for the dominant tenement:5 
“But nothing in this prevents the owner of the servient tenement from making a 
change, and fixing on some other part of his property for the exercise of the right of 
passage, or of driving, or of way, than that determined on previously, either by 
                                            
1
 [2008] 2 All SA 493 (SCA). 
2
 See Van Leeuwen RHR 2 21 6; Nach Investments (Pty) Ltd v Yaldai Investments (Pty) Ltd & Another 1987 
(2) SA 820 (A). 
3
 D 8 1 9; Voet  8 3 8; Laubscher v Rive & Others (1866) 5 Searle 195; Landman v Daverin (1881-1882) 2 
EDC 18; Divisional Council of Kimberley v Executrix Testamentary of Sheasby (1892) 6 HCG 167 at 173; 
Smit v Russouw & Others 1913 CPD 847; Surveyor-General (Cape) v Estate De Villiers 1923 AD 588 at 619; 
Texas Co (SA) Ltd v Cape Town Municipality 1926 AD 467; Reid v Rocher 1946 WLD 294; Nach 
Investments (Pty) Ltd v Yaldai Investments (Pty) Ltd and Another 1987 (2) SA 820 (A). 
4
 Van der Merwe CG Sakereg (2
nd
 ed 1989) 483 cites Caepolla De Servitutibus 1 7; Christiniaeus In Leges 
Municipales Mechlinienses 14 50; Fuchs v Lys (1889-1890) 3 SAR 36 at 38; Van Heerden v Coetzee & 
Others 1914 AD 167; Gardens Estate Ltd v Lewis 1920 AD 144 at 150. 
5
 Voet 8 3 8; Allen v Colonial Government (1907) 24 SC 1 at 7; Rubidge v McCabe & Sons and Others, 
McCabe & Sons and Others v Rubidge 1913 AD 433; Smit v Russouw & Others 1913 CPD 847; Reid v 
Rocher 1946 WLD 294 at 300. 
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election or by the agreement: provided only that this change in no way prejudices 
the owner of the dominant tenement.”6 
However, Voet did not specify whether the abovementioned legal principle regarding the 
relocation of servitudes applies to a specified servitude of right of way. It is not clear either 
whether the owner of the servient tenement enjoys a similar right, namely to relocate a 
servitude if it becomes burdensome for him, even in the case where the route of the 
servitude had been specified. Traditionally, the same flexibility did not apply in 
circumstances where the servitude of right of way had been specified.7 Prior to the 
judgment in Linvestment, the South African case law required that mutual consent be 
obtained in order to relocate a specified servitude of right of way.8 
The traditional common law principle pertaining to the unilateral relocation of a specified 
servitude of right of way as interpreted by the South African case law9 was overturned in 
the decision of Linvestment. Since the Linvestment judgment, the legal position pertaining 
to the unilateral relocation of a specified servitude of right of way is that the location of an 
existing specified servitude of right of way may be altered unilaterally by the owner of the 
servient tenement, provided that the servient owner will be materially inconvenienced in 
the use of his property if the status quo is maintained, that the relocation will not prejudice 
the owner of the dominant tenement, and that the servient owner pays all costs incurred in 
the relocation of the servitude.10 The implication of this judgment is that the legal position 
regarding the relocation of a specified servitude of right of way is now regulated by the 
principles that previously applied only to the relocation of servitudes created under a 
general servitude.11 
Before discussing the main issue, namely the impact of the Linvestment judgment on the 
traditional common law principles pertaining to the relocation of a specified servitude of 
right of way, this chapter will give an overview of the traditional common law principles 
                                            
6
 Voet 8 3 8. (Citations from Voet J Commentarius ad Pandectas (Part II Servitudes Book VIII) translated into 
English by Hoskyns L (1876)). 
7
 Mostert H, Pope A, Badenhorst P, Freedman W, Pienaar J & Van Wyk J The Principles of the Law of 
Property in South Africa (2010) 245. 
8
 Gardens Estate Ltd v Lewis 1920 AD 144. 
9
 Gardens Estate Ltd v Lewis 1920 AD 144. 
10
 Linvestment CC v Hammersley [2008] 2 All SA 493 (SCA) para 35. 
11
 Mostert H, Pope A, Badenhorst P, Freedman W, Pienaar J & Van Wyk J The Principles of the Law of 
Property in South Africa (2010) 245. 
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relating to praedial servitudes in general, with the emphasis on the common law principles 
relating to praedial servitudes of right of way.  
This chapter will analyse how case law prior to the Linvestment judgment interpreted 
Voet‟s statement of the principle. Subsequently, the chapter will discuss the legal position 
after the Supreme Court of Appeal‟s judgment in Linvestment.  
 
2.2 General principles regulating praedial servitudes  
2.2.1 Nature of servitudes 
Ownership in property can never be absolute,12 and it will be limited if it is in the interest of 
the community, neighbours and other holders of rights.13 A servitude is an example of the 
way in which the rights of an owner of property may be limited by mutual agreement. A 
servitude is a limited real right to the property of another person which grants the holder of 
such a right specific entitlements.14  
 
2.2.2 Categories of servitudes 
Roman-Dutch law distinguished between two categories of servitudes, namely praedial 
servitudes and personal servitudes.15 A praedial servitude is a limited real right in the land 
of someone else which grants the holder of the servitude certain entitlements of use and 
enjoyment over the servient land in his capacity as owner of the dominant tenement.16 
Praedial servitudes are constituted in favour of one plot of land (dominant tenement) over 
                                            
12
 Colonial Development (Pty) Ltd v Outer West Local Council 2002 (2) SA 589 (N) 610; Badenhorst PJ, 
Pienaar JM & Mostert H Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property (5
th
 ed 2006) 93-94. 
13
 See examples of limitations imposed on ownership in Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM & Mostert H Silberberg 
and Schoeman’s The Law of Property (5
th
 ed 2006) 94-132. 
14
 Van der Merwe CG Sakereg (2
nd
 ed 1989) 458. The author quotes Puchta GF Pandekten edited by 
Rudorff AF (11
th
 ed 1872) par 178; Arndts L Lehrbuch des Pandekten edited by Pfaff L and Hofmann F (14
th
 
ed 1889) par 175 and Dernburg H Pandekten (6
th
 ed 1900) par 235; Voet 7 1 1; Van Leeuwen RHR 2 19 1. 
See Dreyer v Letterstedt’s Executors (1865) 5 Searle 88 at 99; Dreyer v Ireland (1874) 4 Buch 193 at 199; 
Lorentz v Melle & Others 1978 (3) SA 1044 (T) 1049. See further Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM & Mostert H 
Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property (5
th
 ed 2006) 321; Van der Merwe CG “Servitudes and 
other real rights” in Du Bois F (ed) Wille’s Principles of South African Law (9
th
 ed 2007) 591-629 at 592. 
15
 Van der Merwe CG Sakereg (2
nd
 ed 1989) 459; Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM & Mostert H Silberberg and 
Schoeman’s The Law of Property (5
th
 ed 2006) 321. 
16
 Van der Merwe CG Sakereg (2
nd
 ed 1989) 467. 
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another plot of land (servient tenement).17 A praedial servitude creates a benefit for the 
dominant tenement and it imposes a burden on the servient tenement.18 The benefit and 
burden created by a praedial servitude run with the dominant land and cannot be detached 
from the land.19 Therefore, a praedial servitude will automatically be transferred to the 
successors in title of the owner of the dominant tenement.20 
A personal servitude, on the other hand, is a limited real right to the movable or immovable 
property of someone else which grants entitlements of use and enjoyment over the 
servient land to the servitude holder in his personal capacity and not in his capacity as 
owner of land.21 In contrast to a praedial servitude, a personal servitude is not 
transferrable to the successors in title of the holder of the servitude as it is inseparably 
attached to the holder of the right.22 
 
2.2.3 Common characteristics of praedial and personal servitudes 
Praedial and personal servitudes have certain characteristics in common. Firstly, the 
holder of the servitude is granted a limited real right in the property of another person 
which he can enforce with a real remedy against the owner of the property and all his 
successors in title.23 Secondly, the holder of the servitude cannot expect the owner of the 
servient property to do anything positively as a result of the servitude.24 It is only expected 
of the owner of the servient property to tolerate and respect the holder of the servitude‟s 
                                            
17
 Van der Merwe CG “Servitudes and other real rights” in Du Bois F (ed) Wille’s Principles of South African 
Law (9
th
 ed 2007) 591-629 at 592; Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM & Mostert H Silberberg and Schoeman’s The 
Law of Property (5
th
 ed 2006) 321. 
18
 Van der Merwe CG & De Waal MJ The Law of Things and Servitudes (1993) para 215. 
19
 Van der Merwe CG “Servitudes and other real rights” in Du Bois F (ed) Wille’s Principles of South African 
Law (9
th
 ed 2007) 591-629 at 593; Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM & Mostert H Silberberg and Schoeman’s The 
Law of Property (5
th
 ed 2006) 321. 
20
 Van der Merwe CG & De Waal MJ The Law of Things and Servitudes (1993) para 220. 
21
 Van der Merwe CG Sakereg (2
nd
 ed 1989) 506; Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM & Mostert H Silberberg and 
Schoeman’s The Law of Property (5
th
 ed 2006) 338. 
22
 Van der Merwe CG “Servitudes and other real rights” in Du Bois F (ed) Wille’s Principles of South African 
Law (9
th
 ed 2007) 591-629 at 604; Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM & Mostert H Silberberg and Schoeman’s The 
Law of Property (5
th
 ed 2006) 338. 
23
 Van der Merwe CG Sakereg (2
nd
 ed 1989) 462. See Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM & Mostert H Silberberg 
and Schoeman’s The Law of Property (5
th
 ed 2006) 330-332. 
24
 Van der Merwe CG Sakereg (2
nd
 ed 1989) 471. See Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM & Mostert H Silberberg 
and Schoeman’s The Law of Property (5
th
 ed 2006) 324. 
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right to use and enjoy the entitlements granted to him.25 Thirdly, no person can acquire a 
servitude over his own property and the owner of the property may not transfer the 
servitude to another person.26 Finally, the entitlements must at all times be exercised 
civiliter modo, thus the holder of the servitude must exercise them in a reasonable manner, 
causing as little inconvenience as possible to the owner of the servient tenement.27 
 
2.2.4 Praedial servitude requirements 
A numerus clausus of praedial servitudes is not recognised in South African law.28 
However, to prevent a proliferation of praedial servitudes and undue impediments of land 
certain requirements must be fulfilled.29 Certain prerequisites are in place in order to 
determine whether a praedial servitude was established. Firstly, a praedial servitude can 
only be granted in respect of immovable property.30 Secondly, the existence of two 
tenements,31 namely a dominant and a servient tenement, belonging to different owners, is 
a prerequisite for the establishment of a praedial servitude because a praedial servitude 
always constitutes a burden imposed on one piece of land (the servient tenement) in 
favour of another piece of land (the dominant tenement).32 The holder of the servitude is 
the owner of the dominant tenement and he exercises his entitlements resulting from the 
servitude registered over the servient tenement.33 Thirdly, it is also required that the 
servient and dominant tenements must be situated closely to each other and that the 
                                            
25
 Van der Merwe CG Sakereg (2
nd 
ed 1989) 471-472. See Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM & Mostert H 
Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property (5
th
 ed 2006) 324-325. 
26
 Lorentz v Melle & Others 1978 (3) SA 1044 (T); Erlax Properties (Pty) Ltd v Registrar of Deeds 1992 (1) 
SA 879 (A). 
27
 Van der Merwe CG Sakereg (2
nd
 ed 1989) 466. See Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM & Mostert H Silberberg 
and Schoeman’s The Law of Property (5
th
 ed 2006) 331. 
28
 Van der Merwe CG & De Waal MJ The Law of Things and Servitudes (1993) para 221. 
29
 Van der Merwe CG “Servitudes and other real rights” in Du Bois F (ed) Wille’s Principles of South African 
Law (9
th
 ed 2007) 591-629 at 593; Gordon WM & De Waal MJ “Servitudes and real burdens” in Zimmerman 
R, Visser D & Reid KGC (eds) Mixed Legal Systems in Comparative Perspective (2004) 735-756 at 738, 
743. 
30
 Van der Merwe CG Sakereg (2
nd
 ed 1989) 460. Van der Merwe CG & De Waal MJ The Law of Things and 
Servitudes (1993) para 216. 
31
 Voet 8 1 2; Van der Merwe CG “Servitudes and other real rights” in Du Bois F (ed) Wille’s Principles of 
South African Law (9
th
 ed 2007) 591-629 at 593. 
32
 Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM & Mostert H Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property (5
th
 ed 2006) 
323; Van der Merwe CG “Servitudes and other real rights” in Du Bois F (ed) Wille’s Principles of South 
African Law (9
th
 ed 2007) 591-629 at 593. 
33
 Van der Merwe CG “Servitudes and other real rights” in Du Bois F (ed) Wille’s Principles of South African 
Law (9
th
 ed 2007) 591-629 at 593. 
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servitude should offer a permanent benefit to the dominant tenement which increases the 
value of the dominant tenement.34 Fourthly, according to the Roman-Dutch law maxim nulli 
res sua servit, a person who owns the two properties, in other words both the dominant 
and servient tenement, cannot have a servitude as a burden over one plot of land in favour 
of the other plot of land. Nobody may constitute a servitude over his own property.35 
Fifthly, the maxim servitus servitutis esse non potest holds that no further servitudes can 
be imposed on an existing servitude.36 The owner of the dominant tenement may not allow 
his servitude to be used for the benefit of a tenement other than the dominant tenement. 
There cannot be a servitude on a servitude.37 A sixth requirement is that a praedial 
servitude may not impose any active duties on the owner of the servient land.38 It is only 
expected of the owner of the servient tenement to endure and respect the owner of the 
dominant tenement in exercising his rights and duties.39 In the seventh place, a praedial 
servitude is in principle indivisible.40 The exception to this rule will be in the case where the 
servient tenement is subdivided, which may lead to the partial release of the remaining 
area because not all parts of the servient tenement will necessarily serve the dominant 
tenement.41 The rule of divisibility relating to praedial servitudes is affected by the manner 
in which the servitude is defined in the title deed, namely whether the servitude is created 
                                            
34
 Voet 8 4 19 (Voet J 1647-1713 Commentarius ad Pandectas translated by Gane P Commentary on the 
Pandect (1955-1958)); De Kock v Hänel 1999 (1) SA 994 (C) 998. 
35
 Van der Merwe CG Sakereg (2
nd
 ed 1989) 462; Van der Merwe CG “Servitudes and other real rights” in 
Du Bois F (ed) Wille’s Principles of South African Law (9
th
 ed 2007) 591-629 at 592; Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar 
JM & Mostert H Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property (5
th
 ed 2006) 322; Lewis v SD Turner 
Properties (Pty) Ltd 1993 (3) SA 738 (W) 740. 
36
 D 8 3 33 1; Dreyer v Letterstedt’s Executors (1865) 5 Searle 88 at 99; Van der Merwe CG Sakereg (2
nd
 ed 
1989) 463; Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM & Mostert H Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property (5
th
 ed 
2006) 323. 
37
 Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM & Mostert H Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property (5
th
 ed 2006) 
323. 
38
 D 8 1 15 1; Voet 8 2 7; Voet 8 4 17, Van der Merwe CG Sakereg (2
nd
 ed 1989) 471; Badenhorst PJ, 
Pienaar JM & Mostert H Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property (5
th
 ed 2006) 323. There are two 
exceptions to this maxim, namely the servitutis oneris ferendi which compels the owner of the servient 
tenement to support a building on the dominant land and the servitutis altius tollendi which compels the 
servient owner to raise the height of his building in order to protect the dominant tenement against 
hazardous weather conditions. See Van der Merwe CG “Servitudes and other real rights” in Du Bois F (ed) 
Wille’s Principles of South African Law (9
th
 ed 2007) 591-629 at 595. 
39
 See Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM & Mostert H Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property (5
th
 ed 
2006) 322-326; Van der Merwe CG & De Waal MJ The Law of Things and Servitudes (1993) para 219. 
40
 Voet 8 4 9; Van der Merwe CG Sakereg (2
nd
 ed 1989) 460, 477; Van der Merwe CG “Servitudes and other 
real rights” in Du Bois F (ed) Wille’s Principles of South African Law (9
th
 ed 2007) 591-629 at 597; 
Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM & Mostert H Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property (5
th
 ed 2006) 325. 
41
 Van der Merwe CG & De Waal MJ The Law of Things and Servitudes (1993) paras 222-223. 
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generally or specifically.42 If the title deed specifies where or how a servitude ought to be 
exercised and if the land is subsequently subdivided, "then the specificity of the servitude 
might entail that it continues to exist over a part of the land only”.43 Conversely, if the 
servitude does not indicate where or how the servitude is to be exercised, then the whole 
of the original servient tenement will be subject to the servitude after subsequent 
subdivisions.44 The final requirement is that a praedial servitude is in principle perpetual,45 
thus it is enforceable against the owner of the servient tenement and against all his 
successors in title.46 
 
2.2.5 Categories of praedial servitudes 
Praedial servitudes may be divided into the following categories: rural praedial servitudes, 
urban praedial servitudes and statutory praedial servitudes.47 In contrast to urban 
servitudes, which are mostly negative, rural praedial servitudes are mostly of a positive 
nature. A positive servitude grants the dominant owner the right to carry out certain acts on 
the servient land as opposed to a negative servitude, which entitles the dominant owner to 
compel the owner of the servient estate to refrain from doing certain acts on the servient 
land.48 A right of way; the right to lead water and to draw water; the right to graze cattle; 
and the right to fetch wood are all examples of traditional rural praedial servitudes.49 The 
following servitudes are examples of ancient Roman servitudes of way which continue to 
                                            
42
 Mostert H, Pope A, Badenhorst P, Freedman W, Pienaar J & Van Wyk J The Principles of The Law of 
Property in South Africa (2010) 243. 
43
 Mostert H, Pope A, Badenhorst P, Freedman W, Pienaar J & Van Wyk J The Principles of The Law of 
Property in South Africa (2010) 243. 
44
 Mostert H, Pope A, Badenhorst P, Freedman W, Pienaar J & Van Wyk J The Principles of The Law of 
Property in South Africa (2010) 243-244. 
45
 See Voet 8 4 17; Van der Merwe CG “Servitudes and other real rights” in Du Bois F (ed) Wille’s Principles 
of South African Law (9
th
 ed 2007) 591-629 at 594: “The servient tenement must serve the dominant 
tenement on a permanent basis and must not merely serve the personal pleasure of the owner of the 
dominant tenement.”. 
46
 Van der Merwe CG Sakereg (2
nd
 ed 1989) 460; Van der Merwe CG “Servitudes and other real rights” in 
Du Bois F (ed) Wille’s Principles of South African Law (9
th
 ed 2007) 591-629 at 592. 
47
 Van der Merwe CG Sakereg (2
nd
 ed 1989) 480-501; Van der Merwe CG & De Waal MJ The Law of Things 
and Servitudes (1993) para 224; Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM & Mostert H Silberberg and Schoeman’s The 
Law of Property (5
th
 ed 2006) 326. 
48
 Van der Merwe CG “Servitudes and other real rights” in Du Bois F (ed) Wille’s Principles of South African 
Law (9
th
 ed 2007) 591-629 at 597. 
49
 Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM & Mostert H Silberberg & Schoeman’s The Law of Property (5
th
 ed 2006) 326-
327. 
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form part of our modern law: iter (the right to walk or ride on horseback across servient 
land); actus (the right to drive cattle or light vehicles over servient land); and via (the 
servitude which allows passage of all kinds of traffic).50 
Examples of urban praedial servitudes would be the right of the owner of the dominant 
tenement to insert a beam of his building into the building on the servient tenement51 and 
the right of the holder of the servitude to prevent the construction of any buildings on the 
servient tenement beyond a certain height.52 The respective rights to dam, drain, store and 
lead water in terms of the National Water Act 36 of 1998 are examples of statutory 
servitudes. 
 
2.2.6 Rights and duties of the dominant and servient owners 
The nature and extent of the rights and duties of the owners of the dominant and servient 
tenement will depend on the terms and conditions of the agreement which constitutes the 
servitude.53 The rights of the parties are implied by law, but these rights may also be 
confirmed expressly or it may be varied within certain limitations by means of conventional 
servitude conditions in a deed.54 The law prohibits the owner of the servient tenement to 
use his property as he deems fit.55 The servitude holder is entitled to the unrestricted 
enjoyment of the servitude.56 However, he may not exercise his rights in a manner which is 
inconsistent with the terms and conditions of the servitude.57 The servitude holder should 
exercise his rights in a civil manner, causing as little inconvenience as possible to the 
owner of the servient land without increasing the burden on the servient land.58 If the 
owner of the servient tenement seeks to restrict the owner of the dominant tenement in the 
exercise of his or her rights and if the owner of the servient estate exceeds his rights the 
                                            
50
 Van der Merwe CG Sakereg (2
nd
 ed 1989) 481-482; Van der Merwe CG “Servitudes and other real rights” 
in Du Bois F (ed) Wille’s Principles of South African Law (9
th
 ed 2007) 591-629 at 598. 
51
 Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM & Mostert H Silberberg & Schoeman’s The Law of Property (5
th
 ed 2006) 327. 
52
 Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM & Mostert H Silberberg & Schoeman’s The Law of Property (5
th
 ed 2006) 327. 
53
 Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM & Mostert H Silberberg & Schoeman’s The Law of Property (5
th
 ed 2006) 330. 
54
 Cuizine DJ & Paisley RRM Servitudes and Rights of Way (1998) 387.  
55
 Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM & Mostert H Silberberg & Schoeman’s The Law of Property (5
th
 ed 2006) 331. 
56
 Van der Merwe CG & De Waal MJ The Law of Things and Servitudes (1993) para 219. 
57
 Van der Merwe CG “Servitudes and other real rights” in Du Bois F (ed) Wille’s Principles of South African 
Law (9
th
 ed 2007) 591-629 at 593. 
58
 Van der Merwe CG “Servitudes and other real rights” in Du Bois F (ed) Wille’s Principles of South African 
Law (9
th
 ed 2007) 591-629 at 593. 
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two parties may apply to court for a declaration of their rights.59 When the parties have 
complied with all the requirements, they may enforce the specific duties agreed upon 
between the two of them by way of an interdict.60 If either of the two parties is able to prove 
that he or she has suffered patrimonial loss, that party is entitled to claim damages if the 
other party exceeds his or her rights.61 The agreement between the parties will be 
interpreted strictly, and the terms of the servitude will be construed in a manner which is 
least burdensome for him or her. The rights of the parties to a servitude must be 
interpreted according to the general canons of construction.62 In Glaffer Investments (Pty) 
Ltd v Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry63 the court held that a servitude has to be 
interpreted according to its wording and in light of the surrounding circumstances 
prevailing when it was grounded. If any uncertainty should exist regarding the existence of 
a praedial or a personal servitude, the least onerous interpretation should be followed.64 
 
2.2.7 Registration of servitudes 
Servitudes can be acquired by means of a state grant,65 by statute,66 by delivery of 
movables67 or by registration against the title deeds of the servient land.68 When creating 
or transferring a limited real right in immovable property, South African law requires that 
registration in the deeds registry take place in terms of section 63(1) of the Deeds 
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 Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM & Mostert H Silberberg & Schoeman’s The Law of Property (5
th
 ed 2006) 331. 
60
 Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM & Mostert H Silberberg & Schoeman’s The Law of Property (5
th
 ed 2006) 331. 
61
 Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM & Mostert H Silberberg & Schoeman’s The Law of Property (5
th
 ed 2006) 331. 
62
 Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM & Mostert H Silberberg & Schoeman’s The Law of Property (5
th
 ed 2006) 330. 
63
 2000 (4) SA 822 (T) 828. In Murray v Schneider 1958 (1) SA 587 (A) it was stated that the surrounding 
circumstances had to be taken into account where a clause in the agreement was capable of more than one 
meaning. Evidence of surrounding circumstances would only be permissible if the certainty of an agreement 
cannot be gathered from language alone. In De Kock v Hänel 1999 (1) SA 994 (C) 998 it was held that when 
interpreting servitudes, the words must be given their ordinary grammatical meaning. 
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 In De Kock v Hänel 1999 (1) SA 994 (C), the court stated that if there should be any doubt as to whether a 
praedial or a personal servitude has been established, the rebuttable presumption that a personal servitude 
was created, will apply.  
65
 Van der Merwe CG “Servitudes and other real rights” in Du Bois F (ed) Wille’s Principles of South African 
Law (9
th
 ed 2007) 591-629 at 611; Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM & Mostert H Silberberg & Schoeman’s The 
Law of Property (5
th
 ed 2006) 332. 
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 S 2(1) of the Prescription Act 18 of 1943; s 6 of the Prescription Act 68 of 1969; s 25 of The Constitution of 
the Republic of South Africa 1996 and ss 4 & 5 of the Expropriation Act 63 of 1975; National Water Act 36 of 
1998; ss 28 & 31 Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986; s 19 of the Electricity Act 41 of 1987. 
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 Van der Merwe CG “Servitudes and other real rights” in Du Bois F (ed) Wille’s Principles of South African 
Law (9
th
 ed 2007) 591-629 at 611. 
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 S 63(1) of the Deeds Registries Act 47 of 1937. 
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Registries Act.69 A servitude is registered against the title deed of the servient tenement to 
serve as a notice to the whole world of its existence.70 The purpose and effect of 
registration is that the registered servitude will be enforceable against the owner of the 
servient tenement and all his successors in title.  
If the agreement between the parties to create a servitude is not registered, the 
entitlements granted will result only in creditor‟s rights between the parties.71 The effect of 
a servitude established by an unregistered agreement is that the entitlements are 
enforceable against the current owner only and not his successors in title.72 In principle, 
third parties are not bound by the unregistered servitutal agreement concluded between 
the contracting parties. However, according to the doctrine of knowledge, a third party can 
be held liable to the terms of an agreement to which he was not a party.73 The doctrine of 
knowledge will not be applicable before registration of the property in the name of a new 
owner.74 The court held in Wahloo Sand BK v Trustees, Hambly Parker Trust75 that the 
doctrine of notice will only be applicable in the case of an unregistered servitutal 
agreement where the property has been registered in the name of a new owner with 
knowledge of the servitutal agreement before date of transfer of the property. 
Prior to the judgment in Linvestment CC v Hammersley76 (Linvestment) the law required 
that mutual consent be obtained in order to relocate a registered specified servitude of 
right of way.77 In Linvestment the registration of the servitude as well as the path of the 
right of way created a real right for the owner of the dominant tenement and his 
successors in title, which is not only enforceable against the owner of the servient 
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tenement but also against third parties.78 The Supreme Court of Appeal in Linvestment 
created uncertainty by deciding that a specified servitude of right of way registered against 
the title deeds of property can be changed unilaterally. On an interpretation of the outcome 
in Linvestment it seems as though, despite the existence of a limited real right over the 
servient tenement, the owner of the servient tenement will continue to enjoy the exclusive 
use of his property.79  
The implication of the Supreme Court of Appeal‟s decision, namely that servitudes can be 
relocated unilaterally, has the effect of defeating the purpose and effect of registration, and 
complicates the meaning and effect of a real right.80  
 
2.3 Case law concerning servitudes of right of way  
2.3.1 The legal position before the Supreme Court of Appeal’s decision in 
Linvestment 
2.3.1.1 Introduction 
The previous section relating to the general principles of servitudes serves as a 
background discussion before addressing the main issue, namely whether a specified 
servitude of right of way may be relocated unilaterally.  
Praedial servitudes are designed to survive generations of landowners.81 Servitudes are 
usually created without considering the likelihood of future changed circumstances.82 The 
law provided some measure of flexibility in situations where the servitude of right of way 
has been constituted generally (simpliciter).83 
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The route over which a servitude of way is exercised may be specified by the terms of the 
servitude or it may be undefined.84 It was stated in Nach Investments (Pty) Ltd v Yaldai 
Investments (Pty) Ltd and Another85 that the determination of the route of the servitude is 
not essential in an agreement for the constitution of a right of way.86 However, in 
Grobbelaar v Freund87 it was held that the applicant must establish the nature and ambit of 
the servitude in a clear, unambiguous and objectively determinable way. If the servitude is 
constituted generally (simpliciter), the entire servient tenement will be subject to the 
servitude.88 A servitude conferred simpliciter is described as a right of way, via, without the 
route and width of the road having been determined.89 In such a case the owner of the 
dominant tenement will be entitled to select a particular route, provided that he does so 
civiliter modo.90 Once the owner of the dominant tenement has selected a route, he may 
not change it without the consent of the owner of the servient tenement.91 Voet states that 
if the route chosen by the dominant tenement proprietor is burdensome for the owner of 
the servient tenement, the owner of the servient tenement may suggest an alternative 
route which is equally convenient.92 If the owner of the servient estate wishes to use his 
land over which the right of way is registered, for a good reason, for instance to build a 
house or to cultivate crops on the area, then the owner of the servient estate may relocate 
                                            
84
 Van der Merwe CG Sakereg (2
nd
 ed 1989) 482; Van der Merwe CG & De Waal MJ “Servitudes” in Joubert 
WA (ed) LAWSA vol 24 (1) (2000) 321-363 at 333. 
85
 1987 (2) SA 820 (A). 
86
 Nach Investments (Pty) Ltd v Yaldai Investments (Pty) Ltd and Another 1987 (2) SA 820 (A) at 830–832.  
87
 1993 (4) SA 124 (O) 130-131. 
88
 See Van Leeuwen RHR 2 21 6; Nach Investments (Pty) Ltd v Yaldai Investments (Pty) Ltd and Another 
1987 (2) SA 820 (A). 
89
 “The notable example of a servitude simpliciter is servitude via necessitate which an owner can claim 
where it is necessary for him to have ingress or egress from his property by such way in order to reach a 
public road. Such servitude can be altered by the owner of the servient tenement, if he can afford to the 
owner of the dominant tenement another route as convenient as the old one.” Linvestment CC v 
Hammersley and Another [2007] 3 All SA 618 (N) para 30, Wayne v Pope 1960 (3) SA 37 (C), Van 
Rensburg v Coetzee 1979 (4) SA 655 (A). 
90
 D 8 1 9; Voet 8 3 8; Laubscher v Rive & Others (1866) 5 Searle 195; Landman v Daverin (1881-1882) 2 
EDC 1; Divisional Council of Kimberley v Executrix Testamentary of Sheasby (1892) 6 HCG 167 at 173; Smit 
v Russouw & Others 1913 CPD 847; Surveyor-General (Cape) v Estate De Villiers 1923 AD 588 at 619; 
Texas Co (SA) Ltd v Cape Town Municipality 1926 AD 467; Reid v Rocher 1946 WLD 294; Nach 
Investments (Pty) Ltd v Yaldai Investments (Pty) Ltd and Another 1987 (2) SA 820 (A). 
91
 Van der Merwe CG Sakereg (2
nd
 ed 1989) 483 cites Caepolla De Servitutibus 1 7; Christiniaeus In Leges 
Municipales Mechlinienses 14 50; Fuchs v Lys (1889-1890) 3 SAR 36 at 38; Van Heerden v Coetzee & 
Others 1914 AD 167; Gardens Estate Ltd v Lewis 1920 AD 144 at 150. 
92
 Voet 8 3 8; Allen v Colonial Government (1907) 24 SC 1; Rubidge v McCabe & Sons and Others, McCabe 
& Sons and Others v Rubidge 1913 AD 433; Smit v Russouw & Others 1913 CPD 847; Reid v Rocher 1946 
WLD 294 at 300. 
20 
 
the original route, provided that the owner of the dominant estate is not thereby 
prejudiced.93 In Allen v Colonial Government94 the court held that a right of way is not a 
fixed and defined concept like an erf of ground or a farm. Hence, it is a shifting concept 
and the area over which the servitude is located may be moved from time to time.95 
Traditionally, the same flexibility did not apply to servitudes of right of way that have been 
specified. Prior to the judgment in Linvestment, the law required that mutual consent be 
obtained in order to relocate a specified servitude of right of way.96 Voet did not specify 
whether the abovementioned legal principle regarding the relocation of servitudes 
constituted generally applies to a registered servitude of right of way. It is also 
questionable whether the owner of the servient tenement enjoys a similar right, namely to 
relocate a servitude if it becomes burdensome for him, even in the case where the 
servitude has been registered. The following section will focus on how South African case 
law prior to the Supreme Court of Appeal judgment in Linvestment interpreted the common 
law principle as stated by Voet97 in his commentary on the Pandects.  
 
2.3.1.2 Rubidge v McCabe & Sons and Others, McCabe & Sons and Others v Rubidge  
In this case, a right of way was located over the servient tenement belonging to Rubidge 
(defendant).98 McCabe (plaintiff) as owner of the dominant tenement was allowed to make 
use of the right of way. In their declaration, the plaintiffs set out that from time immemorial 
there had run over defendants‟ farm, a common and public road or via vicinalis.99 The 
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owners of the farms now owned by the plaintiffs and other persons were enabled, either on 
foot or horseback, or with stock and vehicles to use the road. The plaintiffs and their 
predecessors in title had for a period exceeding thirty years openly, peacefully, 
continuously and adversely made use of the road.100 In 1887 the parties consented to the 
deviation of the original right of way to run along a line known as the Blaauwkop Road. 
This new road was used in the same manner as had been the original road until 1904. The 
defendant later constructed a weir on the servient tenement without the consent of the 
plaintiffs, which rendered it impossible for the owner of the dominant tenement to exercise 
his entitlements with regard to the drift. The construction of this weir was unlawful. As a 
result of the plaintiffs‟ disapproval of the relocation of the route, a further deviation of the 
course of the road was agreed upon. This road was used in the manner previously 
described until 1911. In 1911, the defendant constructed a second weir without the 
consent of the plaintiff, in such a place that it became impossible to use the drift safely. At 
the time of construction of this weir the defendant, also without consulting the plaintiffs, 
made a further deviation of the route. This drift was also impracticable and unsafe to use 
for the defendant. The defendant proposed to take certain steps which were essential for 
the safe use of this drift. However, the defendant failed to take the necessary steps to 
make the use of the proposed drift safe. Therefore, the plaintiffs protested against the 
defendants‟ wrongful acts and required the restoration of the original road. Subsequently, 
the defendants negotiated with the plaintiffs and offered to make a further deviation of the 
road. The terms and conditions of this offer were embodied in a certain note of 
understanding. This declaration alleged that the plaintiffs accepted this offer but the 
defendant had wrongfully refused to execute the note of understanding or to carry out his 
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obligations. The defendant admitted to some of the allegations made by the plaintiff, but 
denied that he had accepted or agreed to the terms and conditions in the note of 
understanding. Furthermore, the defendant denied that he made an offer to that effect.  
The trial court held that a servient owner will be able to relocate a servitude when 
circumstances arise that will make it advantageous to the servient tenement, provided that 
the servient owner grants an alternative route to the dominant owner that is equally 
suitable. The trial court held that the plaintiffs are entitled to a road along a route which is 
convenient for them to use, in place of a servitude road, which had been rendered 
impracticable by the acts of the appellant. Furthermore, the court a quo ordered the 
defendant to construct along the proposed route a safe, practicable and convenient road 
and drift. As a result of this judgment, the defendants appealed against the judgment 
reached in the trial court and a cross-appeal was brought by the plaintiffs. 
The Appellate Division confirmed the decision of the Cape Provincial Division, but with 
modifications. The legal questions raised in the Appellate Division were whether a 
servitude was established and whether and when the course of the road can be diverted. 
To begin with, Lord De Villiers CJ determined whether a servitude of right of way was 
established between the parties. Lord De Villiers CJ stated that if the plaintiffs were 
entitled to the right of way, they had every ground for objecting to the weir if the effect of its 
construction was to subject them to the risk of mishaps.101 Lord De Villiers CJ came to the 
conclusion that the plaintiffs had acquired a right of way based on the evidence before the 
court. According to Lord De Villiers CJ, the plaintiffs acquired a right of way by prescription 
over the defendant‟s farm to the main road.102 Lord De Villiers CJ said that the mere fact 
that there have been deviations from time to time would not prevent the creation of such a 
servitude.103 It has been contended that the road was a via necessitatis, but the plea did 
not say so.104 According to Lord De Villiers CJ, it is possible that the right of way was first 
used because the owners of the plaintiffs‟ farms had no other means of approach to the 
outer world.105 The original diagrams of the farms showed traces of roads from these 
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farms over the defendant‟s property.106 Therefore, it was not denied that during the long 
intervening period the right had been continuously and peacefully exercised.107 Lord De 
Villiers CJ held that the legal position is that a servitude existed. Lord Solomon J stated 
that the evidence did not establish that there was a public road over the farm, but rather 
that a servitude of right of way existed.108 With regard to the questions whether and when 
the course of the road could be diverted, the Court held that the owners of the dominant 
tenement must exercise their rights in the manner least oppressive to the defendant.109  
Further, as owner of the servient tenement the defendant held the right, after due notice to 
the plaintiffs to divert the course, provided that the diversion did not make the use of the 
road less convenient or more expensive to the plaintiffs.110  
In this case the diversion of the route made by the defendant was unsuitable and 
inconvenient. The defendants interfered with the rights of the plaintiffs by diverting the 
course of the road without consulting them. The defendant should at least have consulted 
with the plaintiff about his intention to relocate the servitude. 
As soon as the plaintiffs became aware of the fact that the weir was being constructed, 
they sought an interview with the defendant in order to inform him of the possible prejudice 
that the construction would cause. It is also clear from the evidence that the plaintiffs had a 
reasonable attitude and they showed every disposition to meet the defendant‟s 
convenience and merely asked for a road over the defendant‟s property which was equally 
suitable to the one they had enjoyed.111 After long negotiations, a new drift was 
constructed and proved quite satisfactory until the defendant constructed another weir. As 
a result of the construction of the weir, the drift became impassable.  
The contracting parties gave consent to the first diversion of the fixed route. However, the 
second route was never mutually agreed upon by the parties. It was stated by Lord De 
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Villiers CJ, that in the absence of a definite agreement, the plaintiffs could not be expected 
to accept a road with these disadvantages.112 
The owner of the servient tenement had credible motives when he interfered with the 
rights of the owners of the dominant tenement without their consent.113 The object of the 
owner of the servient tenement in making the new weir was to obtain further supplies of 
water for irrigation purposes, but the court held that he could not be allowed to attain his 
objects at the expense of the rights of others.114  
The case illustrates that a servient owner will be able to relocate a servitude when 
circumstances arise that will make it advantageous to the servient tenement, provided that 
the servient owner grants an alternative route to the dominant owner that is equally 
suitable. It is also clear from this case that should a landowner relocate a servitude, he 
should give due notice to the dominant owners about his intentions.115 Furthermore, the 
case illustrates that if a right of way is claimed by prescription the fact that there have been 
deviations of the road for the convenience of and with the concurrence of the owners of 
the servient and dominant tenements, does not constitute an interruption of the user, and 
thus does not prevent the acquisition of a servitude.116 It is important to note that the 
servitude was constituted generally and that the servitude was not specified. The court 
confirmed Voet‟s statement without saying anything about a specified right of way. 
 
2.3.1.3 Van Heerden v Coetzee and Others 
The plaintiff, Coetzee, was the owner of the servient tenement Uitkijk; the defendant was 
the owner of the adjoining dominant tenement Weltevreden.117 Initially the two tenements 
belonged to one Van Wijk. Van Wijk sold Weltevreden in 1897. On the diagram attached to 
the title deed of Weltevreden was a watercourse running through both Weltevreden and 
Uitkijk with the following words: “[t]he dam A is the property of the owner of Weltevreden, 
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who has the right to a water furrow through the veld of Uitkijk, while he also had the right to 
take building materials in the veld of Uitkijk, to repair the dam.”118 However, it stated that 
he could not make the dam so large that the water rises in the cultivated land of Uitkijk. 
Before the sale of Weltevreden, Van Wijk had built a dam at a spot (A). This dam broke in 
1898 and was repaired. It broke again in 1901 and after that was not repaired. 
The plaintiff bought Uitkijk in 1903 and the defendant acquired Weltevreden in 1908. In his 
declaration, the plaintiff maintained that the defendant had wrongfully made and repaired a 
new dam and furrow.  
The plaintiff sought a declaratory order requiring the defendant to remove the new dam 
and to fill up all holes, trenches and furrows made by him. The plaintiff sought an interdict 
prohibiting the defendant from making or using any dam or furrow on the plaintiff‟s farm 
other than the dam at point A. The legal question raised in this case was whether the 
owner of the dominant tenement is entitled to discard the original bank and erect another 
bank.119 
The trial court held that the owner of the dominant tenement could not relocate the 
servitude agreed upon.120 It was as a result of this decision that the defendant appealed 
against the court‟s decision. The defendant was ordered to remove the new dam made by 
him and to cease using the water therein and the furrow.121  
The Appellate Division held that a servitude must be construed in the manner which is 
least onerous to the servient tenement.122 The court stated that where a servitude is given 
in general terms and the owner of the dominant tenement has chosen the spot where he 
will exercise it, he has made his selection and cannot change it afterwards.123 
It was stated in Van Heerden v Coetzee124 that the building of the new dam has made the 
servitude more onerous because more material will be required for building and repairing 
two dams rather than one, a longer furrow will be required, a longer right of way will be 
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necessary, the new dam is causing the stream to develop into a donga and it is altering 
the flow of the donga. The judge also stated that where a particular dam is indicated as the 
subject of the servitude, the owner of the servient tenement is entitled to say that the site 
of the dam shall not be altered without his consent even if it is not shown that the alteration 
would prejudice him.125 As owner of the land, he is the person to decide whether any 
departure from the terms of the servitude shall be allowed.126 It was held that the owner of 
the servient tenement is entitled to hold the owner of the dominant tenement strictly to the 
terms of the instrument creating the servitude, and if the element of prejudice is to be 
introduced at all, the onus of proving such prejudice does not lie with him.127 
This case illustrates the importance of the rule that a servitude must be construed in the 
manner which is least onerous to the servient tenement. Furthermore, the case illustrates 
that where a servitude is given in general terms and the owner of the dominant tenement 
has chosen the spot where he will exercise it, he has made his selection and cannot 
change it afterwards.128 Similar to the previous case, this case confirms the principles of 
Voet but it is silent regarding a specified servitude of right of way. 
 
2.3.1.4 Gardens Estate Ltd v Lewis 
In 1877 the defendant‟s predecessor in title, PJ Kotze, sold and transferred to the plaintiff‟s 
predecessor in title, J de Smidt, a portion of his land.
129
 The transfer was stated to be 
subject to certain conditions which read as follows: “PJ Kotze reserves to himself six feet 
of ground on both sides of the pipes and twenty decimal seventy five feet by forty five feet 
at the heads of spring as shown on the diagram.”
130
 It also stated that J de Smidt had a 
right of free access either to walk or drive across the reserve as far as the pipes were laid 
and also to lay pipes at any time across said reserve without disturbing or injuring the 
pipes of the proprietor of the reserve. Furthermore, it stated that J de Smidt would refrain 
from digging around the springs and making use of the water from the springs.  
                                            
125
 Van Heerden v Coetzee and Others 1914 AD 167 at 172. 
126
 Van Heerden v Coetzee and Others 1914 AD 167 at 173. 
127
 Van Heerden v Coetzee and Others 1914 AD 167 at 173. 
128
 Van Heerden v Coetzee and Others 1914 AD 167 at 169. 
129
 1920 AD 144. 
130
 Gardens Estate Ltd v Lewis 1920 AD 144 at 147. 
27 
 
The dispute related to the meaning of the condition mentioned above. The 
(appellant/plaintiff) Gardens Estate, who was the successor in title to J de Smidt, claimed 
to be the owner of the whole portion, including the land on which the spring and the pipes 
were laid. The appellant maintained that the defendant, the successor in title of PJ Kotze, 
was only entitled to a servitude of aqueductus. The defendant contended that he was the 
owner of the area reserved and that the right of access of J de Smidt mentioned in the 
transfer was merely a personal servitude in favour of J de Smidt which could not be 
transmitted.  
The original pipeline was relocated by the Gardens Estate Syndicate without the consent 
of the defendant and without any notice to him. When this came to the knowledge of the 
defendant he protested against it and he re-laid the pipes along the original course, 
maintaining that as owner of the ground he was entitled to do so. According to him, the 
personal servitude in favour of J de Smidt was no longer in force. 
The legal question was whether the ownership in the reserved portion remained in the 
defendant or whether it passed to the plaintiff, in which case the defendant only acquired a 
servitutal right. A further question was whether the plaintiffs had the right to relocate the 
pipeline. The trial court held that the intention and effect of the reservation in the Deed of 
Transfer from PJ Kotze to J de Smidt, was to retain in PJ Kotze ownership of the portion 
reserved, subject to a servitude of access in favour of J de Smidt and his successors in 
title.
131
 As a result of this order, the plaintiff noted an appeal, and the defendant cross-
appealed to that portion of the order in which it was held that the right of access of J de 
Smidt passed to his successors in title.
132
 
In the Appellate Division, the court held that it followed that what PJ Kotze sold and what 
he transferred to J de Smidt was the entire portion of land, including the reserved area.
133
 
This was not only clear from the extent of land transferred, but also from the deed itself.
134
 
In it PJ Kotze declared “[t]hat he had truly and legally sold [the property] and that he did by 
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these presents cede and transfer in full and free property to and on behalf of J de Smidt a 
certain piece of ground”.
135
 
The respondent contended that the deed must be read as a whole. If read as a whole it 
became clear that although in the first portion of the document PJ Kotze purported to have 
sold and transferred to J de Smidt the whole portion, including the reserved area, the 
language used in the condition showed that PJ Kotze intended to retain the ownership in 
the strip for himself and merely to create a personal servitude on it in favour of J de Smidt. 
The judge argued that if it was the intention of PJ Kotze to retain ownership in the specific 
area, he should not have passed transfer of the whole.136 The judge also mentioned that if 
it was the intention of PJ Kotze to exclude the reserved area, he should not have included 
the reserved area in the portion transferred.137 In addition, it was said that it was too late to 
attempt to rectify the Deed of Transfer.138 
With regard to the second legal question, namely whether the plaintiffs were allowed to 
relocate the original pipeline, the court held that the Gardens Estate Syndicate had no right 
to do so.139 The court drew a clear distinction between a duly constituted servitude and a 
servitude created in general.140 The court held that a specified servitude could only be 
relocated by obtaining mutual consent.141 Voet states that the owner of the dominant 
tenement has the choice of where to lay the line, which must be exercised civiliter 
modo.142 Once he has exercised his election, the owner of the dominant estate cannot 
relocate the servitude. According to Voet, the owner of the servient estate may relocate 
the servitude provided that the newly elected route is as convenient as the former route.143 
The judge stated that when Voet speaks of the owner of the servient tenement having a 
right to point out another route to that which has been agreed upon, he speaks of 
servitudes created simpliciter.144 It followed that the Gardens Estate Syndicate had no right 
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to relocate the pipeline without obtaining the consent from the owner of the dominant 
tenement.  
It is clear from this judgment that the owner of the servient estate will not be allowed to 
relocate a registered or a specified servitude of right of way. If the servitude is defined ab 
initio, it can only be changed by mutual consent.145 If the servitude is undefined, the owner 
of the dominant tenement may choose a particular route.146 Once he has chosen a route, 
he may not change the route without obtaining the necessary consent of the owner of the 
servient tenement. The servient owner may require the owner of the dominant land to 
follow another equally convenient route, if the route chosen by the dominant owner is 
particularly onerous to him.147 
 
2.3.1.5 Linvestment CC v Hammersley and Another 
The Linvestment case concerns a praedial servitude as discussed in 2.2 above.148 The 
appellant‟s property was subjected to two registered servitudes, namely a defined right of 
way as reflected in the diagrams registered in the Deeds Office,149 in favour of the first 
respondent‟s property. The appellant had given notice to the first respondent of his 
intention to amend the course of the servitude. As a result of the respondent‟s refusal to 
accept the alternative route, the appellant claimed an order declaring that he was entitled 
to substitute the proposed servitude‟s route for the existing route. The traditional legal 
principle regarding the relocation of servitudes, as stated in Gardens Estate,150 is that the 
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location of a specified or definite servitude could only be altered by mutual consent. The 
legal question raised in Linvestment was “[w]hether the owner of a servient tenement can 
in his own volition, change the route of a defined right of way registered against the title 
deeds of property.”151 The court a quo decided this question in the negative. In order to 
support its decision, the judge in Linvestment relied on the Gardens Estate152 judgment in 
which the court held that in order for the owner of the servient tenement to alter a 
registered praedial servitude, he must first obtain the consent of the dominant owner 
before effecting the intended alterations.153 The court a quo also referred to Ex parte 
Florida Hills Townships Ltd154 in which Rumpff JA said that once the praedial servitude has 
been legally established, no court has the jurisdiction to come to the assistance of a party 
merely because he wants the terms of the servitude changed for his own benefit. 
Furthermore, Madondo JA relied on Ex parte Uvongo Borough Council and Another155 and 
Ex parte Rovian Trust (Pty) Ltd156 where it was held that in a situation where the right of 
another owner of property is endorsed against the title of the property, such a right cannot 
be destroyed without the consent of the owner. Madondo JA also relied on Ex Parte 
Optimal Property Solutions CC157 which stated that the one who objects to the relocation 
of the servitude does not have to motivate his objection or demonstrate that his objection 
is not unreasonable. Additionally, it was said that it is not the function of the courts to 
unilaterally and without the consent of the affected party, make or break the contract.158 
Madondo JA also said that the unilateral alteration of the registered servitude will infringe 
upon the proprietary rights of the owner of the dominant tenement.159 Granting an order 
which allows the unilateral relocation of a servitude will defeat the purpose and effect of 
registration.160 It would also complicate the meaning, interpretation and effect of a real 
right.161 He also said that the approval of such relocation would mean that the owner of the 
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servient tenement would continue to enjoy the exclusive use of his property and the right 
to do with his property as he pleased, despite the existence of a registered limited real 
right over his property.162 
The court a quo decision was decided in line with the Gardens Estate case, namely that 
the servient owner should first obtain mutual consent before he may relocate the servitude 
registered over the servient tenement.163 
 
2.4 The Supreme Court of Appeal decision in Linvestment CC v 
Hammersley and Another 
The traditional legal principle regarding the relocation of servitudes, as stated in Gardens 
Estate Ltd v Lewis164 is that a specified or definite servitude could only be relocated by 
mutual consent. As the analysis of earlier case law above demonstrates, this principle had 
been accepted as applicable law in South Africa for more than 80 years.165 
The legal question raised in Linvestment was “[w]hether the owner of a servient tenement 
can in his own volition change the route of a defined right of way registered against the title 
deeds of property”.166 As was indicated above, the trial court decided, in line with the 
position established in earlier case law, that the owner of the servient tenement may not 
change the route of a specified right of way unilaterally. 
The Supreme Court of Appeal in Linvestment overturned the decision of the trial court and 
decided the legal question in the affirmative, holding that the owner of a servient tenement 
can unilaterally change the route of a defined right of way. In doing so, a long-established 
precedent relating to servitudes based on the grounds of convenience and equity was 
overturned. The South African legal system recognises the doctrine of stare decisis and 
the court in Linvestment acknowledged the Gardens Estate167 judgment. The Supreme 
Court of Appeal mentioned that unless there is a valid reason to distinguish or depart from 
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the conclusion in Gardens Estate the appeal must fail.168 In the end the court decided that 
there were valid reasons for departing from the traditional position. The problem with the 
Linvestment judgment is that the court made a striking change to the common law on the 
basis of arguably insufficient historical and comparative argument. 
The court relied on historical, comparative and policy reasons to justify the departure from 
the traditional common law principle. In the first place, it was inferred in Linvestment that 
the court in Gardens Estate may have been mistaken as to the state of South African law 
relating to servitudes and that for this reason the traditional legal principles regarding 
relocation of servitudes needed to be reconsidered.169 The court decided that Gardens 
Estate was founded on the unstated but incorrect premise that the law expounded by Voet 
correctly reflected the common law of South Africa at the time when the judgment was 
written in 1920.170 Heher AJ considered historical observations in Linvestment,171 with the 
purpose to ascertain what might have happened between the time when Voet wrote his 
commentary and the time of the Gardens Estate case. The court provided historical 
arguments to justify its reconsideration of the traditional legal principles regarding 
relocation of servitudes as stated in the Gardens Estate case. The court in Linvestment172 
referred to a historical draft of a new draft code of law by Professor JM Kemper of Leiden, 
which was not available to the judges at the time of the Gardens Estate judgment.173 
According to Heher AJ, this draft was an authoritative statement of the Roman-Dutch 
private law at the date of the British occupation of the Cape and it contained principles 
which should have been applied in Gardens Estate.174 The court concluded that it would 
be wrong to adhere blindly to an inference drawn from the views of Voet expressed at the 
end of the 17th century and that the additional information it had available indicated that a 
different approach could be followed. However, as is indicated below, the court‟s 
assessment of and reliance on the Kemper draft was misplaced. 
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The historical reasons for the decision are insufficient because Heher AJ relied on a draft 
civil code which never formed part of the received Roman-Dutch law in South Africa, while 
rejecting arguments based on a text of Voet, which does form part of received Roman-
Dutch law. The Linvestment court stated that the court in Gardens Estate was mistaken as 
to the state of South African law relating to servitudes when the judgment was written and 
that the court should have applied the Roman Dutch principles set out in the draft civil 
code drafted by Professor JM Kemper in 1816. However, the legal historical argumentation 
upon which the court based this conclusion is problematic. The court‟s reliance on the 
abovementioned draft and the conclusions the court reached on the applicable law 
consequently requires further investigation in view of the principles of reception and the 
state of the law at the time when Roman-Dutch law was received in the Cape. 
The laws of Holland were received in the Cape during the period of Dutch colonisation in 
1652-1795 (as well as briefly during the period of 1803-1806, but no real legal 
development occurred during this short time).175 In 1809 Roman-Dutch law was abolished 
in Holland.176 When the Roman-Dutch law was abolished, the Wetboek Napoleon ingerigt 
voor het Koninkrijk Holland came into force.177 In 1811 it was replaced by the Code 
Civil.178 In 1815 it was decided to replace the Code Civil with a truly Dutch Code.179 
Professor JM Kemper was the person principally charged with the preparation of the Civil 
Code.180 Professor JM Kemper‟s draft civil code of 1820 (a revised version of an earlier 
draft of 1816) amounted to an embodiment of pure Roman-Dutch law in its final stage of 
development.181 However, the draft civil code of Professor JM Kemper was rejected by the 
legislature because the Belgian members wanted to retain the Code Civil.182 When 
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Belgium became independent it was too late to start all over again.183 The Dutch Burgerlijk 
Wetboek of 1838 was consequently substantially modelled on the Code Civil.184  
If the abovementioned historical development is taken into consideration it becomes clear 
that Heher AJ could not rely on the 1816 draft of the Dutch civil code of Professor JM 
Kemper as authority, since it never formed part of the 17th and 18th century Roman-Dutch 
law received in South Africa prior to 1806. Secondly, the draft civil code formed part of the 
post-Napoleonic development of Dutch law, which was no longer Roman-Dutch law in the 
sense that we inherited it.185 The Code Civil brought an end to Roman-Dutch law in its 
country of origin.186 Thirdly, the draft civil code of Professor JM Kemper was never official 
law in the Netherlands.187 
The court further relied on comparative law to reach the conclusion that servitudes may be 
relocated if it is in the interest of fairness, equity and justice.188 Additionally, section 173 of 
the 1996 Constitution which entitles the courts to develop the common law was relied upon 
in deciding to change the situation. The problem is that the comparative sources referred 
to are mostly secondary, without any contextual evidence to show how and why the 
foreign jurisdictions follow a flexible approach to the relocation of specified servitudes. In 
chapter 3 I reconsider the evidence from a number of the foreign jurisdictions mentioned 
by the court (the Netherlands, Germany, Scotland, the US and England) to assess the 
weight of the foreign law relied on by the court.  
Heher AJ also stated that he was persuaded that the interests of justice required a change 
in South African established law on the subject.189 The Supreme Court of Appeal stated 
that it would be indefensible to allow the rigid enforcement of a servitude in which the 
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sanctity of the contract benefits neither party, but on the contrary, operated to the prejudice 
of one of them.190 In chapter 5 I assess the policy reasons for the decision. 
The court therefore granted the declaratory order sought, namely that an existing servitude 
right of way may be altered provided that the servient owner will be materially 
inconvenienced in the use of his property if the status quo is maintained, that the 
relocation will not prejudice the owner of the dominant tenement, and that the servient 
owner pays all costs incurred in the relocation of the servitude.191  
 
2.5 Conclusion 
The South African legal position regarding the relocation of servitudes can be summarised 
as follows: The traditional legal principle regarding the relocation of servitudes, as stated in 
Gardens Estate v Lewis,192 is that a specified or definite servitude could only be relocated 
by mutual consent. The importance of the Linvestment193 case is that the court decided 
that the owner of a servient tenement can unilaterally change the route of a defined right of 
way. In doing so the court overturned a long-established precedent relating to servitudes 
based on the grounds of convenience and equity. An existing servitude of right of way may 
be altered provided that the servient owner will be materially inconvenienced in the use of 
his property if the status quo is maintained, that the relocation will not prejudice the owner 
of the dominant tenement, and that the servient owner pays all costs incurred in the 
relocation of the servitude.194 
The judgment creates uncertainty in law and confirms the possibility for courts to trump 
long-established principles. Although the policy reasons for the decision were strong, the 
court could have provided more comprehensive comparative justification, while its 
historical argument was misplaced. The comparative analysis can be regarded as 
problematic because Heher AJ relied on secondary sources in order to support his 
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argument without discussing their comparative context.195 The following chapter aims to 
provide a more contextual comparative legal background analysis of the Dutch, German, 
US, Scots and English legal positions pertaining to the unilateral relocation of a specified 
servitude of right of way. 
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Chapter 3: Comparative Analysis 
3.1 Introduction 
Section 39(1)(c) of the Constitution provides that, when developing the common law, the 
courts may consider foreign law. The court in Linvestment CC v Hammersley1 
(Linvestment) decided the case in line with the international trend to follow a more flexible 
legal approach which allows for unilateral relocation of even specified servitudes. The 
problem with the methodology of this decision is that the court never did a proper, in-depth 
legal background analysis of foreign law in order to support its argument. Instead of using 
primary sources, the court used only secondary sources, without any discussion of their 
comparative value or context. In the absence of a more contextual analysis that reveals 
the reasons for and the context within which foreign jurisdictions follow a more flexible 
approach, the court‟s comparative reasoning is therefore insufficient. 
The aim of this chapter is to do a more contextual analysis of the Dutch, German, US, 
Scots and English legal position pertaining to the unilateral relocation of a specified 
servitude of right of way.2 
 
3.2 Dutch law 
In Linvestment the court stated that the Gardens Estate decision was mistaken as to the 
state of South African law relating to servitudes when the judgment was written and that 
the court should have applied the Roman Dutch principles set out in the draft civil code of 
Professor JM Kemper in 1816. The Roman Dutch principles set out in article 1317 of the 
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draft civil code of Professor JM Kemper in 1816 regarding the unilateral relocation of 
servitudes state that the owner of the servient estate may not act in a manner that will 
lessen the utility of the servitude.3 Furthermore, it provides that the owner of the servient 
estate may only relocate the servitude if the original location of the servitude becomes 
burdensome for him or if the original location of the servitude prohibits him from making 
necessary reparation to the servient estate.4 Article 1188 of the 1820 draft civil code 
retained the same wording as the 1816 draft civil code of Professor JM Kemper. The draft 
civil code of Professor JM Kemper was never official law in the Netherlands and did not 
influence the Dutch Civil Code.5  
The Dutch law of servitudes is regulated by the Dutch Civil Code.6 Article 739 of the old 
Dutch Civil Code provides that the owner of the servient estate may not act in a way that 
will lessen the utility of the easement. Additionally, it provides that the owner of the 
servient estate may not make any changes to the easement. Article 739 also states that 
the owner of the servient estate may not relocate the easement and that, if he should 
                                            
3
 Kemper JM, Bijleveld C & Reuvens JE Ontwerp van het Burgerlijk Wetboek voor het Koninkrijk der 
Nederlanden (1816). 
4
 Kemper JM, Bijleveld C & Reuvens JE Ontwerp van het Burgerlijk Wetboek voor het Koninkrijk der 
Nederlanden (1816). 
5
 Kemper JM, Bijleveld C & Reuvens JE Ontwerp van het Burgerlijk Wetboek voor het Koninkrijk der 
Nederlanden (1816). Professor JM Kemper‟s “Ontwerp of 1820 (a revised version of an earlier draft of 1816) 
constituted a distillation of pure Roman-Dutch law in its final stage of development.” During the next nine 
years, Parliament worked on a new code. The Dutch Burgerlijk Wetboek of 1838 was substantially modelled 
on the Code Civil even though it was by no means a copy of it. The new code was accepted in Parliament 
and would have obtained force of law on 1 February 1831. However, by that time Belgium was in revolt and 
the introduction of the code was postponed. Parliament decided to rework the 1830 draft and did not return 
to the 1816 and 1820 drafts by Professor JM Kemper. Accordingly, the Dutch Civil Code of 1838 remained 
very close to the 1804 Napoleonic code (Code Civil). See Lesaffer R “A short legal history of the 
Netherlands” in Taekema HS (ed) Understanding Dutch Law (2004) 31-58 at 57. It appears as if the 
provisions pertaining to the unilateral relocation of servitudes in the Code Civil were adopted in the old Dutch 
Civil Code (1838). Article 701 of the Code Civil states that a servient owner may do nothing to diminish the 
use of it or to make it less convenient. Therefore, the servient owner may not relocate the servitude to a 
place different from that where it was assigned initially. However, if the initial location of the servitude 
becomes more onerous to the servient owner or if it prevents him from making advantageous repairs, the 
servient owner may relocate the servitude, provided that the new route is convenient for the dominant owner. 
The dominant owner may not refuse the relocation of the servitude. See Crabb JH The French Civil Code 
Revised Edition (as amended to 1 July 1994) (1995) 148. See Chapter 2 section 2.6. 
6
 Also known as Het Burgerlijk Wetboek. The Dutch Burgerlijk Wetboek of 1838 entered into force on 1 
October 1838. See Fontein A “A century of codification in Holland” (1939) 21 J Comp L 83-88; Meijer G & 
Meijer SYTH “Influence of the Code Civil in the Netherlands” (2002) 14 Eur Jnl Law & Econ 227-236 at 230-
231; Lesaffer R “A short legal history of the Netherlands” in Taekema HS (ed) Understanding Dutch Law 
(2004) 31-58 at 57. 
39 
 
relocate the servitude, he should do so without prejudicing the owner of the dominant 
estate.  
Questions which arose when interpreting this provision was whether the owner of the 
servient estate may relocate the servitude unilaterally, without obtaining the necessary 
consent from the owner of the dominant estate, or whether it is a prerequisite that he had 
to obtain the necessary consent from the owner of the dominant estate, or whether he 
should seek a declaratory order from the court in the case where the owner of the servient 
estate refuses to provide the necessary consent.7 The influential commentary of Asser 
stated that if the owner of the servient estate made any changes to the location of the 
servitude and if such relocation is not in conflict with the rights of the owner of the 
dominant estate, the holder of the servitude should accept such relocation, unless he is 
prejudiced by it.8 The burden of proof will rest on the owner of the dominant estate to 
prove that such relocation will interfere with his servitutal rights.9 If the owner of the 
dominant estate refuses to provide the necessary consent, then the owner of the servient 
estate should seek a declaratory order from the court.10 The servient owner will have to 
prove that the dominant owner will not be prejudiced by such relocation.11 
Article 5:73 paragraph 2 of the new Dutch Civil Code now states that the contents of the 
easement and the manner in which the contracting parties should exercise their rights are 
determined by the instrument of establishment and, to the extent that the instrument of 
establishment is silent, by local usage.12 Furthermore, it is also said that in order to 
exercise the easement, the owner of the servient property may allocate a part of the 
property other than that on which the easement would be exercised in accordance with 
article 5:73 paragraph 1, provided that such relocation is possible without reducing the 
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right of the owner of the dominant estate.13 The owner of the servient estate will be held 
liable for any expenses resulting from the relocation of the servitude.14 The Dutch 
Supreme Court has stated that the owner of the dominant estate may be compelled by the 
court to cooperate with the owner of the servient estate.15 Even though it is not a 
prerequisite that judicial consent should be provided, the owner of the servient estate may 
only relocate the servitude unilaterally, without having to obtain the consent from the 
owner of the dominant estate, if such relocation is reasonable and if such relocation will 
not lessen the utility of the easement for the holder of the servitude.16 If there is any doubt 
pertaining to the reasonableness of the relocation, the owner of the servient estate should 
obtain a declaratory order from the court and this would provide him with the necessary 
consent to relocate the servitude.17 
The court may modify or terminate an easement upon the claim of the owner of the 
servient estate-18  The court may only modify the easement in accordance with standards 
of reasonableness and fairness, if there are unforeseen circumstances which are of such a 
nature that the owner of the servient estate cannot be required to maintain the easement 
unchanged.19 The court may also modify or terminate an easement if twenty years have 
passed since the easement was created, and if the existence of the easement is contrary 
to the public interest.20  
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Article 5:80 provides that if it has become permanently or temporarily impossible to 
exercise the easement or where the interest of the owner of the dominant property has 
been diminished, the court may alter the contents of an easement upon the demand of the 
owner of the dominant estate, to such an extent that the possibility of the exercise of the 
servitutal rights is restored.21 This provision is subject to the requirement that the change 
can be imposed upon the owner of the servient estate in accordance with standards of 
reasonableness and fairness.22 
Additionally, article 5:81 paragraph 1 of the Dutch Civil Code now provides that the court 
may allow a claim in accordance with article 5:78 of the Dutch Civil Code, subject to the 
conditions to be determined by the court.23 Article 5:81 paragraph 2 provides that if one of 
the properties is encumbered with a limited right, the claim will only be allowed if the holder 
of the limited right has been joined in the action. The interests of the holder of the limited 
right must be taken into consideration in determining whether the requirements of article 
5:78 have been complied with.24 
 
3.3 German law 
Paragraph 1023(1) of the German Civil Code states that if the use of a (specified) 
servitude is restricted to a part of the servient piece of land, the owner may demand the 
removal of the use to another location, which is equally suitable for the holder of the 
right.25 The owner of the servient estate may only relocate the servitude if the use on the 
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present location is onerous for him.26 A servitude will be regarded as “onerous” when it 
creates more than a mere inconvenience for the servient owner.27 A temporary impairment 
is an insufficient ground to relocate a servitude.28 The impairment of the current position 
for the servient owner should not be weighed against the impact on the holder of the 
servitude because there should not be any impact; relocation of a specified servitude of 
right of way is only allowed to an equally suitable position.29 An alternative position that is 
equally suitable for the holder of the servitude must exist.30 The alternative position must 
be on the same property, even if it is a part of the property that was acquired after the 
servitude was created.31 The servitude holder may choose a suitable alternative position 
when there is more than one suitable location available.32 The owner of the servient estate 
will have to bear the costs of removal and will have to pay in advance.33  
Paragraph 1023(1) applies in situations where the part of the piece of land to which the 
use is limited is determined by legal transaction. The right to the removal cannot be 
excluded or limited by legal transaction.34 Paragraph 1023 is not applicable if the servitude 
was constituted generally.35 The servient owner is entitled to use self-help and he has the 
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right to demand the relocation of the servitude but if an agreement cannot be reached he 
must seek a declaratory order from court.36 If the owner of the dominant tenement and the 
owner of the servient tenement cannot reach an agreement, the servient owner has to 
approach the court. 
 
3.4 US law 
This section of the chapter will focus on the US law governing servitudes. Issues often 
arise regarding the interpretation of the scope of easements. The exact content of the 
rights entrenched by the easement is often at issue, especially when the use rights 
interfere with the interests sought to be retained by the owner of the servient estate.37 One 
of the issues that arise in the interpretation of the scope of easements is whether the 
easement can be relocated by either the easement owner or the owner of the servient 
estate.38 Traditionally, courts in the US have not allowed the owner of the servient estate 
to relocate the easement unilaterally without obtaining the necessary consent from the 
easement owner, on the ground that the easement holder bargained for a fixed location 
and that any changes that might reduce the utility and value of the easement cannot be 
authorised without the agreement of the easement owner.39 Until the late 1990s, the nearly 
uniform majority rule in the American common law was that the owner of the servient 
estate could not relocate an easement once it had been specified.40 In Davis v Bruk41 the 
court stated that in the majority of jurisdictions the rule is that once the location of an 
easement is established, the location may not be changed thereafter by either the owner 
of the dominant estate or the owner of the servient estate, unless consent has been 
obtained from both parties to relocate the route. However, where the document creating 
the easement contains an express or implied grant of reservation of power to relocate, 
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then the servitude may be relocated without having to obtain the necessary consent.42 In 
all other instances, the owner of the servient estate could only relocate the easement with 
the permission of the easement owner. Some courts still retain this view.43 
It is important to note Louisiana‟s uniqueness because it was one of the first states in the 
US to provide a flexible approach pertaining to the relocation of a specified servitude of 
right of way.44 The Louisiana Civil Code does not contain any equivalent to the US 
common law‟s changed conditions doctrine.45 The US common law‟s changed conditions 
doctrine holds that servitudes are unenforceable when circumstances have changed since 
the creation of the obligation so that it is no longer possible to secure the originally 
intended benefits.46 In Louisiana47 and in France,48 praedial servitudes are only terminated 
in narrowly defined circumstances.49 In Louisiana, article 748 of the Louisiana Civil Code, 
which permits the unilateral relocation of a specified servitude or right of way, and article 
695, which provides for the relocation of a specified servitude of right of way of an 
enclosed estate, are “the sole judicial, safety valves for the accommodation of a servitude 
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holder‟s right with a servient owner‟s desire to adapt to changing economic and social 
conditions”.50  
Louisiana‟s law of servitudes is derived largely from the French Civil Code, also known as 
the Code Napoléon, whose servitude provisions are indebted to Roman law.51 Louisiana‟s 
experience with the relocation of servitudes began with the adoption of the Louisiana 
Digest of 1808.52 When the drafters of the Digest created article 46 of Book II, Title IV of 
the 1808 Digest, they copied article 701 of the 1804 Code Napoléon.53 Louisiana accepted 
the default principle of the Code Napoléon, namely that a conventional servitude would be 
defined by two contradictory traits.54 Article 701 of the Code Napoléon states, on the one 
hand, that the owner of the servient estate is not entitled to diminish the utility and 
convenience of the servitude to the owner of the dominant estate by changing the nature 
of the servient estate without justifiable reasons.55 On the other hand, article 701 states 
that a servitude is also subject to discretionary judicial modification. The owner of the 
servient estate can only relocate the servitude if the initial servitude had become 
burdensome to the owner of the servient estate and if the initial servitude prevented the 
owner of the servient estate from making some advantageous repairs.56 The servient 
owner can only do the above if he can provide an alternative location which is equally 
convenient for the owner of the dominant estate.57 According to Batiza,58 the Louisiana 
Digest was directly copied from the French Civil Code of 1804 and the Project of 1800. 
The legislature in Louisiana expanded and revised the Digest of 1808 and created the 
Louisiana Civil Code of 1825.59 When creating the Louisiana Civil Code of 1825, the 
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legislature copied article 64 and renumbered the Louisiana Civil Code dealing with the 
relocation of servitudes to article 773.60 When the legislature adopted the Louisiana Civil 
Code of 1870, the legislature copied the early codified versions derived from the Code 
Napoléon and renumbered the provision regarding the relocation of servitudes to article 
777.61 
In 1825, the legislature also adopted one more servitude relocation article, namely article 
699 (later article 703 of the Louisiana Civil Code).62 This specific article concentrates on 
the right of passage and of way in cases where the specific parcel of land does not have 
any access to public routes.63 This article provides that if the owner of the dominant 
tenement and the owner of the servient tenement have agreed on a route serving the 
landlocked property, it may not be changed by the enclosed estate owner, but may be 
relocated by the owner of the servient estate if the original route has become a burden to 
him, provided that he can provide an alternative route which is equally convenient.64 The 
main difference between article 777 and 703 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 is that 
article 703 did not require that the owner of the servient estate should prove that the 
original location has become more burdensome.65 The principles relating to the relocation 
of servitudes have emerged more or less unchanged in the current version of the 
Louisiana Civil Code, which has undergone extensive revision since the beginning of 
1977.66 Article 703 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 has been revised and has been 
renumbered to article 695 in the Louisiana Civil Code of 1980.67 Article 695 provides the 
owner of a servient estate with the same relocation rights provided for in article 703 of the 
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1870 Civil Code.68 The only change is that the owner of the servient estate, who wishes to 
relocate the easement, should pay for the relocation himself.69 
Revised article 748 of the current Louisiana Civil Code provides essentially the same 
rights that existed under article 777 of the 1870 Louisiana Civil Code.70 A key difference 
that exists between the new article 748 and its 19th century predecessor is that the second 
paragraph of article 77771 was suppressed by article 748.72 Article 777‟s second paragraph 
prohibited the servient owner from making any alteration in the condition of the servient 
estate or moving the servitude to a different place.73 This second paragraph was 
inconsistent with the third paragraph of article 777.74 The third paragraph of article 777 
authorised the relocation of a servitude to an equally convenient place when the initial 
assignment of the servitude had become burdensome or in circumstances where 
advantageous repairs were needed.75 Apart from an updating of language, the only other 
change is the addition of an express requirement, namely that the servient owner bear the 
expenses of relocation.76 This requirement was implicit in article 777 of the 1870 Louisiana 
Civil Code and is implicit in Scots law as well.77 Article 74878 provides that the servient 
owner may do nothing to diminish the use of the servitude. If the initial location of the 
servitude has become more burdensome for the servient owner or if it should prevent him 
from making useful improvements, the servient owner may provide another equally 
convenient location.79 The dominant owner is bound to accept the alternative route. The 
owner of the servient tenement should pay the necessary expenses.80 
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According to Lovett,81 the first noteworthy aspect of Louisiana‟s judicial experience with 
regard to the relocation of servitudes is that there are no reported 19th century decisions. 
Lovett82 states that the absence of 19th century decisions pertaining to the relocation of 
servitudes illustrates that neighbours have strong incentives to reach extrajudicial 
compromises. In order to illustrate his point, he states that a servient owner may not seek 
to relocate a servitude without consent, unless the original location of the servitude poses 
a serious development obstacle and if the owner of the servient estate can provide a route 
which is equally convenient.83 Similarly, Lovett84 states that a servitude holder might not 
reject a request from the owner of the servient estate to relocate a route because he may 
fear that a court might order relocation anyway. Furthermore, Lovett85 adds that if the 
owner of the dominant estate should need the consent of the servient owner to relocate 
the servitude, he might agree to the relocation request of the owner of the servient estate 
in the hope that it would earn him a reciprocal favour in the future. The first Louisiana 
decision dealing with the relocation of servitudes was reported in 1928.86   
It was not until the 1970s and 1980s, during Louisiana‟s Civilian Renaissance, that the 
courts in Louisiana brought clarity to the interpretation of the Civil Code‟s servitude 
relocation articles.87 The process of clarification began in 1970, when the Louisiana 
Supreme Court realised the significance of article 77788 in Denegre v Louisiana Public 
Service Commission89 (Denegre). This case was an appeal against the judgment of the 
19th Judicial District Court, which affirmed the action of the Public Service Commission 
denying the petitioner‟s application for removal and relocation of certain switch tracks that 
were situated on land recorded in the petitioner‟s name (Denegre). Denegre v Louisiana 
Public Service Commission90 concerned a request by the owner of the servient estate 
(Denegre) to relocate several conventional servitudes providing railroad rights of way, so 
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that Denegre could better utilise his property for commercial development.91 The railroad 
carriers had no objection to the relocation of the tracks, but the neighbours and customers 
of the railroads did object.92 The railroad carriers did not object, provided that certain 
conditions were met by Denegre. The conditions were the following: that none of the 
parties served by the existing switch tracks are adversely affected by the proposed 
removal and relocation, that all property owners with an interest consented to such 
removal and relocation and that the petitioner (Denegre) will carry all the expenses.93 The 
Commission, with one member dissenting, denied Denegre‟s request. On appeal to the 
District Court, this action was affirmed.94 Denegre asserted that he had the authority to 
change the servitude of passage if the usage of the current servitude of passage is 
inconvenient and burdensome and proved that he can provide a place which is convenient 
as the original route. For this view, Denegre relied on articles 703, 753 and 777 of the 
Louisiana Civil Code.95 However, the majority held that the articles of the Louisiana Civil 
Code cited by the petitioner were without application.96 Article 703 states that the place of 
the servitude may be changed by the owner of the servient estate to an alternative place 
which is less inconvenient to him, provided that the owner of the servient estate can 
provide a route which is equally convenient. The majority held that article 703 was 
irrelevant because it dealt with praedial servitudes and that the application of article 703 
therefore pertains only to servitudes imposed by law.97 Furthermore, the majority held that 
the other two articles cited by the petitioner applied to conventional servitudes which, like 
the ones involved here, are without application as conventional servitudes and, according 
to article 709, are regulated by the titles under which they were granted.98 It is only where 
there are no written titles that the articles following article 709 have any pertinence, or 
unless the conventional titles contain provisions contrary to public policy.99  
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Justice Tate, who is an important figure in Louisiana‟s Civilian Renaissance, asserted that 
if an owner of the servient estate seeks to relocate a railroad right of way, he should be 
able to secure a judicial adjudication under article 777 of the Louisiana Civil Code for 
relocation to a place which is less burdensome.100 Justice Tate declared that in order for 
the owner of the servient estate to succeed with the relocation, the appropriate public 
regulatory agency should determine that the public‟s transportation interests would not be 
prejudiced.101 According to Lovett,102 Justice Tate correctly found that the real issue of the 
case is not the public and administrative law issues on which the majority had focused, but 
the battle over private interests.103 Justice Tate corrected the erroneous dicta in the 
majority decision that restricted the application of articles 753 and 777 of the Louisiana 
Civil Code to servitudes established without valid written titles; servitudes established by 
implication, judgment or prescription; or servitudes that contain titles against public 
policy.104 Justice Tate held that the intent of these articles is to permit the court to relocate 
the servitude when the exercise of the servitude is located in a place too burdensome 
upon the encumbered estate and that the court should weigh the competing interests 
when exercising its judicial discretion.105 According to Lovett,106 Justice Tate‟s concurrence 
in Denegre re-established the superiority of the Louisiana Civil Code‟s servitude relocation 
principles and also highlighted the fact that even though servitudes create property rights, 
they will always be subsidiary to society‟s need for flexibility in instances where the original 
location of the servitude becomes too burdensome for the owner of the servient estate.107   
In other reported cases, the Louisiana Supreme Court demonstrated that attempts made 
by the owner of a servient estate to relocate servitudes non-consensually would be subject 
to scrutiny;108 that judicial authorisation for relocation in advance of unilateral action is not 
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necessarily required, but advisable nonetheless;109 and that when the owner of the 
servient estate‟s proposed relocation complies with the requirements of the Louisiana Civil 
Code, he may reap the enhanced development value himself without having to share it 
with the servitude holder.110 
In the mid-1990s something unexpected happened.111 The Louisiana rule regarding the 
role of servitude relocation, which authorises the owner of a servient estate to relocate a 
specified servitude at his own expense as soon as the original location becomes 
burdensome on the servient estate and as long as he provides an alternative route which 
is equally convenient,112 was adopted by the American Law Institute‟s Restatement (Third) 
of Property (Servitudes) § 4.8 (2000) as the proposed new default rule for the relocation of 
servitudes in US law generally.113 During the last couple of years the leading courts in four 
common law states (Colorado, South Dakota, New York, and Massachusetts) adopted the 
Restatement‟s rule which was originally borrowed from the Louisiana Civil Code.114 Even 
though certain courts in the US retained the traditional common law position, some courts 
in the US began to adopt the Restatement rule by allowing the owner of the servient estate 
to relocate the easement irrespective of whether consent was obtained from the owner of 
the dominant estate or not.115  
This part of the chapter will discuss the content of The Third Restatement of Property 
(Servitudes).116 The Restatement declares that, except where the location and dimensions 
of an easement are determined by the instrument creating a servitude, it should be 
determined as follows: In the first instance, the owner of the servient estate has the 
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authority to locate a servitude.117 The specified location must be reasonably suited in order 
for the owner of the dominant estate to carry out the purpose for which the servitude was 
created.118 The reason why the servient owner is given the authority to select the location 
of a servitude in the first instance is because the owner of the servient estate is better able 
to specify a route that will not interfere with the value and future development of the 
servient estate.119 The requirement that the location should be reasonably suitable to the 
purpose that the servitude was created for also grants the holder of the easement a means 
of protection.120 The Restatement121 also provides that the holder of the servitude may 
proceed to locate the route if the owner of the servient estate should fail to allocate a 
suitable location within a reasonable time. A location is regarded as suitable if it gives 
effect to the purpose that the servitude was created for, while at the same time inflicting 
the minimum amount of damage on the servient estate.122 Furthermore, the 
Restatement123 articulates that the dimensions of a servitude should be of such a nature 
that it is reasonably necessary for enjoyment of the servitude. It states that if the parties 
intend that the servitude should be capable of adapting to changing uses under the 
principles stated in § 4.10, they may intend that the dimensions should change over time 
to provide the space necessary for enjoyment of the servitude.124 However, if the 
dimensions of the servitude are specified and if they are interpreted as establishing the 
maximum size, then in such a case the dimensions of the servitude cannot be enlarged 
unilaterally by the owner of the servient estate.125 The Restatement126 also mentions that 
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the owner of the servient estate is entitled to make reasonable changes to the servient 
estate as long as the changes are reasonable and do not significantly lessen the utility of 
the easement; do not increase the burden on the dominant owner in its use and enjoyment 
and do not frustrate the purpose for which the servitude was created. This rule was 
created to allow the owner of the servient estate to develop his property to the extent that 
he can accomplish this goal without interfering with the interests of the holder of the 
easement.127 However, this rule is not reciprocal because it does not authorise the 
dominant owner to relocate the easement.128 The American Law Institute declares that the 
new rule will increase overall utility as it will increase the value of the servient estate 
without diminishing the value of the dominant estate.129 It also decreases the risk that the 
servient estate will be unduly restricted from future development.130 Subsection 3 of the 
Restatement131 adopted the civil law rule that is applied in Louisiana and a few other 
states.  
The case of Roaring Fork Club LP v St Jude’s Co132 illustrates the application of the 
Restatement rule. In this case, Roaring Fork Club bought agricultural land on which it 
intended to develop a fishing and golf club. On the property, three ditches that crossed the 
property carried water for the landowner and for the ranch that was located next to the 
property. The Roaring Fork Club had to move the ditches in order for the club to build the 
golf course. The legal question was whether the owner of the servient estate was entitled 
to relocate the servitude. The Colorado Supreme Court held that the relocation of the 
ditches could only take place once it was proven that the relocation of the easement will 
not damage the easement by lessening its utility, increasing the burden on use and 
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enjoyment of the easement or by frustrating the purpose that the servitude was created to 
serve.133 
This rule overturned the traditional legal position advocated by the weight of authority in 
the United States, namely that the owner of the servient estate may not relocate an 
easement unilaterally. American legal scholars such as Orth134 complain that allowing the 
owner of the servient estate to relocate an easement unilaterally is based on a “radical, if 
unacknowledged, reconceptualisation of the nature of an easement”. Orth135 reasons that 
the Restatement rule denies the easement owner the right to determine the utility of the 
easement, which is unfair. Furthermore, he states that the Restatement has the effect of 
devaluing the limited real right of the owner of the dominant estate and that it deprives the 
owner of the easement of one of the prime protections accorded private property, which is 
the ability to refuse to suffer the loss of property even if the other person offers property of 
equal value in exchange.136 Orth137 declares that the Restatement rule is unfair because it 
retains the common law prohibiting the owner of the dominant estate to relocate the 
servitude, while conferring on the owner of the servient estate the right to relocate a 
servitude unilaterally. According to Orth,138 the Restatement rule is most likely to defeat 
the original intention of the parties, because if the parties to the deed wanted the 
easement to be relocated, they would have made an express agreement.  
In Herren v Pettengill,139 the court emphasised why the majority rule is sounder than the 
Restatement rule, namely that it provides certainty in landownership. It was held that by 
allowing the unilateral relocation of an easement by the owner of the servient estate, 
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fairness principles will be violated.140 It would also create uncertainty in real property law 
by opening the door for increased litigation over reasonableness issues based on today‟s 
conditions rather than those considered in the original bargain.141 In MacMeekin v Low 
Income Housing Institute Inc142 the court held that the traditional approach should be 
applied because it favours uniformity, stability, predictability and property rights. If the 
traditional approach is followed, the holder of the servient estate will be obliged to 
purchase the right to relocate the easement if the owner of the dominant estate consents 
to the relocation.143 
However, French144 is in favour of the new rule. According to French,145 the default rule is 
designed to accommodate the interests of both the owners of the servient estate and the 
owners of the dominant estate. She also argues that this rule allows each owner to 
maximize the utility of their property to a certain extent without creating any damages for 
the other owner.146 The problem that French has with the traditional rule is that it has the 
effect of unfairly advantaging the holder of the easement at the expense of the 
landowner.147 French148 avers that the traditional rule is unfair to the owners of the servient 
estate because it denies the owner of the servient estate the right to make the changes to 
the easement which may be necessary for future development of the servient estate. In my 
view, Singer149 is correct in stating that there is no easy answer to this rule choice, 
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because it turns on different ways to measure the value of the respective interests and 
also because it turns on competing conceptions of the entitlements or rights in question. 
 
3.5 Scots law 
In Scots law, the term “servitude” is applied only to praedial servitudes.150 Like the law of 
Louisiana, the origin of general Scots rules of servitude is Roman law.151 According to 
Cuisine and Paisley,152 it is essential in each case to determine the nature and extent of 
the servitutal right. It will only be possible to look at the rights and obligations of the parties 
in relation to servitudes once the nature and extent of the servitutal right have been 
determined.153 The rights and obligations of the parties to the servitude are implied by law, 
but they may also be confirmed expressly or within certain limitations, or supplemented 
expressly by means of conventional servitude conditions in a deed.154 It is inevitable that 
there must be legal principles that govern the continuing relationship between the parties 
entitled to the various rights.155 When exercising a servitutal right, the owner of the 
dominant tenement must exercise his right in a way which is least burdensome to the 
servient tenement.156 
In Scots law the question as to whether the owner of the servient estate may relocate a 
servitude unilaterally has also been raised. Cuisine and Paisley explain the approach 
followed in the Scots law by distinguishing between an early approach, a later approach 
and a modern composite approach.157  
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The early common law approach was that the owner of the servient estate was entitled to 
alter the route of the servitude, provided that the adjustment did not materially interfere 
with the legitimate exercise of the rights of the owner of the dominant estate.158 This 
approach may be observed in the statements of the Institutional writers.159 These 
Institutional writers indicate that the owner of the servient estate would only be entitled to 
divert a right of way when the owner of the servient estate wishes to enclose and labour 
his ground.160 The case law decided in this period reflects the approach set out by the 
Institutional writers, which means that the owner of the servient estate could substitute a 
new route, provided that it was equally convenient and commodious as the original 
route.161 According to Cuisine and Paisley,162 the case law which applied the early 
common law approach did not provide a complete picture of the circumstances under 
which diversion of a route could be carried out. The courts did not provide any guidance as 
to whether the owner of the servient estate could relocate the servitude, without a court 
order confirming his right to do so, or whether obtaining a court order was a 
prerequisite.163 
The later approach can be summarised as a much stronger preference for contract-
oriented certainty, with the most important authority being the influential decision of Hill v 
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Maclaren164 (Hill). In the Hill165 case, the owners in Dundee subdivided their land and 
feued166 a part of the land to Hill. The contract granted Hill as well as his successors in title 
a servitude of access. The exact specification of the line and location of this servitude was 
selected on a plan which was attached to the original feu contract. Maclaren was the 
successor in title of the original proprietor, namely Dundee. Maclaren sought to relocate 
the original servitude. Hill, who was the owner of the dominant estate, sought a declaratory 
order which confirmed his right to continued access through the original way. A civil 
engineer appointed by the court determined that even though the route increased the 
length of access, it was “more commodious, safer, better lighted and therefore the more 
convenient of the two passages”.167 The sheriffs who heard the case ruled in favour of the 
owner of the servient estate. In order to justify their decision, the sheriffs relied on the 
decisions of the 18th century and the commentaries of the Institutional writers.168 The 
approach followed by the sheriffs was rejected on appeal. Unlike the earlier cases, Hill 
involved a servitude of access where the line of the route was specified in a deed.169 The 
Lord Justice Clerk Moncrieff decided that once a route is fixed by means of a contract, that 
route cannot be altered by the owner who has contracted to grant it.170 Even though this 
principle, stated by Lord Justice Clerk Moncrieff, was not applicable to this case, as Hill 
was the successor in title of the original grantor (Dundee), the Lord Justice Clerk 
highlighted the distinction between a situation where a servitude or right of way is indefinite 
and situations where the line of the route is determined by contract.171 The judge declared 
that in the case where a servitude is indefinite, relocation of the servitude will be possible if 
it is in the interests of justice.172 If the servitude is specified, which contrasts with the 
principle mentioned above, the owner of the servient tenement may not demand a 
relocation of a servitude even though the alternative route may be as convenient as the 
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original one.173 The owner of the dominant estate is entitled to claim his contractual 
right.174 The judge decided this case in favour of the owner of the dominant estate and 
decided that if the owner of the servient estate is entitled to relocate a specified servitude 
of right of way it would lead to a gradual destabilisation of property rights.175 It was also 
held that the 18th century authorities were “doubtful” and that the proposed right of way 
was not as convenient and desirable as the original one.176 Lovett177 states that it is quite 
curious that none of the judges cited a single authority to justify the new approach adopted 
by them, other than the two 18th century decisions whose rules are ignored and 
distinguished. 
In Thompson’s Trustees v Findlay178 the owner of the servient estate sought to relocate a 
servitude. The route was specified in the contract. The owner of the servient estate sought 
to relocate the route because the original route blocked them from going ahead with their 
development. The Inner House stated that the owner of the servient estate is entitled to 
relocate the servitude because Hill179 did not eliminate all utilitarian based claims to alter a 
servitude of passage over a fixed line.180 The court also stated that the extent of the 
relocation would only be “slight and harmless”.181 Furthermore, it was said that the owner 
of the dominant tenement‟s rights could not be exercised to affect a development.182 
In Moyes v McDiarmid183 (Moyes) the trial court rejected the approach followed in Hill.184 In 
Moyes the owner of the servient estate sought authority to erect buildings on a servitude 
whose route had been “minutely described as to breadth and direction” and “to substitute 
another at one side”.185 The Dean of Guild refused the objections made by the owner of 
the dominant tenement and held that the original route created a disadvantage to Moyes 
                                            
173
 Hill v Maclaren (1879) 6 R 1363 at 1366.  
174
 Hill v Maclaren (1879) 6 R 1363 at 1366. 
175
 Hill v Maclaren (1879) 6 R 1363 at 1366-1367. 
176
 Hill v Maclaren (1879) 6 R 1363 at 1366-1367. 
177
 Lovett JA “A new way: Servitude relocation in Scotland and Louisiana” (2005) 9 Edin LR 352-394 at 371. 
178
 (1898) 25 R 407. 
179
 Hill v Maclaren (1879) 6 R 1363. 
180
 Thompson’s Trustees v Findlay (1898) 25 R 407 at 410. 
181
 Thompson’s Trustees v Findlay (1898) 25 R 407 at 411. 
182
 Thompson’s Trustees v Findlay (1898) 25 R 407 at 411. 
183
 (1900) 2 F 918. 
184
 Hill v Maclaren (1879) 6 R 1363. 
185
 Moyes v McDiarmid (1900) 2 F 918 at 918-919. 
60 
 
because it divided her property into two portions.186 The court also held that the substitute 
route was equally commodious and convenient to the respondent as the existing route.187 
Lord President Balfour drew a distinction between indefinite servitudes of rights of way and 
those that were created by prescriptive use on the one hand and those servitudes that 
were specified and defined in the deed on the other.188 The Court of Session reversed the 
decision. According to Lord President Balfour, he was unable to see any reason why the 
contract as it is contained in the titles should not be enforced according to its terms as any 
other lawful contract.189 Lord President Balfour also stated that where the parties have 
insisted upon a specified servitude of right of way in their contractual agreement, the 
specified route must be regarded as the essence of the contract.190 
The following part of the chapter will evaluate the arguments justifying the application of 
the majority and the minority approach pertaining to the unilateral relocation of servitudes 
in Scotland. If the abovementioned early and later arguments concerning the unilateral 
relocation of a specified servitude of right of way are taken into consideration as it is 
applied in the Scots law, a distinction can be drawn between a majority approach and a 
minority approach regarding the unilateral relocation of a specified servitude of right of 
way.191 The majority approach is illustrated clearly in Hill192 and Moyes.193 The majority 
view holds that the owner of the servient estate may not unilaterally alter the route or width 
of the servitude without the consent of the owner of the dominant estate because the 
owner of the dominant tenement retains an interest in the existing route of the servitude.194 
The minority view is expressed in Hill.195 The minority approach suggests that the owner of 
the servient estate may seek a declaratory order from the court to have the servitude 
varied even if the owner of the dominant estate retains an interest in the servient tenement 
                                            
186
 Moyes v McDiarmid (1900) 2 F 918 at 919. 
187
 Moyes v McDiarmid (1900) 2 F 918 at 919. 
188
 Moyes v McDiarmid (1900) 2 F 918 at 922-923. 
189
 Moyes v McDiarmid (1900) 2 F 918 at 921. 
190
 Moyes v McDiarmid (1900) 2 F 918 at 921. 
191
 Cuisine DJ & Paisley RRM Servitudes and Rights of Way (1998) para 12.43. 
192
 Hill v Maclaren (1879) 6 R 1363. 
193
 Moyes v McDiarmid (1900) 2 F 918. 
194
 Cuisine DJ & Paisley RRM Servitudes and Rights of Way (1998) para 12.43. 
195
 Hill v Maclaren (1879) 6 R 1363. This case and comments on it are discussed below. 
61 
 
and even if the owner of the dominant tenement refuses to consent to the proposed 
variation.196 
According to Cuisine and Paisley, an objection to the majority approach may be raised 
with regard to the interest to enforce the contractual obligation not to vary the route as 
binding on the successors of the owner of the servient estate.197 Cuisine and Paisley198 
stated that it is difficult to see why the successor in title of the owner of the dominant 
estate should be presumed to have the same interest to enforce the obligation as the first 
dominant proprietor in respect of the servitude.199 Cuisine and Paisley refer to Gordon‟s200 
statement to justify their objection. Gordon states that it is questionable whether a contract 
that has been drafted years ago by other parties should be enforced strictly in accordance 
with its terms.201 He states that if the route has been specified in the contract, then this will 
be a valid argument for holding the parties to it.202 However, he also says that it is not 
unreasonable to require an objecting dominant owner to show an interest in objecting to 
the relocation of the servitude rather than presuming that the interest of the original party 
still exists.203 The dominant owner could for example object that the new passage is going 
to be substantially more inconvenient or that no offer has been made to constitute his right 
properly.204  
The second objection to the majority‟s approach is that it benefits the owner of the 
dominant estate, because the owner of the dominant estate cannot be compelled to accept 
a relocation of the route of a servitude even if the owner of the servient estate can provide 
a route which is equally commodious to the owner of the dominant estate.205 The interests 
of the owner of the servient estate may in certain circumstances require flexibility, 
especially in cases where the servient tenement should be redeveloped. The interests of 
the owner of the servient estate are accommodated by the statutory provisions which 
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permit variation by the Lands Tribunal.206 Cuisine and Paisley state that even though the 
majority approach benefits the owner of the dominant estate, it should not be taken to 
suggest that, where the line and width of a servitude has been expressly stated in the 
deed, evidence of convenience or prejudice arising from a proposed variation is rendered 
irrelevant.207  
According to Cuisine and Paisley,208 the minority approach is not likely to be applied in 
Scots law. The minority view is expressed in Hill.209 In this case, Lord Gifford asserted that 
the owner of the servient estate should have the opportunity to relocate a servitude even if 
the owner of the dominant estate is reluctant to consent to the relocation.210 According to 
Lord Gifford, the owner of the servient estate could seek a declaratory order from court 
that would entitle him to relocate the route provided that sufficient grounds are established 
by the owner of the servient estate.211 Sufficient grounds will include grounds of necessity 
or grounds that are of manifest convenience to the servient tenement, but without 
detriment to the owner of the dominant estate.212 The court will interfere and determine 
what the substitute line of the route should be like.213 Furthermore, Lord Gifford stated that 
when the owner of the servient estate has specified the route of the servitude in an 
onerous contract, which has been acted on, the owner of the servient estate will not be 
allowed to take the law into his own hands by relocating the route of the servitude.214 In the 
Hill case, Lord Gifford stated that the owner of the servient estate did not establish 
reasonable grounds that allowed him to relocate the original servitude and provide an 
alternative route.215 To summarise, according to the approach of Lord Gifford, the owner of 
the servient estate may be entitled to relocate a servitude, even if the owner of the 
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dominant estate should retain an interest in a particular line of such a servitude, provided 
that the owner of the servient estate can provide sufficient grounds for the relocation.216  
According to Cuisine and Paisley,217 this dictum of Lord Gifford is confusing. Cuisine and 
Paisley state that even though this dictum was approved by Lord President Balfour in 
Moyes,218 Lord President Balfour also approved and applied the majority approach 
followed by Lord Justice-Clerk Moncreiff in the Hill219 case. Therefore, Cuisine and Paisley 
argue that the weight that may be given to the minority view set out by Lord Gifford is 
unclear.220 They also caution against any reliance on the dictum because of this 
uncertainty. According to Cuisine and Paisley,221 the balance of authority indicates that at 
common law there is no implied right to relocate the route of a servitude, especially where 
the servitude has been established by express written provisions. However, this implied 
right is qualified by the recognition that the route of a servitude may be relocated if the 
owner of the dominant estate has no interest in the existing route.222 
Cuisine and Paisley223 suggest that the risks involved in reliance on the possibility that the 
minority approach would be adopted by the courts are likely to lead the servient owner to 
make an application for the variation of the servitude to the Lands Tribunal.224 
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Finally, the modern composite approach acknowledges that parties may exclude the right 
to vary the route of a servitude in cases where there has been an express statement 
regarding the precision of the line and width of the route.225 However, Cuisine and Paisley 
assert that even if there should be a precise statement of the width and line of the route, 
the authority to relocate the route of the servitude may be reserved expressly to the owner 
of the servient estate by means of a suitably worded servitude condition.226 Furthermore, 
Cuisine and Paisley227 mention that in many deeds granted with regard to servient 
tenements that are most likely to be developed in the foreseeable future, an express 
declaration exists that provides that the servitude of access granted should not be 
exercised in any manner that impedes or restricts the development to be carried out on the 
servient tenement. Cuisine and Paisley228 argue that such a declaration is adequate to 
exclude the contractual implication which provides that the route of the servitude cannot be 
relocated unilaterally by the owner of the servient estate.  
The modern composite approach defined by Cuisine and Paisley229 regarding the legal 
principles on the relocation of a specified servitude of right of way can be categorised as a 
combination of the early and the later approaches.230 The legal position pertaining to the 
unilateral relocation of a specified servitude of right of way in Scots law is unclear as there 
is no uniform legal principle. The early common law approach, namely that the owner of 
the servient estate is entitled to alter the route of the servitude, provided that the 
adjustment did not materially interfere with the legitimate exercise of the rights of the 
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owner of the dominant estate, remains authoritative in Scots law but within certain 
limitations.231 In some instances the later approach will be applicable, which is based on 
drawing a distinction between servitudes where the route is specified in a deed and those 
where it is not.232 Once the route has been specified, the owner of the dominant estate is 
regarded as being in a stronger position.233 The owner of the servient estate is not entitled 
to relocate the servitude unilaterally, once the servitude of right of way is specified. 
 
3.6 English law 
In England, the common law rule pertaining to the unilateral relocation of servitudes is that 
once the location of an easement has been specified by contract or usage, the owner of 
the servient estate will have no right to alter or deviate from the line, unless that right has 
been expressly reserved by agreement.234 The width of the right of way is of vital 
importance.235 A wrongful interference with a private right of way is a nuisance in relation 
to which either damages or an injunction (or both) may be sought.236 However, every form 
of interference is not actionable.237 Minor interferences or alterations to the servient estate 
have to be tolerated, but action can be taken against any substantial interference238 with 
the right granted. The interference will be regarded as substantial where the conduct 
interferes with the owner of the dominant estate‟s reasonable use of the right of way.239 
The test whether an interference is actionable does not depend on whether what the 
dominant owner is left with is reasonable, but whether his insistence on being able to 
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continue to use the whole of what was contracted for is reasonable.240 Examples of 
substantial interferences are the narrowing of the right of way241 and restricting the height 
of a right of way.242 There may be a remedy where the width of the way is more than 
halved.243 Alterations may only be allowed if such a right has been reserved.244 No right to 
deviate from the line of a right of way exists.245 The owner of the servient estate has no 
right to alter the route of a right of way unless the right of the owner of the servient estate 
to do so was expressly or impliedly granted to him either by the grant or reservation of the 
easement or by subsequent agreement.246 Whether an alteration of a right of way will in all 
cases be an actionable interference, even if the alteration is equally convenient to the 
owner of the servient estate, has not been settled.247  
In Greenwich Healthcare NHS Trust v London and Quadrant Housing Trust,248 the plaintiff 
acquired land. The land included a road connecting it with a highway in order to build a 
hospital. The development was approved. However, the development was subject to a 
condition that a new road and new junction with the public highway be completed before 
the hospital could open. The plaintiff had to realign the road. However, this road was used 
by the defendants as a right of way. The land was also subject to a restrictive covenant 
limiting its use. The defendants were given notice about the proposed development, but 
none of the parties had objected to it. No reasonable objection could be made to the 
realignment of the right of way because the purpose of the realignment was to improve the 
safety and convenience of access to the public highway. The plaintiffs applied for 
declarations that they were entitled to realign the right of way and that the defendants were 
not entitled to an interdict to restrain the proposed realignment, but that their rights were 
limited to an award of damages with regard to any interference with the right of way. The 
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court held that in general the owner of the servient estate had no right to alter the route of 
an easement of way, unless the right of the owner of the servient estate to do so had been 
expressly or impliedly granted to him.249 The court held that the defendants should be 
satisfied with and restricted to an award of damages.250  
The English law pertaining to the unilateral relocation of servitudes may be summarised as 
follows: No right to deviate from the line of a right of way exists.251 The owner of the 
servient estate has no right to alter the route of a right of way unless the right of the owner 
of the servient estate to do so has been expressly or impliedly granted to him either by the 
grant or reservation of the easement or by subsequent agreement.252 
 
3.7 Conclusion 
The court in Linvestment provided comparative reasons to justify its departure from the 
common law position. Instead of using primary sources, the court merely used secondary 
sources without any discussion regarding their comparative value or context. The court 
referred to the Ontwerp of Professor Meijers,253 who stated that many foreign codes, 
including Switzerland, Italy and Greece, recognise the unilateral relocation of a specified 
servitude of right of way, provided that the servient owner proves that the dominant 
owner‟s servitutal rights will not be reduced.254 Furthermore, the court referred briefly to 
the Belgian Civil Code and the German Civil Code, as well as the discussion of the Scots 
law by Cuisine and Paisley.255 The comparative reasons provided for the decision are 
insufficient because the court failed to provide a context that could explain the reasons for 
following a flexible approach and the conditions under which it is applied.  
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Unlike the Linvestment judgment, this chapter aims to provide a more contextual 
comparative analysis to illustrate how different jurisdictions address the issue concerning 
the relocation of a specified servitude of right of way. Comparative research between legal 
cultures without direct historical relationships can be fruitful and enriching.256 The chapter 
focuses on Dutch, German, US (particularly Louisiana), Scots and English law because 
most of these jurisdictions illustrate that a flexible approach to the relocation of servitudes 
is preferred.  
Dutch law follows a flexible legal approach with regard to the relocation of a specified 
servitude of right of way. Dutch law provides that the owner of the servitude may relocate a 
servitude, provided that it does not lessen the utility of the dominant estate.257 The owner 
of the servient estate will be held liable for any expenses.258 The law also states that the 
owner of the dominant estate may be compelled to cooperate with the owner of the 
servient estate unless he is prejudiced by such relocation. It is not necessary for the owner 
of the servient estate to obtain a court order if the relocation is reasonable and fair.259 If the 
legal issue should reach the court then the court may modify the easement in the case of 
unforeseen circumstances which are of such a nature that the owner of the servient estate 
cannot be required to maintain the easement unchanged.260 The burden of proof will rest 
on the owner of the dominant estate to prove that the alternative route is inconvenient.261 If 
the interests of the dominant estate are diminished the court may alter the contents of an 
easement upon the demand of the owner of the dominant estate to such an extent that the 
possibility of the exercise of the servitutal rights is restored.262 The approach followed in 
Dutch law is similar to the approach adopted in Linvestment. However, unlike the 
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Linvestment judgment, the provisions in the Dutch Civil Code pertaining to the relocation of 
a specified servitude of right of way sets out the legal position more systematically. In 
Linvestment, the court only mentions the criteria that the servient owner should comply 
with in order to relocate a servitude unilaterally. The Dutch Civil Code does not only state 
the requirements that should be complied with, it also illustrates when judicial consent 
should be obtained by the servient owner, it specifies on whom the burden of proof will rest 
and the Dutch Civil Code also indicates the circumstances in which a servient owner will 
be ordered to restore the servitude to its original position. 
German law also follows a flexible approach. The German Civil Code provides that the 
unilateral relocation of a specified servitude is possible, provided that the owner of the 
servient estate will provide an alternative route which is equally suitable.263 The owner of 
the servient estate will only be able to relocate the servitude if the current route is onerous 
to him.264 The owner of the servient estate will have to pay for all the expenses regarding 
the relocation of a servitude. However, unlike the South African and Dutch legal systems, 
the German Civil Code contains a provision which states that the right to removal cannot 
be excluded or limited by legal transaction.265 It seems as though, on an interpretation of 
the outcome of the provisions in the German Civil Code, the courts will be entitled to 
interfere with the initial agreement between the contracting parties if a situation changes 
unfairly towards one of the contracting parties.  
Unlike the South African, Dutch and German legal systems the US does not have a 
uniform legal system regarding the relocation of a specified servitude of right of way. Some 
states in the US follow a strict common law approach, whereas other states follow a 
flexible approach pertaining to the relocation of a specified servitude of right of way. 
Traditionally, the courts in the US have not allowed the owner of the servient estate to 
relocate the easement unilaterally without obtaining the necessary consent from the 
easement owner. The traditional common law approach in the US is similar to the South 
African legal position prior to the Linvestment Supreme Court of Appeal judgment. 
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Louisiana was the first state in the US to acknowledge the unilateral relocation of a 
specified servitude of right of way. The flexible legal approach in Louisiana is similar to the 
approach adopted in Linvestment. The Louisiana rule regarding the role of servitude 
relocation was adopted by the American Law Institute‟s Restatement (Third) of Property 
(Servitudes) § 4.8 (2000) as the proposed new default rule for the relocation of 
servitudes.266  During the last couple of years the leading courts in four common law states 
(Colorado, South Dakota, New York, and Massachusetts) adopted the Restatement‟s rule, 
which was originally borrowed from the Louisiana Civil Code.267 There are various debates 
in the US in favour of the new default rule and debates which are against the application of 
the new default rule.268 Singer269 is correct in stating that there is no easy answer to this 
rule choice because it turns on different ways to measure the value of the respective 
interests and on competing conceptions of the entitlements or rights in question. 
Compared to the South African, Dutch, German, US and English law, the Scots law is less 
clear regarding the legal position on the relocation of a specified servitude of right of way, 
but there are strong arguments in favour of the unilateral relocation of a specified servitude 
of right of way. The legal approach followed in the Scots law can be divided in three 
different timelines, namely an early approach, a later approach and a modern composite 
approach.270 The early common law approach was that the owner of the servient estate is 
entitled to alter the route of the servitude, provided that the adjustment does not materially 
interfere with the legitimate exercise of the rights of the owner of the dominant estate.271 
The later approach can be summarised as a much stronger preference for contract-
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oriented certainty. The modern composite approach as defined by Cuisine and Paisley,272 
regarding the legal principles on the relocation of a specified servitude of right of way, can 
be categorised as a combination of the early and the later approaches.273 The early 
approach as discussed above remains authoritative, within certain limitations.274 The later 
approach is based on drawing a distinction between servitudes where the route is 
specified in a deed and those where it is not. Once the route has been specified, the 
owner of the dominant estate is regarded as being in a stronger position.275 
English law pertaining to the unilateral relocation of servitudes is not as flexible as the 
approach followed in the South African, Dutch, German and US law. The position in 
English law is that once the location of an easement has been specified by contract or 
usage, the owner of the servient estate will have no right to alter or deviate from the line 
unless that right has been expressly reserved by agreement.276 Alterations may only be 
allowed if such a right has been reserved.277  
Even though most of these jurisdictions do not have any historical relationships, the 
discussion of each jurisdiction can be regarded as fruitful because it enhances law reform. 
The flexible legal approach is welcomed and to a certain extent convincing, as the law 
cannot remain rigid and needs to be continually changed in order to meet changing 
conditions. Even though this comparative analysis is limited, it is more contextual than the 
comparative discussion provided in the Linvestment judgment. The comparative analysis 
reaches the same result as the court in Linvestment and therefore confirms the court‟s 
result.  
Although some of the abovementioned jurisdictions illustrate that widespread practice 
favours a flexible approach to the relocation of servitudes, the judge in Linvestment failed 
to test the constitutional implications that the flexible legal approach may have for the 
dominant owner. The following chapter will assess the constitutional implications regarding 
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the application of a flexible legal approach pertaining to the unilateral relocation of a 
specified servitude of right of way. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
73 
 
Chapter 4: Constitutional Analysis 
4.1 Introduction 
When developing the common law, the courts must determine whether the common law is 
inadequate when measured against the objectives of section 39(2). When the common law 
is deficient, the courts have to determine what ought to be done to meet those objectives.1 
When giving content to the common law principles, the courts should ensure that the 
common law reflects the spirit, purport and objectives of the Bill of Rights.2 In this chapter, 
the constitutional implications of the judgment in Linvestment3 will be evaluated. The first 
constitutional aspect in Linvestment concerns section 25(1) of the Constitution, which 
contains the deprivation provision of the property clause. This subsection provides that no 
one may be deprived of property, except in terms of law of general application; and no law 
may permit arbitrary deprivation of property. The test for arbitrary deprivation was set out 
in First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commisioner, South African Revenue 
Service; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance.4 According to 
this decision, a deprivation of property is regarded as “arbitrary” in terms of section 25 
when there is not a sufficient reason for the particular deprivation or if it is procedurally 
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the Bill of Rights. In Thebus and Another v S 2003 (10) BCLR 1100 (CC) para 27 Moseneke J noted that 
“this section does not specify what triggers the need to develop the common law or in which circumstances 
the development of the common law is justified”. Moseneke J referred to Carmichele v Minister of Safety and 
Security and Another 2001 (10) BCLR 995 (CC) in which the court recognised that there are different ways 
to develop the common law under section 39(2) of the Constitution. Moseneke J noted in Thebus and 
Another v S 2003 (10) BCLR 1100 (CC) para 28 that two instances may trigger the need to develop the 
common law under section 39(2) of the Constitution. The first instance would be when the common law rule 
is inconsistent with a constitutional provision. The second instance that will trigger the development of the 
common law is when the particular rule falls short of the spirit, purport and objects of the Constitution even if 
the common law rule is not inconsistent with the constitutional provision. In such circumstances, the common 
law must be adapted in order to bring it in line with the “objective normative value system” found in the 
Constitution. See Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (2005) 446-447. In Linvestment CC v 
Hammersley & Another [2008] 2 All SA 493 (SCA) para 31 the court held that the interests of justice required 
a revision of the common law relating to servitudes. Heher JA said: “Servitudes are by their nature often the 
creation of preceding generations devised in another time to serve ends which must now be satisfied in a 
different environment. Imagine a right of way over a farm portion registered fifty years ago. Since then new 
public roads have been created providing new access to the dominant tenement, the nature of the 
environment has changed, the contracting parties have long gone. Properly regulated flexibility will not set an 
unhealthy precedent or encourage abuse. Nor will it cheapen the value of registered title or prejudice third 
parties.” 
2
 Midgley JR & Van der Walt JC “Delict” in Joubert WA (ed) LAWSA vol 8(1) (2005) 23. 
3
 Linvestment CC v Hammersley and Another [2008] 2 All SA 493 (SCA). 
4
 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC). 
74 
 
unfair.5 When applying the test for arbitrary deprivation to Linvestment, the question is 
whether the result of the Linvestment judgment, namely that a specified servitude of right 
of way may be relocated unilaterally, constitutes an arbitrary deprivation of property of the 
dominant estate owner, which may be in conflict with section 25(1) of the Constitution. This 
first question is discussed in 4.2 below. 
A second constitutional aspect of the decision in Linvestment is the question whether the 
decision and the possibility that a specified servitude of right of way may be relocated 
unilaterally could constitute an expropriation of property (particularly expropriation of the 
rights of the owner of the dominant tenement) and if so, whether such expropriation is in 
conflict with sections 25(2) and 25(3) of the Constitution. This second question is 
discussed in 4.3 below. 
Linvestment deals with a private dispute between private parties regulated by the common 
law. Before the owner of the dominant estate could succeed with an argument that the 
decision in Linvestment may amount to an arbitrary deprivation or unconstitutional 
expropriation, it will have to be shown that this private legal dispute has constitutional 
relevance and that section 25 is applicable. The following paragraphs will discuss the 
requirements that have to be complied with before the provisions in the Bill of Rights may 
be applicable to a private law dispute. 
Similar to other provisions entrenched in the Bill of Rights, section 25 of the Constitution is 
subject to section 8 of the 1996 Constitution. This provision regulates the applicability of all 
the rights entrenched in the Bill of Rights. Section 8(1) of the Constitution provides that the 
Bill of Rights applies to all law, which includes all forms of legislation, common law and 
customary law.6 In addition, section 8(1) states that state institutions are bound by the Bill 
of Rights. The fact that the provision states nothing about private individuals may suggest 
that constitutional rights do not bind private individuals to the same extent as the state,7 
but section 8(2) of the Constitution provides that a provision of the Bill of Rights may also 
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bind a natural or a juristic person if, and to the extent that it is applicable, taking into 
account the nature of the right and the nature of any duty imposed by the right.8 Section 
8(3) adds a further qualification to section 8(2) of the Constitution. It states that when the 
provisions of the Bill of Rights are applied to natural and juristic persons in terms of section 
8(2), a court must apply or where necessary, develop the common law to the extent that 
legislation does not give effect to that right;9 and may develop rules of the common law to 
limit the right, provided that the limitation is in accordance with section 36(1).10 
The 1996 Constitution favours the indirect horizontal application of the Bill of Rights.11 In 
order to bring the adjudication of private disputes in line with the Constitution, the indirect 
horizontal application of section 25 may be used to develop the common law in light of 
section 25 and interpret legislation to bring it in conformity with section 25. When the Bill of 
Rights is applied indirectly, the Bill of Rights will not necessarily override ordinary law, but 
will demand furtherance of its values mediated through the operation of ordinary law.12 
Roux13 states that it is not necessary for the court to apply section 25 directly if private 
actors argue that the common law has the effect of depriving them of their property. 
Section 173 of the Constitution authorises High Courts, the Supreme Court of Appeal and 
the Constitutional Court to develop the common law. If a court addresses a legal dispute 
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pertaining to the arbitrary deprivation of property sanctioned by the common law, the 
courts are authorised to develop the common law in order to achieve a just result.14 
Section 39(2) of the Constitution obliges courts to “promote the spirit, purport and objects 
of the Bill of Rights”15 Roux suggests that since the objects of the Bill of Rights are to 
protect people against arbitrary deprivation of property, “it would seldom be necessary to 
consider whether section 25 [i]s directly applicable to the case”.16 
The application of the abovementioned legal principles to the dispute in Linvestment17 
creates the impression that the decision reached in Linvestment is constitutionally relevant 
despite the fact that the Linvestment decision deals with a private law dispute. 
This chapter will argue that Linvestment18 concerned the development of a common law 
principle which infringes the property right of the owner of the dominant estate. It is clear 
from the abovementioned legal principles that section 25 will be indirectly applicable to the 
private legal dispute, since the constitutionality of a common law principle is challenged in 
terms of the property clause.19 
 
4.2 The deprivation provision: Section 25 (1)  
4.2.1 Introduction 
The preceding passage established that section 25 of the Constitution applies to the 
private legal dispute in Linvestment. The aim of the next part of the chapter is to determine 
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whether the decision in Linvestment amounts to a deprivation or expropriation that may be 
in conflict with section 25(1) and section 25(2) of the Constitution. 
In the decision of First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commisioner, South African 
Revenue Service; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 
(FNB),20 the Constitutional Court set out the structure of the constitutional property 
analysis in the form of a set of questions as follows: The court has to determine whether 
the law or conduct complained of affects “property” as understood by section 25. If the law 
complained of affects “property” as understood by section 25, the court must determine 
whether there was a deprivation of property. If there was a deprivation of property, the 
court must determine whether the deprivation is consistent with the provisions of section 
25(1) of the Constitution. If the deprivation is not consistent with the provisions of section 
25(1) of the Constitution, the next step of the analysis is to determine whether the 
deprivation is justified under section 36 of the Constitution. If the deprivation was not in 
conflict with section 25(1) or may be justified under section 36 of the Constitution, the 
question is whether the deprivation amounts to expropriation for purposes of section 25(2). 
If the deprivation amounts to an expropriation, the next step is to determine whether the 
deprivation complies with the requirements of sections 25(2) and (3). If it does not comply 
with the requirements, the next question is whether the expropriation is justified under 
section 36. 
This structure of analysis provided by FNB has been described as a “true algorithm”.21 The 
next part of the chapter follows the formal structure of the constitutional property clause as 
set out by the court in the FNB case to test the effect of the Linvestment decision. 
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4.2.2 Does the law or conduct complained of affect “property” as understood by 
section 25? 
Section 25(1) of the Bill of Rights states that no one may be deprived of property except in 
terms of law of general application. This provision also states that no law may permit the 
arbitrary deprivation of property. 
In any constitutional property inquiry, it is important to determine whether the interest or 
property at stake qualifies for protection under sections 25(1) and 25(2) of the Constitution 
before analysing the meaning of what a deprivation of property constitutes.22 If the law 
does not interfere with a property interest that qualifies as property for constitutional 
purposes, the protection afforded in section 25 will not be available.23 In Ex Parte 
Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, 1996,24 the Constitutional Court had to decide whether the 
property clause of the Constitution complied with established international human rights 
standards. The court held that there is no universal formulation that describes property and 
also that the general term “property” in section 25 is of such a nature that it allows 
sufficient scope to include all rights and interests that have to be protected according to 
international standards.25 In the decision of the FNB case,26 the court did not provide a 
comprehensive definition of property for purposes of section 25 and stated that it would be 
practically impossible to do so. However, the FNB court outlined its approach to the 
meaning of property by referring to Van der Walt‟s argument,27 namely that the courts 
should move away from a static, private law conceptualist view of property to a more 
dynamic public law view of property. It seems as if the court will most likely adopt a wide 
conception of property, which includes all kinds of rights (real and personal rights) with 
regard to all categories of property (movable and immovable corporeal property as well as 
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immaterial property).28 In the FNB case the Constitutional Court said that as far as the 
objects of property rights are concerned, land would definitely be regarded as property in 
terms of section 25 of the Constitution.29 Additionally, section 25(4) of the Constitution 
states that “property” is not restricted to land. Therefore, it can be concluded that at least 
land is considered an object of property rights for purposes of section 25.30 
In order for the hypothetical argument derived from the Linvestment decision (namely that 
the relocation of a servitude may amount to an arbitrary deprivation in terms of section 25 
of the Constitution) to succeed, it must be proved that the limited real right that the 
dominant owner has in the property of the servient owner is an interest in property for 
purposes of section 25 of the Constitution. 
A servitude originates from an agreement between the owner of the dominant tenement 
and the owner of the servient tenement.31 The servitude comes into existence as a real 
right only when the servitude arising from the agreement between the contracting parties is 
registered, “either by means of a reservation in a deed of transfer in the circumstances 
envisaged in section 76 of the Deeds Registries Act32 or by the registration of a notarial 
deed, accompanied by an appropriate endorsement against the title deeds of the dominant 
and servient tenements, respectively”.33 All registered servitudes are real rights because 
they burden ownership.34 A servitude is a limited real right in the property of another 
person which grants the holder of such a right specific entitlements.35 Servitudes grant 
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powers of use and enjoyment to a person other than the owner and require the owner of 
the land to refrain from exercising one or more of his entitlements of ownership.36 The 
owner of the servient estate is also obliged not to interfere with the owner of the dominant 
tenement‟s use authorised by the servitude.37 The owner of the property is expected to 
tolerate and respect the right of the holder of the servitude to use and enjoy the 
entitlements granted.38 
The court in Linvestment decided that a specified servitude of right of way can be changed 
unilaterally by the owner of the servient tenement. The implication of the Linvestment 
judgment is that the owner of the dominant estate is deprived of his servitutal entitlement 
to have a say in the matter as to whether a relocation of a specified servitude of right of 
way should be allowed. The purpose and effect of registration is defeated when an order 
which allows the unilateral relocation of a registered, specified servitude of right of way is 
granted.39 It also complicates the meaning, interpretation and effect of the limited real right 
of the owner of the dominant estate.40 Unilaterally relocating a registered right of way that 
is clearly defined in the title deed has the effect of depriving the dominant owner of an 
aspect of a limited real right that he held. The court a quo held that when the servient 
owner is allowed to tread over the proprietary rights of the dominant owner because he is 
the owner of the property, this will have the effect of eroding the limited real rights that the 
dominant owner holds in the property in question.41 In Ex Parte Optimal Property Solutions 
CC42 the court held that registered praedial servitutal rights are included within the concept 
of “property” under section 25(1) of the Constitution and that any removal or deletion of 
such rights is a deprivation of property.43 
                                                                                                                                                 
Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property (5
th
 ed 2006) 321; Van der Merwe CG “Servitudes and 
other real rights” in Du Bois F (ed) Wille’s Principles of South African Law (9
th
 ed 2007) 591-629 at 592; Van 
der Merwe CG & De Waal MJ The Law of Things and Servitudes (1993) para 215. 
36
 Mostert H, Pope A, Badenhorst P, Freedman W, Pienaar J & Van Wyk J The Principles of The Law of 
Property in South Africa (2010) 236. 
37
 Van der Merwe CG & De Waal MJThe Law of Things and Servitudes (1993) para 219. 
38
 Van der Merwe CG Sakereg (2
nd 
ed 1989) 471-472. See Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM & Mostert H 
Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property (5
th
 ed 2006) 322-326 for a discussion of the prerequisites 
for the establishment of a praedial servitude. 
39
 Linvestment CC v Hammersley and Another [2007] 3 All SA 618 (N) para 41. 
40
 Linvestment CC v Hammersley and Another [2007] 3 All SA 618 (N) para 41. 
41
 Linvestment CC v Hammersley and Another [2007] 3 All SA 618 (N) para 43. 
42
 2003 (2) SA 136 (C) para 19. 
43
 2003 (2) SA 136 (C) para 19. 
81 
 
It is important to note that the unilateral relocation of the servitude does not completely and 
permanently deprive the servitude holder of his entitlement,44 because it is required that 
the servient owner should provide the dominant owner with an alternative route that is 
equally useful. On the other hand, it can be argued that the owner of the dominant 
tenement did have a right to the fixed route and that this right is taken away by allowing 
the relocation of the fixed route to an alternative route. The alternative route does not 
provide the dominant owner with the same right he was initially entitled to. 
Therefore, in the Linvestment case, the dominant owner had a limited real right in the 
property of the servient landowner. The limited real right of the dominant owner qualifies 
as property in terms of section 25 of the Constitution. The right of the dominant owner to 
the specified and registered route is an aspect or part of this right and should be regarded 
as property for purposes of section 25(1). If the court decides that the particular right or 
interest at stake amounts to property worthy of constitutional protection under section 25, 
the next stage of the analysis is to determine whether there was a deprivation of 
property.45 
 
4.2.3 Was there a deprivation of the property by the law or conduct? 
No comprehensive definition of “deprivation” has been adopted in South African case law 
yet.46 The term “deprivation” is generally defined with reference to the way in which it 
differs from expropriation.47 Both deprivation and expropriation involve state intervention 
with private property.48 However, they differ from each other in the following way: When 
expropriation is involved, the state compulsorily acquires private property and 
compensates the affected owner.49 On the other hand, when deprivation is involved, the 
state merely regulates the use of that property without acquiring it and the affected owner 
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is not compensated.50 When the owner of private property is deprived of his property, he 
will not be compensated because the regulatory deprivation is not intended to take 
property away.51 
In FNB,52 the Constitutional Court described the term “deprivation” as any interference with 
the use, enjoyment or exploitation of private property. The court held that a deprivation 
could entail the dispossession of “all rights, use and benefit to and of corporeal movable 
goods” and the court also stated that “deprivation” could also entail an infringement upon 
some of the ownership entitlements.53 
In Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality; Bisset and Others v Buffalo 
City Municipality; Transfer Rights Action Campaign and Others v Member of the Executive 
Council for Local Government and Housing, Gauteng and Others,54 the Constitutional 
Court stated that whether a deprivation occurred “depend[s] on the extent of the 
interference or limitation of use, enjoyment or exploitation” and that “at the very least, 
substantial interference or limitation that goes beyond the normal restrictions on property 
use or enjoyment found in an open and democratic society would amount to deprivation”.55 
According to Van der Walt,56 this definition of deprivation is problematic in several aspects. 
Van der Walt states that it is odd that deprivation should be limited to that which exceeds 
restrictions that are normal, because all legitimate regulatory restrictions on the use and 
enjoyment of property are normal.57 Van der Walt also submits that restricting the concept 
of deprivation to substantial or abnormal limitation on property use serves no purpose at 
all, because the purpose of section 25(1) is to legitimise the imposition of regulatory 
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control of property and the deprivation of property generally accompanies it.58 According to 
Van der Walt, comparative analysis reveals that there are factors which can be taken into 
consideration when developing a useful definition for deprivation.59 
If one applies the abovementioned legal principles defining a deprivation, it can be argued 
that a deprivation occurred in Linvestment when the court authorised the unilateral 
relocation of a specified servitude of right of way by a servient owner. Relocating a right of 
way that is registered and clearly defined in the title deed has the effect of depriving the 
dominant owner of a right that he held. In the court a quo of Linvestment, the court held 
that “the effecting of the alterations to the subject of the servitude by the owner of the 
servient tenement without the concurrence of the owner of the dominant tenement, 
invades the proprietary rights of the owner of the dominant tenement as contained in 
section 25(1) of the Constitution”.60 Furthermore, the court a quo held that when the 
servient owner is allowed to tread over the proprietary rights of the dominant owner 
because he is the owner of the servient property, this has the effect of eroding the limited 
real rights that the dominant owner holds in the property in question.61 In Ex Parte Optimal 
Property Solutions CC62 the court held that property rights are one of the fundamental 
rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution and that a purposive interpretation 
of “property” means that it should be read to include any right to, or any right in property.63 
Therefore, the court stated that registered praedial servitutal rights are included within the 
concept of “property” under section 25(1) of the Constitution and that any removal or 
deletion of such rights constituted a deprivation of property.64 
Even though the abovementioned argument is convincing, it is important to note that 
unilateral relocation of the servitude by the servient owner does not completely and 
                                            
58
 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (2005) 127: “In the constitutional framework of section 25(1) 
any regulatory restriction on the use and enjoyment of property, however small or significant can be 
classified as a deprivation.” 
59
 Factors that can be taken into consideration are inter alia the source of the power responsible for the 
deprivation, the purpose or intention behind the limitation, the effect of the limitation on the property holder. 
See Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (2005) 128-132. 
60
 Linvestment CC v Hammersley and Another [2007] 3 All SA 618 (N) para 42. 
61
 Linvestment CC v Hammersley and Another [2007] 3 All SA 618 (N) para 43. 
62
 2003 (2) SA 136 (C) para 19. 
63
 2003 (2) SA 136 (C) para 19. 
64
 2003 (2) SA 136 (C) para 19. 
84 
 
permanently deprive the servitude holder of his entitlement as such,65 because it is 
required of the servient owner to provide the dominant owner with an alternative route. 
Furthermore, the court in Linvestment held that an existing servitude of right of way may 
only be altered if the servient owner will be materially inconvenienced in the use of his 
property if the status quo is maintained, if the relocation will not prejudice the owner of the 
dominant tenement and if the servient owner pays all costs incurred in the relocation of the 
servitude.66 Therefore, deciding that the unilateral relocation amounts to a deprivation of 
the dominant owner‟s property does not entail that he loses his right of way or even that he 
necessarily loses anything material at all. The mere fact that he is deprived of the right to 
have a say in the location of the servitude is enough to characterise the unilateral 
relocation as a deprivation of property. The extent of the loss suffered by the dominant 
owner is more relevant when considering the justification for the decision to allow a 
unilateral relocation. 
Once it is accepted that the unilateral relocation constitutes a deprivation of property for 
purposes of section 25(1), the next question is whether the deprivation complies with the 
requirements in section 25. Generally, case law tends to focus on the formal requirements 
for deprivation rather than attempting to define the concept of deprivation.67 The next 
section will discuss the formal requirements that should be complied with, in order to 
determine whether a deprivation is justifiable in terms of the Constitution or not. 
 
4.2.4 If there has been a deprivation of the property, is the deprivation consistent 
with the provisions of section 25(1)? 
If the deprivation does not comply with the requirements as outlined in section 25(1), the 
limitation will be regarded as invalid, despite the merits of the purpose served.68 The 
decision in FNB should always be the point of departure when analysing the 
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constitutionality of infringements of property in terms of section 25(1).69 According to 
section 25(1), a deprivation must first of all be authorised by law of general application and 
secondly no law may allow arbitrary deprivation. 
Additionally, it is required implicitly that the deprivation should serve a legitimate public 
purpose or be in the public interest.70 According to Van der Walt,71 it can be inferred from 
either the legality requirement or the non-arbitrariness requirement that section 25(1) 
contains an implicit public purpose requirement, even though section 25(1) does not state 
it explicitly. Van der Walt72 relies on various comparative sources to illustrate his point of 
view, namely German law, US law, Irish law and the European Convention. It appears that 
foreign law is inclined to require that a regulatory deprivation of property should be in 
accordance with law, proportional and that it should be imposed for a public purpose or in 
the public interest. According to Van der Walt,73 the recognition of the implicit requirement 
that a deprivation should be for a public purpose fits in with section 25(1) of the South 
African Constitution in view of what the Constitutional Court stated in FNB, namely that the 
prohibition of deprivation of property is imposed with due regard for proportionality 
between the public interest served by regulation and the private interests affected by it. 
Van der Walt74 states that it is clear that section 25(1) recognises the power to impose 
regulatory limitations on the use and enjoyment of property, irrespective of the fact that it 
causes a deprivation of private property, because such regulatory action protects and 
promotes public health and safety interests. It is for this reason that it can be accepted that 
section 25(1) of the Constitution includes an implicit requirement that a deprivation of 
property should serve a public purpose or a public interest. 
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The first requirement is that only law of general application may limit property rights.75 
Section 25(1) refers to “law of general application” as opposed to “a law” in order to ensure 
that the regulatory deprivation of property may also be authorised by the rules of common 
and customary law.76 The requirement that any deprivation of property must occur in terms 
of “law of general application” means that the law authorising the deprivation of property 
must be equally applicable to everybody involved.77 A law will not comply with this 
requirement if the law is intended to single out a particular individual or group of individuals 
for discriminatory treatment.78 
It is clear that the recently developed common law rule, namely that the owner of the 
servient estate is entitled to relocate a servitude unilaterally, is law of general application 
because it establishes or elucidates a common law rule that applies to all owners of 
servient and dominant estates.79 The rule aims to strike a balance between the competing 
interests and rights of both parties. The rule aims to increase overall utility because the 
new rule only allows for the relocation of a servitude when the value of the servient estate 
will increase and the value of the dominant estate does not decrease.80 Law of general 
application includes the common law. Therefore, the recently developed common law rule 
in Linvestment can be regarded as law of general application. 
The second requirement is that even law of general application may not permit the 
arbitrary deprivation of property. There are two points of view regarding the meaning of the 
“non-arbitrariness” provision. One view is that the non-arbitrariness provision ensures 
formal procedural justice, read as a “thin”, low level of scrutiny rationality test which 
ensures that the deprivation is rationally connected to some legitimate government 
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purpose.81 On the other hand, the interpretation of the non-arbitrariness requirement as a 
“thick”, proportionality test means that a deprivation must establish sufficient reason for the 
deprivation.82 This means that the deprivation should not only be rationally linked to a 
legitimate government purpose, but that it should also be justified in the sense of 
establishing a proper balance between means and ends.83 
Prior to the decision in FNB84 it was unclear whether the courts would follow a rationality or 
proportionality interpretation of the arbitrariness requirement.85 In the FNB judgment, the 
court responded to the debate by deciding that the test involved will vary between mere 
rationality and a proportionality approach, depending on the context of each case.86 The 
way in which the Constitutional Court in FNB analysed the constitutionality of legislation 
illustrates the court‟s application of the non-arbitrariness test. In the FNB case, the court 
adopted a substantive interpretation of the non-arbitrariness requirement.87 The 
Constitutional Court held that a deprivation of property will be arbitrary and in conflict with 
section 25(1) of the Constitution if the law of general application in terms of which the 
deprivation is effected or authorised does not provide sufficient reasons for the deprivation 
and if the deprivation is procedurally unfair.88 In order to determine whether there is 
sufficient reason for the deprivation, the courts will have to consider a complexity of 
relations.89 These relations include the “relationship between the means employed and the 
ends sought to be achieved, the relationship between the purpose for the deprivation and 
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the person whose property is affected, and the relationship between the purpose of the 
deprivation and the nature of the property and the extent of the deprivation”.90 
In Mkontwana91 the Constitutional Court was confronted with a constitutional property law 
challenge regarding the constitutional validity of section 118(1) of the Local Government 
Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000. This section had the effect of placing limits on the 
owner‟s power to transfer immovable property. Section 118(1) stated that the registrar of 
deeds may not authorise the transfer of any property without a certificate issued by the 
municipality after the unpaid consumption charges during the previous two years have 
been settled in full.92 The provision was used to collect debts incurred by non-owner 
occupiers (tenants, illegal occupiers).93 The High Court held that the legislation created an 
arbitrary deprivation of property, because of the absence of a relevant nexus between the 
debts on the one hand and the owner on the other hand.94 The court held that insufficient 
reason existed for this provision to deprive owners of the right to transfer their properties, 
especially in cases where the owners are technically not responsible for the municipal 
debts incurred in respect of their properties.95 The High Court‟s finding was referred to the 
Constitutional Court. The Constitutional Court had to determine whether there was a 
sufficient reason for the deprivation. In order to answer this legal question, the court had to 
take into consideration the relationship between the purpose of the legislation and the 
deprivation effected by that law.96 The court applied the test for arbitrary deprivation as set 
out in FNB and came to the conclusion that there was a sufficient reason for the 
deprivation.97 It was stated in Mkontwana that there was a close connection between the 
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purpose of the deprivation of property (the collection of municipal debts incurred in respect 
of the supply of services to a particular property) and ownership of the property (the owner 
was made indirectly responsible for debts incurred in supplying services to his property), 
even when the land was unlawfully occupied and the charges were levied for services 
enjoyed by the unlawful occupiers.98 The court held that it was not arbitrary to impose 
indirect liability on a property owner for debts incurred by occupiers, essentially because 
the property owner benefited from the supply of the services to the property.99 
Furthermore, it was stated that it could be expected from the owner to take steps to 
prevent illegal occupation of the premises, to choose a responsible tenant and to monitor 
payment by the tenant of consumption charges that are due.100 
In Reflect-All 1025 CC and Others v MEC for Public Transport, Roads and Works, 
Gauteng Provincial Government and Another,101 the Gauteng Transport Infrastructure Act 
8 of 2001 had the effect of placing restrictions on the use, enjoyment and exploitation of 
privately owned property. Sections 10(1) and (3) of the Act authorised provincial 
authorities “to subject route determinations and preliminary designs of provincial roads 
which had been approved under the previous regulatory scheme, to the regulatory 
measures under the Act”.102 The applicants, who were landowners whose properties were 
affected by the road network in the Gauteng Province, applied to the High Court for an 
order declaring sections 10(1) and 10(3) of the Gauteng Transport Infrastructure Act 8 of 
2001 to be unconstitutional and invalid. The legal question in this case was whether this 
legislation amounts to an arbitrary deprivation of property or alternatively, whether the 
deprivation amounted to an expropriation of property without just and equitable 
compensation. They based their application on the grounds that the Act arbitrarily deprived 
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them of their land and that it was in violation of section 25(1) of the Constitution, that the 
deprivation amounted to an expropriation without just and equitable compensation and that 
the Act failed to facilitate co-operative governance. 
The High Court declared section 10(3) of the Act unconstitutional and invalid.103 However, 
the High Court did not declare section 10(1) unconstitutional and invalid because the 
restrictions imposed by the provision were not extreme.104 The applicants appealed to the 
Constitutional Court for confirmation of the High Court‟s declaration that section 10(3) of 
the Act is unconstitutional. The applicants also appealed against the High Court‟s decision 
not to declare section 10(1) of the Act unconstitutional. The Constitutional Court held that 
the deprivation was not sufficient to be regarded as being inconsistent with section 25(1) of 
the Constitution.105 The interference is only regarded as unconstitutional if the deprivation 
is arbitrary.106 The applicants have to prove that the law in question provided insufficient 
reason for the deprivation or that the provision was procedurally unfair.107 The court relied 
on the FNB decision and held that the substantive arbitrariness in this case required more 
than the presence of a rational connection between the means adopted and the ends 
sought to be achieved in order for the deprivation not to be arbitrary.108 The Reflect-All 
case dealt with land on which section 10(3) imposed far-reaching restrictions. Therefore, 
compelling reasons had to be provided in order for the restrictions not to be arbitrary.109 
Nkabinde J held that section 10(3) of the Act was not unreasonably disproportionate to the 
end sought to be achieved because the Act struck a balance between the legitimate 
interests in protecting the hypothetical road network while at the same time ensuring that 
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individual property rights were protected.110 Therefore, it cannot be regarded as 
arbitrary.111 
When applying the test for arbitrary deprivation to Linvestment, the question is whether the 
result of the Linvestment judgment, namely that a specified servitude of right of way can 
be relocated unilaterally, constitutes an arbitrary deprivation of property of the dominant 
estate owner, which may be in conflict with section 25(1) of the Constitution.112 
This part of the chapter will analyse the procedural fairness of the outcome in Linvestment. 
If the deprivation is procedurally unfair, it will be regarded as arbitrary.113 Procedural 
fairness is a flexible concept because the requirements that has to be complied with in 
order to make an action procedurally fair will depend on the circumstances.114 The 
question that has to be addressed with regard to the facts in Linvestment is whether the 
outcome of the decision is procedurally unfair. The court in Linvestment did not stipulate 
whether obtaining judicial consent was a prerequisite before a unilateral relocation of a 
specified servitude of right of way can take place. On the one hand, it may be argued that 
the outcome of the Linvestment case is not procedurally unfair because the court 
mentioned strict requirements that have to be complied with before a servient owner may 
unilaterally relocate a servitude of right of way. In other words, even if the flexible legal 
approach allows the burdened landowner to determine the utility of the servitude holder‟s 
right in the existing location, the owner of the dominant tenement may always approach 
the court and demand restoration of the servitude to its original location if there is any 
doubt pertaining to the reasonableness of the relocation of the servitude.115 If the fairness 
criteria are not met by the servient owner, it is most likely that a court will order that the 
servitude should be located to its original position. The mere fact that the servient owner 
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runs the risk that the unilateral relocation would be negated if he does not comply with the 
criteria of the flexible legal approach serves as a deterrent to prevent abusive unilateral 
relocations.116 
On the other hand, the absence of a declaratory order authorising the relocation of a 
servitude of right of way may be procedurally unfair to a certain extent.117 Assigning the 
entitlement to relocate the servitude unilaterally to the owner of the servient tenement 
without the consent of the owner of the dominant tenement would lead to an increase in 
the costs of beginning the bargaining process because the owner of the servient tenement 
may have already invested significant resources in relocating the servitude.118 The owner 
of the dominant tenement would incur information costs when he discovers the plans of 
the owner of the servient tenement to relocate the servitude.119 It is also likely that the 
owner of the servient tenement would incur preparation costs before making any visible 
improvements.120 When the owner of the dominant tenement eventually becomes aware of 
the intention of the owner of the servient to relocate the servitude and initiates bargaining, 
the owner of the servient tenement may be reluctant to accept an offer from the owner of 
the dominant tenement to cease the relocation.121 Even though the owner of the servient 
tenement may be under the impression that he complied with the fairness criteria, it is 
possible that the alternative route selected by the owner of the servient tenement may still 
be inconvenient for the owner of the dominant tenement. In Louisiana, some courts have 
focused on the necessity of requiring judicial authorisation before relocation of servitudes 
can take place.122 In Colorado, the Supreme Court123 was emphatic that the servient 
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owner should obtain a declaratory order from court before initiating alterations. The court 
stated that in order to avoid an adverse ruling of trespass or restoration of the servitude, 
the court is the appropriate forum for the resolution of a dispute pertaining to the relocation 
of servitudes.124 The Supreme Judicial Court125 in Massachusetts reiterated this point and 
stated that the owner of the servient tenement should obtain a declaratory order from court 
that the relocation meets the fairness criteria and that the servient owner should not resort 
to self-help remedies. In the Louisiana case of Brian v Bowlus,126 the court was divided on 
the question whether the owner of the servient tenement could relocate a servitude 
unilaterally without obtaining judicial authorisation for the relocation.127 The majority were 
unperturbed by the procedural sequence of the flexible legal approach.128 The majority 
noted that the mere fact that the owner of the servient tenement runs the risk that the 
unilateral relocation investment would be wiped out if the owner of the servient tenement 
does not comply with the criteria of the flexible legal approach serves as a deterrent to 
prevent abusive unilateral relocations.129 Justice Lemmon dissented on this point.130 He 
stated that the owner of the servient tenement should first obtain consent from the owner 
of the dominant tenement or that he should “have the relocation approved and the new 
location fixed by the court”.131 Justice Lemmon noted that the servient owner‟s failure to 
obtain judicial approval meant that even if the relocation were later approved, the servient 
owner should still be penalised for the servitude holder‟s loss of use of the original 
servitude during the interval between unilateral relocation and the eventual judicial 
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approval.132 Even though the majority‟s decision is convincing, the arguments raised by 
Justice Lemmon are also noteworthy.133 According to Cuisine and Paisley, an accurate 
statement of the Scots law regarding the obtaining of judicial consent prior to the relocation 
of a servitude is that judicial consent will only be required for alterations to the route of a 
servitude which are “material and extensive in nature”.134 In situations where a unilateral 
relocation is competent and if the alternative route proposed is not “material and extensive 
in nature”, none of the Scots law authorities requires a court order to be obtained before 
relocation may be effected.135 If one takes into consideration the latter arguments, it 
appears as though the absence of a declaratory order authorising the relocation of a 
servitude of right of way may be procedurally unfair. In situations where the proposed 
route is material and extensive in nature, the servient owner should only be allowed to 
relocate the servitude once the court has granted a declaratory order authorising the 
servient owner to do so. The court is a neutral decision maker and will be able to 
determine if “the utility of the easement owner‟s right in the existing location” is outweighed 
by the benefit and utility of the servient owner‟s proposed relocation.136 
In addition to procedural considerations, the requirement that a deprivation should not be 
of an arbitrary nature imposed a second constraint on a law that effects a deprivation of 
property.137 This requirement insists that a law that deprives someone of property is non-
arbitrary in its substance.138 The Constitutional Court held that arbitrariness in substance is 
assessed by means of a test that falls between a “mere rationality” enquiry and the 
proportionality enquiry that is used to assess the legitimacy of a limitation of rights.139 
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In the next section, the interplay of factors as mentioned in FNB140 will be assessed in 
order to determine whether there are sufficient reasons for the deprivation of the dominant 
owner‟s limited real right in Linvestment. In the first instance, the end sought to be 
achieved in the Supreme Court of Appeal in Linvestment was to allow the servient owner 
to develop his land. The means employed to achieve this result was to develop the 
traditional common law rule (prohibiting the relocation of a servitude without obtaining 
mutual consent) pertaining to the relocation of a specified servitude of right of way to a 
more flexible legal approach (authorising the unilateral relocation of a specified servitude 
of right of way if certain requirements are complied with). Secondly, the purpose of the 
deprivation was to allow the servient owner to develop the land on which the servitude was 
located. The person whose property is affected as a result of the deprivation is the 
dominant owner who has a registered limited real right in the servient tenement. Even 
though the dominant owner does not lose his entitlement completely, he loses the right to 
use the road that he has initially agreed upon. Finally, the property in question is the 
limited real right that the dominant owner has over the property belonging to the servient 
tenement; and specifically the dominant owner‟s right to be involved in a decision to 
relocate the specified and registered servitude. Even though the dominant owner holds a 
limited real right and not ownership in the affected property, a more compelling purpose 
will have to be established in order for the common law as it has been developed in the 
Supreme Court of Appeal decision of Linvestment to constitute a sufficient reason for the 
deprivation. If it is argued that the deprivation in Linvestment is marginal, the deprivation 
will not be arbitrary if the deprivation is rationally connected to the legitimate purpose.141 
However, if it is argued that the deprivation is severe, then it will have to be shown that the 
deprivation is proportionate.142  
In Linvestment,143 the purpose of the new rule is to allow one of the contracting parties (the 
owner of the servient estate) to deviate from the initial servitutal agreement unilaterally and 
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against the other party‟s will, especially if upholding the initial agreement will benefit 
neither party and if it will have the effect of prejudicing one of the parties. It appears as 
though the outcome of this rule is to strike a balance between the landowner‟s right to use 
and enjoy the servient property and the servitude holder‟s right of ingress and egress.144 
The policy grounds that the court based its decision on, namely fairness and justice are 
convincing to a certain extent, since the law cannot remain rigid and needs to change in 
order to meet changing conditions. It does not appear as though the new rule interferes 
with the right of the owner of the dominant estate too severely, because the court held that 
an existing servitude of right of way may only be altered if the servient owner will be 
materially inconvenienced in the use of his property if the status quo is maintained, if the 
relocation will not prejudice the owner of the dominant tenement and if the servient owner 
pays all costs incurred in the relocation of the servitude.145 If one takes into consideration 
the abovementioned factors, the deprivation by definition has to be described as 
immaterial. In terms of the FNB constitutional property analysis, justification of the 
deprivation therefore requires mere rationality.146 
In view of the abovementioned opinions, it appears as though the unilateral relocation of a 
specified servitude of right of way in Linvestment may be arbitrary unless the relocation is 
effected by a court order. Even though the policy reasons provided for the limitation are 
sufficient to justify the marginal substantive effects of the deprivation, the deprivation in 
Linvestment may be arbitrary because it may be regarded as procedurally unfair in the 
absence of a court order. If it should be argued that the deprivation in Linvestment is 
arbitrary, the next step of the constitutional test as set out in the FNB case would be to 
determine whether the deprivation is justifiable in terms of section 36 of the Constitution. 
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4.2.5 If the deprivation is not consistent with the provisions of section 25(1), is the 
deprivation justified under section 36 of the Constitution? 
If the deprivation is not consistent with the provisions of section 25(1) because it might be 
procedurally unfair or substantively arbitrary, the next step of the analysis is to determine 
whether the deprivation is justified under section 36 of the Constitution.147 The respondent 
will have to prove that the provision or conduct complies with the criteria set out in section 
36. This entails showing that the right has been limited by law of general application; and 
that the specific law can be considered “reasonable and justifiable in an open and 
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom”; taking into account all 
relevant factors.148 These relevant factors include the nature of the right, the importance of 
the purpose of the limitation, the nature and extent of the limitation, the relation between 
the limitation and its purpose and less restrictive means available to achieve the purpose. 
In Linvestment, the nature of the dominant owner‟s right is a limited real right. The 
dominant owner is deprived of his servitutal entitlement to have a say in the matter as to 
whether a relocation of a specified servitude of right of way should be allowed. The 
purpose of the infringement is to accommodate the servient owner to develop his land. 
The nature and extent of the infringement is not too severe, because the court provides 
certain requirements that the servient owner should comply with before he will be 
authorised to relocate the servitude.149 A deprivation will be justified in terms of section 36 
if there is no less restrictive means available to achieve the purpose of the recently 
developed common law rule. Requiring a court order before relocation can take place 
would be a less restrictive way of achieving the same purpose. Therefore, it can be argued 
that the deprivation would not be justifiable under section 36 of the Constitution in the 
absence of the requirement that there should be a court order before relocation can take 
place. If one assumes that the deprivation was not arbitrary if it was authorised by a court 
order, the next step is to determine whether the deprivation amounts to an expropriation. 
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4.3 The expropriation provision: Section 25 (2) 
4.3.1 Introduction 
A deprivation of property is regarded as an interference with property, while expropriation 
is defined as a subset of deprivation.150 The distinction between the two terms has 
practical significance and is not merely terminological and conceptual due to the 
requirement that expropriations must be compensated.151 The requirement of 
compensation does not attach to an ordinary deprivation.152 Accordingly, it is very 
important to distinguish between deprivations of property that do not amount to 
expropriation and those that do.153 However, the distinction between the two categories is 
not as simple as it may appear.154 There may be cases where it would be difficult to decide 
whether a state interference amounts to a deprivation or to an expropriation.155 
It is important to note that the structure of analysis of sections 25(1) and 25(2) as set out in 
FNB156 treats expropriation as a subset of the wider category of deprivations of property.157 
The FNB case states that all expropriations are deprivations, while only some deprivations 
will be regarded as expropriations.158 It is clear that the deprivation in Linvestment did not 
amount to an arbitrary deprivation, because the court provided sufficient reasons for the 
marginal deprivation of the dominant owner‟s limited real right brought about by a 
unilateral relocation of a specified right of way as described in the decision. Provided that 
the relocation is authorised by a court order, the deprivation would not be arbitrary. In that 
case, the deprivation in Linvestment complies with section 25(1) of the Constitution. 
Therefore, the next step is to assess whether the deprivation in Linvestment also amounts 
to an expropriation. 
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4.3.2 Does the deprivation amount to expropriation for purposes of section 25(2) of 
the Constitution? 
Section 25(2) of the Constitution provides that property may only be expropriated in terms 
of law of general application, for a public purpose or in the public interest. It also states 
that expropriation is subject to payment of compensation that is just and equitable. The 
amount of compensation to be paid will depend on the agreement reached between the 
parties who are affected by the expropriation or it may be decided by a court, but it has to 
reflect an equitable balance between the public interest and the interests of those affected 
by expropriation.159 When calculating the amount of compensation, all relevant 
circumstances must be taken into consideration, including the list of circumstances 
enumerated in section 25(3)(a)-(e). 
The main issue is whether a deprivation such as that established in Linvestment can or 
should be regarded as an expropriation. In Harksen v Lane NO160 (Harksen) and Steinberg 
v South Peninsula Municipality161 (Steinberg) the courts provided guidelines to distinguish 
between expropriation and other forms of deprivation of property.162 In Harksen the 
Constitutional Court held that the property of the appellant had not been expropriated, 
even though the legal effect of the provision was to pass full ownership of the solvent 
spouse‟s property to the trustee of the insolvent estate.163 The Constitutional Court stated 
that expropriation for purposes of section 28(3) of the interim Constitution means the 
acquisition of rights in property by a public authority against the payment of 
compensation.164 The court concluded that an expropriation is more than a mere 
dispossession because it requires the expropriator to appropriate or acquire or become 
owner of the property.165 Goldstone J held that there was no basis for regarding the effect 
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of section 21 as an expropriation, because the legislature did not intend that the public 
authority should acquire the property of the solvent spouse on a permanent basis.166 
In Steinberg v South Peninsula Municipality167 (Steinberg) Cloete AJA held that even 
though section 25 provides a clear distinction between deprivation and expropriation of 
property, there is room in South Africa for the development of a doctrine akin to 
constructive expropriation.168 Nevertheless, Cloete AJA stated that the development of a 
more general doctrine of constructive expropriation may be undesirable both for the 
pragmatic reason that it could create uncertainty in the law and the theoretical reason that 
if compensation is paid to the owner for a right which is limited it will adversely affect the 
constitutional imperative of land reform embodied in section 25 of the Constitution.169 
In Reflect-All 1025 CC and Others v MEC for Public Transport, Roads and Works, 
Gauteng Provincial Government and Another170 (Reflect-All), Nkabinde J held that section 
10(3) of the relevant Act was not in conflict with section 25(2) of the Constitution because 
the particular provision did not transfer rights to the state. Nkabinde J accepted the 
distinction drawn between deprivation and expropriation in the Harksen case.171 A result of 
the Harksen judgment was that the court asserted that the meaning of expropriation 
should not extend to situations where the deprivation does not have the effect that the 
property is acquired by the state.172 The state did not acquire the applicants‟ land as 
envisaged in sections 25(2) and 25(3) of the Constitution. As a result, no compensation 
had to be paid.173 
Van der Walt174 states that it is unfortunate that the court relied on the Harksen case to 
indicate whether the court is dealing with an expropriation. According to the Harksen175 
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case, an expropriation will exist only in the case where the state acquired the property or 
rights. Van der Walt176 stated that the absence of state acquisition of property rights is not 
sufficient to conclude that there was no expropriation. According to Van der Walt, “a more 
convincing and simpler conclusion would have been the absence of an act of expropriation 
in terms of legislation that authorises expropriation”.177 If an expropriation is not authorised 
in terms of law, then it will be unnecessary to consider the irrelevant debate about 
constructive expropriation.178 Additionally, he argues that the court‟s reliance on the 
Steinberg decision is also unfortunate.179 The court in Reflect-All stated that because the 
state had not acquired the applicants‟ land as envisaged in sections 25(2) and 25(3) of the 
Constitution, no compensation had to be paid.180 Van der Walt181 emphasised that the 
court in Reflect-All could have decided that payment of compensation ought to be 
irrelevant because no formal expropriation was involved. Van der Walt182 submits that an 
excessively burdensome deprivation of property should be regarded as a form of arbitrary 
deprivation. If the deprivation is arbitrary, then it should be regarded as unconstitutional 
instead of trying to force the discussion into a theoretical analysis of what constitutes an 
expropriation and what does not.183 
The court in FNB treated expropriations as a subset of deprivation.184 Even where the 
disputed law in question clearly provides for the expropriation of property, the law will have 
to be assessed for compliance with section 25(1).185 The FNB court stated that section 
25(1) will always be the point of departure when considering any challenge under section 
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25.186 Expropriation is regarded as a subcategory of deprivation; and for this reason 
expropriation must comply with the general requirements for deprivation before it can even 
be tested against the requirements for expropriation.187 The requirements for deprivation 
are also applicable to the expropriation of property, consequently law of general 
application and public purpose are both also required for an expropriation to be 
constitutionally valid.188 In short, before the compliance of any arguably expropriatory act 
can be tested against the requirements in section 25(2), it has to comply with the 
requirements in section 25(1) first. 
The FNB case illustrates that it is unlikely that a law that deprives the claimant of his 
property without providing for compensation, will survive the test for arbitrariness.189 
According to Roux,190 this example illustrates that it does not matter whether the law is 
categorised as providing for a deprivation of property that does not amount to 
expropriation or whether it is categorised as a law that provides for the expropriation of 
property. In the same way, a law that provides for the compensated expropriation of 
property but which is not designed to serve a “public interest or public purpose” is unlikely 
to provide a sufficient reason for the deprivation of property in terms of section 25(1) of the 
Constitution.191 Therefore, it is doubtful whether such a law will survive constitutional 
scrutiny beyond the section 25(1) stage.192 Roux193 notes that the only circumstances 
where a plaintiff may have an interest to persuade a court that a law provides for the 
expropriation of property instead of an arbitrary deprivation of property, is where the 
plaintiff requests that the law should be preserved and requests of the court to read in a 
requirement that the state should pay some form of compensation. Therefore, insofar as 
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the Linvestment decision results in an arbitrary deprivation, it is unlikely that it would ever 
comply with the requirements for a valid expropriation in terms of section 25(2). 
However, it should be noted that Nhlabathi and Others v Fick194 (Nhlabathi) provides an 
illustration of the way in which consideration of all the circumstances could indicate that 
the expropriation of a right without the payment of compensation may be justified, in terms 
of both section 25(1) and section 25(2).195 This case dealt with the constitutional validity of 
section 6(2)(dA) of the Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997.196 This provision 
granted the right to bury a deceased occupier including members of the occupier‟s family 
on agricultural land. This right was granted regardless of the landowner‟s reluctance to 
grant consent. The burial right must be in accordance with the occupiers‟ religion or 
cultural belief and an established practice in respect of such burials must exist on the land. 
The court held that the provision was not unconstitutional. The court acknowledged, 
without deciding, that the granting of a right to establish a grave could amount to an 
expropriation of land without compensation.197 In Nhlabathi the court held that the 
occupier‟s right to appropriate a grave site on the owner‟s land without the owner receiving 
any compensation was reasonable and justifiable.198 In Nhlabathi, the court provided 
various reasons in order to justify the uncompensated expropriation.199 The court held that 
the right does not create a major interference with the property rights of the landowner; the 
right of the occupiers is subject to balancing with the rights of the landowner; the right will 
only exist where there is an established practice to bury deceased members residing on 
the land; and the occupiers had to comply with a cultural belief that deceased members of 
their family must be buried close to their homestead.200 The court held that giving statutory 
recognition to that belief accords with the constitutional mandate of the state to institute 
land reform measures.201 Hence, according to this decision, it is theoretically possible that 
a person‟s property could be expropriated without any compensation, in such a way and 
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under circumstances which renders such an expropriation justifiable in terms of section 
25(2). 
In conclusion, even though there is a possibility that the outcome of the Linvestment 
judgment may be in compliance with the requirements of section 25(1) of the Constitution, 
for instance if the deprivation is authorised by a court order, it does not seem as if this 
particular deprivation could amount to an expropriation. In Linvestment, the court stated 
that the owner of the servient estate will only be able to relocate the servitude of right of 
way if the specified route materially inconveniences the owner of the servient estate and if 
the relocation will not prejudice the owner of the dominant tenement.202 The Linvestment 
judgment cannot be characterised as an expropriation, because the deprivation is not 
aimed at acquiring property forcibly for a public purpose.203 The purpose of the rule is to 
make one party better off without making the other party worse off and to improve the use 
of private land.204 According to Van der Walt,205 Roux may be correct in stating that it is 
doubtful that common law rules will be invoked in expropriation cases, because in our legal 
system expropriation is a state action that will always be carried out in terms of statutory 
authorisation. 
 
4.4 Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was to evaluate whether the result of the Linvestment judgment, 
namely that a servitude may be relocated unilaterally, constitutes an arbitrary deprivation 
of property rights for the dominant estate owner, which may be in conflict with section 
25(1) of the Constitution. A second constitutional aspect of the decision in Linvestment is 
the question whether the decision, and with it the possibility that a specified servitude of 
right of way may be relocated unilaterally, could constitute an expropriation of property 
(particularly the rights of the owner of the dominant tenement) and, if so, whether such 
expropriation is in conflict with sections 25(2) and 25(3) of the Constitution. 
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In order for the argument that the decision in Linvestment may amount to an arbitrary 
deprivation on the part of the owner of the dominant estate to succeed, it had to be 
justified that this private legal dispute was constitutionally relevant and that section 25 was 
applicable. The decision reached in Linvestment206 can be regarded as a constitutional 
issue, because the common law rules that regulate the relocation of servitudes and their 
effect on private rights must comply with section 25 and have to be developed in terms of 
section 39(2) of the Constitution. 
In order to determine whether the legal dispute in Linvestment constituted a deprivation in 
terms of section 25(1) or an expropriation in terms of section 25(2), the structure of 
analysis as set out in the FNB case was applied to Linvestment. First, it had to be 
determined whether the law or conduct complained of affected “property” as understood by 
section 25. All servitudes are real rights, since they burden ownership.207 In the 
Linvestment case, the dominant owner had a limited real right in the property of the 
servient landowner. A servitude is a limited real right in the property of another person 
which grants the holder of such a right specific entitlements.208 Servitudes grant powers of 
use and enjoyment to a person other than the owner and require the owner of the land to 
refrain from exercising one or more of his entitlements of ownership.209 The implication of 
the Linvestment judgment is that the owner of the dominant estate was deprived of at least 
an aspect of his registered servitutal entitlement, namely the right to have a say in the 
location of the servitude. It can be said that the interest that the owner of the dominant 
estate has over the servient estate is a real interest in property which ought to qualify for 
protection in terms of section 25 of the Constitution. 
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Secondly, it had to be determined whether there was a deprivation of the property. It can 
be argued that a deprivation occurred in Linvestment when the court authorised the 
unilateral relocation of a specified servitude of right of way by a servient owner. Relocating 
a right of way that has been registered and clearly defined in the title deed has the effect of 
depriving the dominant owner of a right that he held, namely to have a say in the location 
of the servitude. In the court a quo of Linvestment, the court held that “the effecting of the 
alterations to the subject of the servitude by the owner of the servient tenement without the 
concurrence of the owner of the dominant tenement, invades the proprietary rights of the 
owner of the dominant tenement as contained in section 25(1) of the Constitution”.210 
In the third instance, it had to be determined whether the deprivation was consistent with 
the provisions of section 25(1) of the Constitution. Section 25(1) provides that no one may 
be deprived of property except in terms of law of general application, and that no law may 
permit arbitrary deprivation of property. It is clear that the recently developed common law 
rule, namely that the owner of the servient estate is entitled to relocate a servitude 
unilaterally, is law of general application since the rule aims to strike a balance between 
the competing interests and rights of both parties. 
A deprivation will be regarded as arbitrary if there is not a sufficient reason for the 
deprivation or if it is procedurally unfair. The court in Linvestment did not stipulate whether 
obtaining judicial consent was a prerequisite for a unilateral relocation of a specified 
servitude of right of way to take place. The absence of a declaratory order authorising the 
relocation of a servitude of right of way may be procedurally unfair where it would allow the 
owner of the servient land to use self-help.211 Conversely, it may be argued that the 
outcome of the Linvestment case, where the court did not explicitly stipulate that judicial 
consent should be required prior to the unilateral relocation of a specified servitude of right 
of way, is not procedurally unfair, because the court mentioned strict requirements that 
have to be complied with before the owner of the servient tenement may relocate a 
servitude. If the fairness criteria are not met by the owner of the servient tenement, it is 
likely that a court will order that the servitude should be located back to its original position. 
The mere fact that the servient owners‟ run the risk that the unilateral relocation would be 
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negated if they do not comply with the criteria of the flexible legal approach serves as a 
deterrent to prevent abusive unilateral relocations.212 On the surface it does not seem as if 
the new rule interferes with the right of the owner of the dominant estate too severely, 
because the court held that an existing servitude of right of way may only be altered if the 
owner of the servient tenement will be materially inconvenienced in the use of his property 
if the status quo is maintained, if the relocation will not prejudice the owner of the dominant 
tenement and if the owner of the servient tenement pays all costs incurred in the relocation 
of the servitude.213 
If the deprivation is not consistent with the provisions of section 25(1) of the Constitution, 
the next step of the analysis would be to determine whether the deprivation is justified 
under section 36 of the Constitution. There is a possibility that the deprivation in 
Linvestment may be procedurally unfair in the absence of a court order. Therefore, the 
next step of the analysis will be to determine whether the deprivation is justifiable and 
reasonable in terms of section 36 of the Constitution. It appears as though the deprivation 
in Linvestment would either not be arbitrary due to the fact that the deprivation is 
substantively marginal and provided that it was authorised by a court order; or it might be 
procedurally unfair in the absence of a court order. In the latter case the deprivation might 
not be reasonable and justifiable because there is a less restrictive means to achieve the 
same purpose, namely by requiring a court order. 
If the deprivation complies with section 25(1) or if it is justified under section 36 of the 
Constitution, the question will be whether the deprivation amounts to expropriation for 
purposes of section 25(2). Section 25(2) of the Constitution provides that property may 
only be expropriated in terms of law of general application, for a public purpose or in the 
public interest. It also states that expropriation is subject to compensation that is just and 
equitable. Even though there is a possibility that the outcome of the Linvestment judgment 
may be in compliance with the requirements of section 25(1) and section 36 of the 
Constitution (provided that relocation is authorised by a court order), it does not seem as if 
this particular deprivation could amount to an expropriation. The common law rule 
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pertaining to the relocation of a specified servitude of right of way does not result in a 
compulsory state acquisition of property. The Linvestment judgment cannot be 
characterised as an expropriation, because the deprivation was not aimed at forcibly 
acquiring property for a public purpose.214 The purpose of the rule is to make one party 
better off without making the other party worse off and also to improve the use of private 
land.215 
The policy grounds on which the court in Linvestment based its decision are to a certain 
extent convincing, since the law needs to be continually changed in order to meet 
changing conditions. The following chapter aims to assess the policy arguments regarding 
the selection of an appropriate rule which will have the effect of creating an efficient 
outcome for both owners of the servient and dominant estate more extensively. 
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Chapter 5: Policy Analysis 
5.1 Introduction 
An essential component of landownership in society is the limitation of property rights.1 
Ownership in property can never be absolute,2 and it will be limited if it is in the interest of 
the community, neighbours and other holders of rights.3 A servitude is an example of the 
way in which the rights of an owner of property may be limited. Servitudes provide 
landowners with a legal mechanism to accommodate multiple property interests in land.4 
Any change in the law of servitudes has a potentially large impact on property ownership 
because servitudes are connected to most parcels of land.5 The court in Linvestment CC v 
Hammersley6 (Linvestment) stated that an order declaring the relocation of a specified 
servitude of right of way without the consent of the owner of the dominant tenement will 
only be granted if the servient owner is or will be materially inconvenienced in the use of 
his property if the status quo ante were maintained.7 The servient owner will be authorised 
to relocate the servitude unilaterally if the relocation will not prejudice the owner of the 
dominant tenement and if the servient owner pays the expenses upon such relocation. 
The importance of the Linvestment case is that the court decided that the owner of a 
servient tenement may unilaterally change the route of a defined right of way, thereby 
overturning a long-established precedent relating to servitudes based on the grounds of 
convenience and equity.8 This chapter will evaluate whether it is justifiable for courts to 
overturn long-established common law principles based on the grounds of justice, equity 
and practicality. This chapter will investigate whether the policy reasons provided in 
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Linvestment CC v Hammersley9 (Linvestment) to reach its conclusion that a unilateral 
relocation of a specified servitude of right of way is possible in South African law, are 
convincing and sufficient. The issue is to determine which of the two legal approaches is 
the correct one, to adhere to the traditional common law rule which prohibits the unilateral 
relocation of the servitude by the owner of the servient tenement unless consent has been 
obtained from the owner of the dominant tenement or to adopt the flexible legal approach 
that allows the unilateral relocation of a servitude.10 
Furthermore, this chapter utilises law and economics theory to analyse the legal problem 
pertaining to the right of a servient tenement owner to relocate a servitude unilaterally. 
There are many reasons why the law and economics approach is useful. The concept of 
property is fundamental to both law and economics.11 The law defines and protects the 
bundle of rights that constitute property.12 The economic approach to property law 
emphasises the role of property law in promoting an efficient allocation of resources.13 Law 
and economics theory provides an economic perspective on legal problems. The 
economic analysis of law can be divided into two subfields,14 namely positive law and 
economics which uses economic analysis to predict the effects of various legal rules; and 
normative law and economics which entails the making of policy recommendations based 
on the economic consequences of various legal principles. 
The key concept for normative economic analysis is efficiency.15 Property law is the most 
fundamental area of common law from an economic perspective, because well-defined 
property rights are essential for market exchange and investment.16 It is crucial that 
property rights should be clearly defined and understood because these rights impact on 
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so many questions in the economic literature.17 The economics literature further assumes 
that when rights are not clearly defined, this results in market failure.18 The meaning of 
property rights is central to economics.19 The role of property law in this context is to 
assign and protect property rights as a background for economic activities.20 The 
economic approach to property law emphasises the role of property law in promoting an 
efficient allocation of resources.21 An efficient allocation of resources will only be achieved 
by creating and protecting rights in order to encourage exchange and investment.22 This 
chapter aims to assess the on-going debate regarding the selection of an appropriate rule 
from a law and economics point of view which will have the effect of creating an efficient 
outcome for the owners of both the servient and the dominant tenement. 
The arguments pertaining to the traditional common law and the flexible legal approach to 
relocation of servitudes will be discussed in the first part of the chapter. Subsequently, 
both approaches will be evaluated with regard to the competing rights and interests of 
property holders by means of applying various law and economic theories. Issues that will 
be addressed are whether a choice between the two rules matters, whether decision 
makers should prefer clear “property rules” or muddier “liability rules”23 and the different 
proposals as to how the rules can be improved in order to strike a balance between the 
interests of the different parties to the servitude-creating contract. 
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5.2 Rationales supporting the traditional common law position 
Prior to the Linvestment judgment, the common law required that mutual consent be 
obtained in order to relocate a specified servitude of right of way.24 Jurisdictions adhering 
to the traditional common law rule offer a number of rationales in support of its 
application.25 Firstly, one very old and common rationale for the traditional common law 
rule is that it promotes certainty in landownership.26 The uncertainty created by the flexible 
legal approach27 would discourage the owner of the dominant tenement from developing 
his property for fear that any unilateral relocation of the servitude by the servient owner 
would frustrate that development.28 This fear may lead to depreciation in the value of the 
dominant tenement.29 The traditional common law rule creates certainty in 
landownership.30 It encourages investment in dominant tenements while at the same time 
avoiding uncertainty and discouraging excessive litigation.31 In the US judgment of 
Stamatis v Johnson32 the court held that if the location of a servitude is treated as variable 
it would incite litigation and depreciate the value and discourage the improvement of the 
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land over which the servitude is registered. This decision has been confirmed in Davis v 
Bruk.33 
The second commonly asserted rationale in support of the traditional common law rule is 
rooted in assumptions about parties‟ expectations about servitude relocation.34 Courts and 
scholars argue that if the common law rule of no unilateral relocation is discarded, it will 
lead to servient owners obtaining economic windfalls and servitude holders being unjustly 
deprived of part of their rights.35 According to Lovett36 the assumption is that when a 
servitude is created, the grantor receives consideration not only for giving the grantee non-
possessory rights to use the servient owner‟s property, but also for the permanent 
localisation of the servitude.37 Under the traditional common law rule, the owner of the 
dominant tenement included in his purchase price the value of a fixed servitude when he 
purchased the right to the servitude or when he purchased property that already enjoyed 
the benefit of the servitude.38 From a law and economics perspective, it has been argued 
that it may be presumed that the fact that the fixed servitude cannot be relocated without 
the dominant owner‟s consent makes it more valuable than a servitude that can be 
relocated unilaterally.39 On the contrary, it is likely that if the owner of the servient 
tenement granted the servitude, he will command a higher price for a fixed servitude than 
a variable one.40 Alternatively, if the owner of a servient tenement purchased property 
already burdened by a fixed servitude, it is presumed that the servient owner paid a lower 
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price for the property than he would have had the servitude been variable.41 The argument 
is that if a court permits the owner of the servient tenement to relocate the servitude, the 
value of the servitude to each party will no longer comport with the price that each party 
paid.42 The reason for this is that the owner of the dominant tenement will have paid too 
much for his property right and the owner of the servient tenement too little.43 
A third argument in favour of the traditional common law rule is that it balances the 
restrictions placed on both parties to the servitutal relationship.44 This argument is based 
on the fact that the traditional common law rule prohibits the owners of both the servient 
and the dominant tenement respectively from relocating a servitude unilaterally without the 
other party‟s consent.45 Critics such as Orth argue that if this is the case, then the flexible 
legal approach should be made symmetrical.46 Orth47 criticises the flexible legal approach 
and concludes that it is asymmetrical and unfair because it retains the common law rule 
forbidding relocation by the holder of the servitude, while at the same time conferring on 
the servient owner the right to make unconsented relocations. Unless the holder of the 
servitude is given a correlative right to relocate a servitude, provided there is no diminution 
in the utility of the burdened land, it is unfair to give this right to only the servient owner.48 
The final argument in favour of the traditional common law rule is based on the nature of a 
servitude.49 According to this rationale, even if a new servitude location would not cause 
any harm to the holder of the servitude and even if it is beneficial to the dominant owner, a 
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servitude is nothing less than a fixed and judicially unchangeable property right.50 A 
servitude is envisaged as a static and permanent property right that the holder of a 
servitude can control by means of power.51 This right is subject to the rule that the holder 
of the servitude does not interfere with the servient owner‟s use of the land in ways 
unrelated to the servitude.52 
French criticises the application of the traditional common law approach. French argues 
that the traditional rule puts the landowner at the mercy of the owner of the dominant 
tenement.53 Under the traditional common law approach, the dominant owner can torpedo 
a proposed relocation even though the relocation poses no damage to his property.54 The 
traditional common law approach creates an asymmetry in the rights of the parties, unfairly 
advantaging the holder of the servitude at the expense of the owner of the servient 
tenement.55 The traditional rule is unfair towards the owner of the servient tenement since 
it “creates obstacles to the development of the servient tenement that are unrelated to the 
merits of the development”.56 Additionally, French57 states that the traditional common law 
approach is generally unfair to servient owners because it is based on the implausible 
assumption that the transaction granting the servitude encompasses a knowing exchange 
of future development rights. The traditional common law approach is regarded as unfair 
because it prohibits the owner of the servient tenement to make changes to the servitude 
which may be essential for future development of the servient tenement.58 The traditional 
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common law approach is also unfair because it rewards the non-cooperating dominant 
owner with the ability to extract all the surplus value created by the relocation of the 
servitude even though the dominant owner incurs no costs and suffers no harm.59 
 
5.3 Rationales supporting the flexible legal approach 
The flexible legal approach provides that an existing servitude of right of way may be 
altered, provided that the servient owner will be materially inconvenienced in the use of his 
property if the status quo is maintained, the relocation will not prejudice the owner of the 
dominant tenement and the servient owner pays all costs incurred in the relocation of the 
servitude.60 The question arises whether a landowner should have the right to relocate a 
servitude registered over his property without the consent of the owner of the dominant 
tenement.61 According to French,62 the answer to this question would be in the negative, 
because altering the location of the servitude may reduce the utility of the servitude to the 
owner of the dominant tenement and deprive the dominant owner of the benefit bargained 
for.63 French64 questioned whether it would be possible for a servitude to be relocated 
without causing any utility loss to the holder of the servitude in the case where a 
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landowner wishes to develop the land that is subject to the servitude. French65  advocates 
that it is possible to relocate a servitude without creating material inconvenience to the 
holder of the servitude. This is because the flexible legal approach states that the 
particular parties in the dispute are entitled to the unilateral relocation of the servitude, 
provided that the alteration of the servitude does not lessen the utility of the servitude, that 
it does not burden the owner of the dominant tenement by frustrating the purpose for 
which the servitude was created and that the owner of the servient tenement bears the 
expenses upon such relocation.66 According to French67 the courts should welcome the 
opportunity to increase the general welfare by adopting the flexible legal approach, 
because the rule has the effect of making one party better off without making the other 
party worse off. In order to justify her arguments for preferring the flexible legal approach 
instead of the traditional common law approach, French68 refers to some judgments in 
New York and Colorado where the flexible legal approach was favoured. 
Various reasons have been provided in favour of the application of the flexible legal 
approach rather than the application of the traditional common law approach. The first 
reason is that the original parties to the contract most probably did not intend to create a 
right of way that could not be altered by the owner of the servient tenement.69 The second 
reason is that if the right to relocate the servitude unilaterally is awarded to the servient 
landowner it may have the effect of striking a balance between the servient owner‟s right to 
use and enjoy his property and the dominant owner‟s right of ingress and egress.70 The 
third reason is that the flexible legal approach may increase the value of the servient 
tenement as it encourages the servient owner to make improvements.71 The flexible legal 
approach may also decrease the amount of litigation. In Lewis v Young72 (Lewis), the court 
stated that “both the owner of the dominant and servient tenement have an incentive to 
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resolve a dispute pertaining to the relocation of a specified servitude of right of way prior to 
relocation because the servient owner‟s right to relocate a right of way without consent is 
limited to the extent that relocation may not impair the dominant owner‟s rights”.73 
Furthermore, the court in Lewis asserted the following reason for why the flexible legal 
approach may decrease the amount of litigation: 
“The dominant owner has an interest in influencing the servient owner‟s choice of a 
new location, and the landowner will want to avoid the risk and costs involved of 
allowing a court to make an after-the-fact determination as to the correctness of the 
relocation”.74 
The court in Lewis concluded that all of the concerns are adequately addressed by the 
flexible legal approach, namely that a servient owner may not relocate a servitude 
unilaterally if such relocation would prejudice the rights of the dominant owner.75 
The fourth reason for French‟s selection of the flexible legal approach is that this approach 
“maximizes the overall utility of the land” since the servient tenement profits from an 
increase in value while the dominant tenement suffers no decrease at all.76 The flexible 
legal approach provides the owner of the servient tenement with the ability to make the 
most economic use of his or her land that may not have been foreseen when the servitude 
was created.77 The court in Roaring Fork Club LP v St Jude’s Co78 also dealt with the 
court‟s argument in Davis v Bruk,79 namely that allowing the servient owner to relocate a 
specified servitude of right of way unilaterally may confer a sudden unexpected piece of 
good fortune and personal gain on the owner of the servient tenement. In Roaring Fork 
Club LP v St Jude’s Co80 (Roaring Fork Club), the court mentioned that each property 
owner should be able to make use of his or her property to the full as authorised by law, 
provided that they comply with the requirement not to prejudice each other‟s rights relating 
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to the property. The court in Roaring Fork Club said that the economic gain of the owner of 
the servient tenement will be tempered by the servient owner incurring the expense of 
relocating the servitude and ensuring that it complies with the parameters of the flexible 
legal approach.81 The court in Roaring Fork Club assessed the overall fairness of the two 
approaches: 
“The old rule creates a „bilateral monopoly‟82 in that neither owner can transact with 
anyone else.83 While the Restatement rule „imposes upon the servitude holder the 
burden and risk of bringing suit against an unreasonable relocation‟ it „far surpasses 
in utility and fairness the traditional rule that left the servient land owner remediless 
against an unreasonable servitude holder.‟84 The Restatement rule operates to 
redistribute the (one-sided) burden the traditional rule places on the estate burdened 
by the servitude.”85  
French86 mentions a number of reasons to justify her advocacy for a more flexible legal 
approach pertaining to the relocation of a specified servitude of right of way. The flexible 
legal approach does not put the servient owner at the mercy of the owner of the dominant 
tenement.87 The servient owner can relocate only if the dominant owner suffers no 
damage.88 In terms of the traditional common law approach, the dominant owner can claim 
and expect to get almost all the surplus value created by any relocation, whereas if the 
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development made possible by relocation of the servitude increases the value of the 
servient tenement, the owner of the servient tenement will be better off by the amount of 
that increase.89 French90 argues that the flexible legal rules are designed to accommodate 
the interests of both the servient owners and dominant owners and to allow each of the 
owners to maximize the utility of his or her property without damaging the other.91 French92 
favours the flexible legal approach because it surpasses the traditional rule in utility and 
fairness. 
 
5.4 The traditional common law rule and the flexible legal approach from 
a law and economics perspective 
5.4.1 Calabresi and Melamed’s property and liability rule paradigm 
Miceli states that the role of law is to assign property rights.93 He also argues that law 
provides rules that govern voluntary transactions and remedies for violation of rights.94 The 
rules for enforcing property rights may affect the allocation of resources because these 
rules dictate how property rights can be transferred and what remedies are available for 
infringements.95 This part of the chapter will evaluate the legal issue pertaining to the 
relocation of a specified servitude of right of way from the perspective of Calabresi and 
Melamed‟s property and liability rule paradigm. This section will evaluate the economic 
repercussions of the choice of enforcement rules. Calabresi and Melamed developed an 
economic theory of rules for transferring rights that is a natural extension of Coase‟s 
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analysis of the externality problem.96 Calabresi and Melamed‟s theory could be helpful in 
deciding how the rules pertaining to the unilateral relocation of a specified servitude of 
right of way ought to be defined and assigned to the contracting parties. 
As a point of departure, Calabresi and Melamed draw a distinction between two types of 
rules to protect property rights, namely property rules and liability rules.97 Property rules 
allow the right-holders to enjoin all attempts to acquire the right on terms that they deem to 
be unacceptable.98 Liability rules allow right-holders to seek monetary compensation 
awarded by a court for seizures of the right.99 The key distinction lies in the fact that in the 
case of property rules, the right-holder‟s consent is required for a transfer under the 
property rule; however, consent will not be required under a liability rule.100 Under liability 
rules, the party seeking to acquire the right can do so without obtaining the right-holder‟s 
consent.101 However, the acquirer of the right must be willing to pay compensation for the 
holder‟s loss.102 The trade-off is that if consent is required, it will guarantee that any 
exchanges that occur will be mutually beneficial and therefore efficient.103 However, the 
transaction costs involved in obtaining consent will sometimes be too high and will prevent 
otherwise efficient exchanges.104 The trade-off suggests that property rules should be the 
preferred remedy when transaction costs are low, because they facilitate mutually 
beneficial bargaining between private parties.105 By contrast, liability rules should be 
preferred when transaction costs are high since liability rules allow the court to coerce 
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exchanges when bargaining is not possible.106 The theorem regarding the choice between 
property rules and liability rules forms the core of the economic theory of property law.107 
Calabresi and Melamed108 illustrate the way in which legal disputes can be solved by 
application of either property or liability rules. Calabresi and Melamed109 illustrate their 
property and liability paradigm by describing how a legal dispute involving a homeowner 
complaining about emissions from a nearby cement factory could be resolved by 
application of either two alternative property rules or two alternative liability rules.110 Rule 
one assumes that the homeowner has an entitlement to be free of pollution. The 
homeowner has a property right and can obtain an interdict to stop the pollution. Rule 
three assumes that the factory owner possesses an entitlement to make polluting 
emissions when a court allows the pollution to continue unabated despite complaints. The 
homeowner cannot obtain any remedy. The first liability rule variation (Rule two) occurs 
when the homeowner‟s entitlement to be free of pollution is protected, not by means of an 
interdict, but by a damage award (a liability rule) that is intended to compensate the 
homeowner for the damage inflicted upon his entitlement. Rule four is the second liability 
rule variation and will occur when the factory owner‟s entitlement to pollute may be bought 
by the homeowner at some measure of just compensation. 
According to Lovett, this property and liability rule paradigm contributes to legal 
scholarship in two ways.111 First, it provides legal scholars with the ability to visualise “a 
pattern of entitlement enforcement” by which the prevailing party‟s entitlement may be 
vindicated in one of two ways, either through a property rule or through a liability rule, no 
matter who wins the dispute about an entitlement.112 Secondly, the establishment of the 
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property and liability rule paradigm led to a normative inquiry into the question of when 
property rules and when liability rules should be implemented by courts and policy 
makers.113 
The question that remains to be addressed is whether decision makers should prefer clear 
property rules or muddier liability rules.114 The abovementioned question also arises in the 
legal issue relating to the relocation of servitudes, namely whether the traditional common 
law approach should be applicable or whether the flexible legal approach should be 
applicable. 
The insights drawn from Calabresi and Melamed‟s property and liability rule paradigm can 
be applied to frame the debate about the relocation of servitudes.115 The traditional 
common law rule is essentially a property rule that provides the owner of the dominant 
tenement with the entitlement to maintain the original location of the servitude.116 The 
entitlement of the owner of the dominant tenement will be protected through injunctive 
relief (an interdict) because any unlawful interference with the servitude by the owner of 
the servient tenement will be regarded as a form of trespass.117 The servient owner‟s only 
way to relocate the servitude (assuming relocation rights were not preserved in the 
instrument creating the servitude) will be through bargaining.118 If the primary goal of the 
law of servitudes is to achieve economic efficiency and if the cost of bargaining and 
completing a transaction that affects relocation rights is minimal, then most scholars would 
argue that a property rule approach should be applicable.119 Most scholars prefer the 
application of property rules instead of liability rules because, as an entitlement protection 
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mechanism, property rules are simple and clear.120 They reduce uncertainty.121 Property 
rules provide entitlement holders with the right to preserve their property interests without 
any fear that their interest may be taken away by opportunists.122 They also encourage 
individual investment and planning.123 It is also stated that the tendency of property rules 
to define rights and identify right-holders clearly promotes consensual bargaining.124 Bell 
and Parchomovsky are correct when they state that Calabresi and Melamed‟s clarification 
of the concepts of property and liability rules has “solidified the dominance of private 
ordering over public ordering” and that they have led many to presume that private 
bargaining should “take precedence over legal intervention”.125 It is only when private 
bargaining is ineffective that legal intervention should be the last resort.126 
In addition to the abovementioned arguments favouring the application of property rules, 
the next part of this section will provide a pragmatic discussion as to why property rules 
should be applied to dictate how property rights regarding the relocation of servitudes 
should be transferred. The aim of the Harvard Law Review Note127 discussed below is to 
select a rule that will have the effect of creating an efficient outcome for owners of both the 
servient and the dominant tenement. The next part of the chapter will evaluate the 
traditional common law approach and the flexible legal approach from two analytical 
perspectives.128 First, the chapter will examine whether the choice between the traditional 
common law and flexible legal approach will affect the parties‟ actions. Second, the 
chapter will focus on the social values embedded in the law of servitudes to establish 
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whether one of the rules will more faithfully promote the property interests of the dominant 
or servient owner. 
The first question is whether the choice between the traditional rule and the new rule will 
affect the parties‟ action. If one applies the Coase theorem, it does not matter which one of 
the two rules a jurisdiction chooses to adopt, particularly in cases where the parties to a 
servitutal relationship can contract around the rule or when they can rely on authoritarian 
norms that exist independently of the law.129 According to the Coase theorem, the efficient 
outcome can be achieved without government intervention if transaction costs are low, 
regardless of how initial property rights are assigned to individuals in externality 
settings.130 Another way of describing the Coase theorem is that the initial assignment of 
property rights is irrelevant to the final allocation of resources.131 The Coase theorem 
suggests that the owners of the dominant and servient tenement would negotiate when 
determining an appropriate location for the servitude, regardless of whether the common 
law or the flexible legal approach was in force.132 It has been indicated that the transaction 
costs that are normally associated with bargaining between the owners of the dominant 
and servient tenements may prohibit the realisation of the efficient outcome through 
bargaining.133 The Coasean theorem is ineffective to solve the issues relating to the 
unilateral relocation of a specified servitude of right of way, because there may be a 
possibility that cultural impediments may hinder residential neighbours from approaching 
one another and offering an exchange.134 There is also the possibility that at least one of 
the parties will be an organisation and that decision and get-together costs may become 
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significant.135 When bargaining occurs between the organisation and the individual, it will 
require a person to determine the appropriate representative of the organisation to 
negotiate with.136 The decision making procedure in an organisation may be 
burdensome.137 As a result of the potential friction in bargaining, the choice of a particular 
legal rule may matter greatly.138 Therefore, it has been argued that from an efficiency point 
of view the law should assign the entitlement to the party that values the entitlement the 
most.139 However, in situations where it is impossible to determine whether the entitlement 
should be assigned to the owner of the servient or dominant tenement, the law should 
assign the entitlement so that bargaining will be initiated at the least cost.140 It is 
impossible to determine whether the owner of the dominant tenement or of the servient 
tenement values the entitlement to prevent the relocation of a servitude or to relocate a 
servitude unilaterally more highly.141 However, it is possible to determine which party 
would initiate bargaining at the least cost.142 Therefore, assigning the entitlement to 
relocate the servitude unilaterally to the owner of the servient tenement without the 
consent of the owner of the dominant tenement, would lead to an increase in the costs of 
beginning the bargaining process because the owner of the servient tenement would have 
already invested significant resources in relocating the servitude.143 The owner of the 
dominant tenement would incur information costs when he discovers the plans of the 
owner of the servient tenement to relocate the servitude.144 The owner of the dominant 
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tenement will only know for certain of the planned relocation once the owner of the 
servient tenement has made some improvements to the servitude.145 It is also likely that 
the owner of the servient tenement would incur preparation costs before making any 
visible improvements.146 When the owner of the dominant tenement eventually becomes 
aware of the intention of the servient owner to relocate the servitude and initiates 
bargaining, the owner of the servient tenement might be reluctant to accept an offer from 
the owner of the dominant tenement to cease the relocation.147 By contrast, assigning the 
entitlement to prevent the relocation of the servitude to the owner of the dominant 
tenement would make initiating the bargaining process less costly.148 The bargaining 
process will be less costly because the common law rule compels the owner of the 
servient tenement to begin bargaining before incurring significant costs.149 
From the abovementioned law and economics arguments relating to the relocation of 
servitudes, it becomes evident that the choice of a particular legal rule may be important 
because a dispute between a dominant and servient owner presents a bilateral monopoly 
problem.150 A bilateral monopoly will arise in the case when there is only one seller and 
one buyer in a particular market.151 When the parties to the servitutal agreement negotiate 
on whether the servitude should be relocated, the two parties present a bilateral monopoly 
problem since they can only transact with each other.152 Economists acknowledge that 
none of the economic theories can predict the outcome of bargaining between the two 
monopolists.153 The Coase theorem does not address the problem. It appears as if the 
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Coase theorem assumes that the problem does not exist.154 The Coase theorem fails to 
account for the manner that neighbours allocate property entitlements.155 Theories about 
how individuals bargain with respect to or in spite of the formal law do not fully determine 
how the owners of property subject to the servitudes will behave.156 
The next part of the chapter will focus on the social values embedded in the law of 
servitudes in order to establish whether one of the rules will more faithfully promote the 
property interests of the dominant or servient owner. In order to determine which legal rule 
should be adopted, the social values157 embedded in property law ought to be taken into 
consideration as well. The issue that needs to be addressed relates to which policy goals 
the traditional common law approach and the flexible legal approach advance 
respectively.158 The traditional common law rule establishes forced sharing between the 
servient and dominant owner.159 It forces the parties to negotiate where to locate the 
servitude cooperatively.160 In that sense, the property right that the common law rule aims 
to protect is not an entirely private property right.161 The mere fact that the common law 
rule forces cooperation between the two parties does not make it inefficient.162 Enforcing 
such cooperation between the owners of the dominant and servient tenement is good.163 
Maintaining the traditional common law rule forces both parties to recognise and develop 
their interdependence, because neither of the parties could relocate the easement without 
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consulting the other.164 The flexible legal approach is mostly concerned with the facilitation 
of property development.165 However, the flexible legal approach fails to recognise that 
parties to a servitude are interdependent.166 The flexible legal approach favours the 
economic interests of the servient owner only.167 
A question that arises in the law and economic literature is why courts168 and policy 
makers choose to substitute property rules with liability rules if property rules are regarded 
as being beneficial.169 From an economic efficiency point of view it may be argued that the 
cost of establishing the value of an entitlement is so high that even though a transfer of the 
entitlement would benefit both parties, such a transfer will not occur.170 There are also 
arguments that property rules afflict the market with a “bilateral monopoly” situation which 
eventually leads to “holdout” problems.171 According to Epstein, the application of liability 
rules should be limited to those circumstances where property rules function 
inefficiently.172 Lovett173 states that liability rules can be helpful because if the value of the 
entitlement is judicially determined it will smooth the progress of the transaction (transfer of 
the entitlement) between the two contracting parties.174 Liability rules facilitate transactions 
because the court can establish an efficient and fair price for the transfer of the 
entitlement, especially in situations where there is friction between the contracting parties 
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in the bargaining process and where the contracting parties refuse to reveal information 
about their actual valuations to accomplish a transfer.175 The natural consequence of the 
abovementioned view is that in cases where the transaction costs are low, a property rule 
would be the best solution to achieve an optimal allocation of the entitlement, because it 
promotes consensual bargaining and the parties can make the valuations that will be 
necessary to achieve a transfer in a manner that is cheap and accurate.176 According to 
Calabresi and Melamed177 the common reason for implementing a liability rule instead of a 
property rule to protect an entitlement is because the market valuation implicit in property 
rules is regarded as inefficient. 
The next part of the chapter will focus on the risks that arise when a legal system switches 
from property to liability rule protection.178 Liability rules may create an undervaluation of 
entitlements in cases where entitlement holders are sentimentally attached to their 
entitlements.179 Furthermore, the liability rules may result in risks of error and it may 
contribute to an increase in costs.180  It is possible that problems may occur in obtaining 
and processing information (assessment costs) for purposes of damage calculations.181 
Liability rules may actually raise transaction costs; result in market avoidance; and 
discourage individuals from practicing self-reliance and long-term planning.182 Finally, it 
may be argued that when liability rules are applied to possessory interests, the rules could 
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lead to “an infinite round of reciprocal takes and take-backs”183 and could attract third 
parties to buy out rights by taking advantage of liability rules, which will eventually lead to a 
destabilisation of rights.184 
 
5.4.2 Bell and Parchomovsky’s pliability rule paradigm 
Calabresi and Melamed interpreted the law as a structure consisting of three levels, 
namely inalienability rules at the ground level, property rules at the first floor and liability 
rules at the second.185 According to Bell and Parchomovsky, the metaphor of Calabresi 
and Melamed is incomplete because it does not reflect the dynamism of the legal 
system.186 Bell and Parchomovsky propose that pliability rules should be viewed as the 
“stairways between the floors and the corridors and doorways connecting rooms on those 
floors”.187 By contrast to Calabresi and Melamed‟s property and liability rule paradigm, Bell 
and Parchomovsky state that “property and liability rules do not exist in airtight doctrinal 
boxes in which an entitlement is always protected by only one kind of rule”.188 Bell and 
Parchomovsky aim to re-evaluate and improve upon Calabresi and Melamed‟s property 
and liability rules paradigm.189 According to Bell and Parchomovsky, a more complete 
legal analysis that will probe beyond the dichotomy between property and liability rules is 
required.190 In order to fully capture the protection of entitlements in the legal system, Bell 
and Parchomovsky added another level to Calabresi and Melamed‟s analysis, namely the 
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pliability rule paradigm.191 Pliability rules provide the possibility of protecting legal 
entitlements in such a way that the protection of entitlements can shift between property 
and liability rules as long as some circumstances are present.192 However, if the relevant 
condition changes, a different rule will protect the entitlement, as the circumstances 
dictate.193 Therefore, pliability rules can be seen as dynamic rules, while property and 
liability rules are regarded as static.194 A dynamic legal system allows the changing of 
entitlements as the needs of society change.195 Bell and Parchomovsky‟s conceptual 
understanding does not focus on the legal protection of entitlements in isolation.196 
Lovett is in favour of the pliability rule paradigm and argues that it is the best mechanism 
to dictate how the legal dispute regarding the relocation of servitudes ought to be 
regulated.197 With the insights of Bell and Parchomovsky in mind, Lovett asserts that the 
flexible legal approach pertaining to the unilateral relocation of a specified servitude of 
right of way can be regarded as a classic pliability rule.198 Classic pliability rules can be 
described as the transformation of an entitlement from property rule protection to liability 
rule protection.199 Classic pliability rules take into account various instances where default 
property rule protection becomes inefficient or unfair.200 A classic pliability rule starts with a 
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property rule that provides the “baseline protection” of the entitlement.201 This property rule 
then defines a “triggering event that alters the protection from property to liability rule”.202 
When defining the triggering event that alters protection from property to liability rules, the 
classic pliability rule retains the advantages of baseline property rule protection, while at 
the same time it creates the flexibility to adapt to changing circumstances.203 
The flexible legal approach pertaining to the unilateral relocation of a specified servitude of 
right of way can be regarded as a classic pliability rule,204 because the flexible legal 
approach as applied in Linvestment takes an important entitlement associated with a 
servitude; namely the right of the holder to maintain and exercise the servitude in the same 
place;205 and strives to transform its measure of protection by adopting a liability rule 
standard.206 The flexible legal approach seeks to shift the way courts think about the 
relocation of servitudes in the direction of liability rules.207 Lovett208 argues that this shift is 
worthwhile because it assists courts and the contracting parties to understand servitudes 
as evolving relationships between parties who have concurrent interests in the same land 
and not merely as inflexible property rights. 
According to Bell and Parchomovsky, pliability rules allow rule and policy makers “to 
foresee changed circumstances and to incorporate them into a legal rule by identifying the 
change as the trigger that shifts protection modes”.209 Pliability rules are flexible because 
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they allow policy makers to avoid the consequence of either a static property or liability 
rule regime.210 Pliability rules are regarded as more attractive rule models, especially in 
cases where a policy maker aims to achieve a balance of “incompatible interests” such as 
the concerns of efficiency and justice.211 
According to Lovett,212 the flexible legal approach as a classic pliability rule is an 
improvement to the static property rule protection provided by the traditional common law 
rule since it leads to fairness and efficiency. 
 
5.4.3 Refinement of the flexible legal approach 
Critics of the flexible legal approach and liability rules argue that a sudden change from a 
property rule to a liability rule has the potential to destabilise property rights, discourage 
investment, upset settled expectations and undermine the ability of individual property 
owners to resist forced sales.213 Some may argue that the dominant owner may appear to 
be selfish by refusing to cooperate with the owner of the servient tenement.214 However, 
there are strong reasons for respecting the rights and interests of the owner who refuses 
to cooperate with the servient owner.215 If the dominant owner possesses a property 
interest after all and if the dominant owner‟s right to hold out, is an aspect of the right to 
hold property, then the neighbour‟s holdout is perfectly legitimate.216 As a result of the 
potential of the flexible legal approach to undermine the long-term staying power that 
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developers, purchasers and investors look for in a servitude, Rose217 fears that the flexible 
legal approach could introduce uncertainty into servitude transactions and discourage the 
land development that servitudes are intended to secure. Rose218 proposes a very clear 
approach to address the problem of servitude obsolescence. She proposes that the 
duration of servitudes should be limited to a fixed period of time. Rose219 states that the 
fixed period of time should ideally be chosen by the original parties themselves or chosen 
by the legislature according to the type of development purpose the servitude serves. 
Once the fixed period has terminated, the servitutal contract should be open for 
renegotiation.220 Dunham‟s alternative remedy for the relocation of servitudes is similar to 
the solution provided by Rose.221 Dunham proposes a temporal “limit on the duration of 
restrictions, calculated from the time of recordation” or a buy-out mechanism supervised 
by a court, in terms of which a servient owner would have the right to purchase a release 
of the servitude restriction from the dominant estate at a judicially determined fair price (a 
sum equal to the loss suffered by reason of the release).222 Reichman223 asserts that 
servitudes are efficient upon creation and that the right should be enforced. If the 
contracting parties rights are protected it will encourage utilisation of private planning.224 A 
servitude‟s utility may fluctuate or even diminish as time passes and changes in patterns of 
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land uses and technological developments occur.225 As a result of this, judicial ingenuity is 
necessary in structuring remedies.226 
Even though Lovett227 is in favour of the flexible legal approach, he states that too much 
will be left unexplored if one declares that the flexible legal approach constitutes an 
improvement to the traditional common law position. He submits that the efficiency and 
fairness of the flexible legal approach pertaining to the relocation of servitudes could be 
further improved and strengthened.228 Lovett229 proposes three pliability rule refinements 
to the flexible legal approach. Lovett230 borrowed his insights regarding the refinement of 
the flexible legal approach from the views of the abovementioned legal scholars. First, he 
states that the flexible legal approach could be improved by creating a two-step triggering 
mechanism which can be used to strengthen the property rule protection phase of the 
pliability rule.231 This two-step triggering mechanism is formulated by establishing a 
definite time period during which the location of the servitude cannot be altered without 
obtaining the necessary consent from the owner of the dominant tenement.232 Lovett233 
states that if servitudes were allowed a duration of twenty years, it would reduce the risk 
and economic cost of obsolescence and the transaction costs involved in attempting to 
obtain the release of an obsolete servitude. According to Lovett,234 this improvement would 
respond to the efficiency-oriented criticisms of the flexible legal approach, because if the 
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property rule protects the dominant owner‟s entitlement for a defined period of time, it 
provides the dominant owners with a measure of certainty and predictability.235 
Lovett‟s236 second proposed improvement to the flexible legal approach includes two 
elements. He advocates that after the expiry of the period during which the relocation of a 
servitude is prohibited, the location of a servitude should only be changed without the 
dominant owner‟s consent if the servient owner obtains a declaration from a court in terms 
of which the utility and fairness criteria of the flexible legal approach have been met.237 
This will include instances where the servient owner will be materially inconvenienced in 
the use of his property if the status quo is maintained, the relocation will not prejudice the 
owner of the dominant tenement and that the servient owner pays all costs incurred for the 
relocation of the servitude.238 According to Lovett,239 the arbiter need not be a typical court. 
The requirement of judicial or quasi-judicial authorisation for the relocation of servitudes is 
a response to the concerns raised by Orth.240 Orth241 is not in favour of the flexible legal 
approach because the flexible legal approach does not require of the servient owner to 
obtain judicial authorisation in advance before relocating the servitude. It appears as if the 
flexible legal approach authorises a servient owner to make a unilateral decision that the 
advantages of the relocation of the servitude outweigh the servitude holder‟s interests in 
maintaining the original location of the servitude.242 
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In response to Orth‟s concern, some courts interpreting the Louisiana Civil Code as well as 
decisions adopting The Third Restatement of Property (Servitudes) (Restatement)243 in the 
US have focused on the necessity of requiring judicial authorisation before relocation of 
servitudes can take place. In the first reported servitude relocation judgment in Louisiana, 
Hotard v Perrilloux244 (Hotard) the court dismissed the servient owner‟s claim to relocate 
the servitude because he had sought to relocate the servitude arbitrarily without obtaining 
judicial authorisation. Louisiana‟s law of servitudes is derived largely from the French Civil 
Code, namely the Code Napoléon, whose servitude provisions are indebted to Roman 
law.245 The court in Hotard cited French writers from the 19th century interpreting article 
701 of the French Civil Code in support of the conclusion that judicial authorisation was 
required before relocation of a servitude could take place.246 In Denegre v Louisiana Public 
Service Commission247 the court stated that a servient owner seeking to relocate a right of 
way should be able to “secure a judicial adjudication” under article 777 of the Louisiana 
Civil Code. The importance of obtaining judicial authorisation before relocating a servitude 
was also reiterated in Discon v Sara Inc.248 
The third pliability rule improvement that could be attached to the flexible legal approach 
would grant the court the discretion to award compensatory damages.249 Lovett250 asserts 
that he designed this refinement to bring more efficiency and fairness to the relocation of 
servitudes and modification decisions. Furthermore, Lovett251 states that this third pliability 
rule refinement responds to the criticism that liability rules may discourage individuals from 
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learning how to bargain with each other. In addition, Lovett asserts that if a servient owner 
complies with all the requirements of the flexible legal approach and the court awards no 
damages, then the servient owner will capture the entire gain of the transaction without 
having to share it with the dominant owner, which might not have happened if the parties 
had settled the dispute themselves by means of bargaining.252 Lovett253 refers to Ogden v 
Bankston (Ogden)254 to illustrate the unfairness of the flexible legal approach in allowing 
the owner of a servient tenement to capture all the surplus value of servitude relocation. In 
the Ogden case, the plaintiff was the owner of the dominant tenement. The defendant was 
the owner of the servient tenement. A servitude was registered over the defendant‟s 
property. The servient owners desired to subdivide and market their property as a 
residential neighbourhood and contend that the present location of the servitude interfered 
with their plans to develop and sell the property. The dominant owner sought a preliminary 
and permanent injunction against the servient owner to prevent the servient owner from 
interfering with the dominant owner‟s property as well as a claim for damages. The 
servient owner sought a declaratory order to relocate the servitude. The District Court 
decided the case in favour of the owner of the dominant tenement and granted a 
permanent injunction which prohibited the owner of the servient tenement from any further 
interference with the servitude.255 The servient owner did not succeed with his claim 
because he failed to prove that the present site of the right of passage had become 
burdensome.256 The Court of Appeal affirmed the decision of the trial court.257 The Court of 
Appeal held that the servient owner did not have a contractual right to relocate the 
servitude.258 Furthermore, the court held that the right of relocation under the provision of 
the Louisiana Civil Code could not be claimed because the servient owner could not 
establish that the continued existence of the servitude had become burdensome in its 
present location.259 The Supreme Court of Appeal stated that the Court of Appeal was 
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correct in determining that once a praedial servitude was established by contract, the 
servient owner may not superimpose relocation rights over property sold without being 
subject to a right of relocation.260 
The court considered whether the servient owners‟ legal rights under article 777 of the 
1870 Louisiana Civil Code (the predecessor of the current Article 748) justified the 
proposed location. The court held that the critical question in this case was to determine 
whether it has been shown that the current location of the servitude “has become more 
burdensome” to the current owner of the servient tenement.261 The court recognised the 
conflicting policies supporting each party‟s position.262 Dixon CJ noted that the right of a 
servient owner to relocate a servitude was founded on the civilian principle that “praedial 
servitudes are restraints on the free disposal and use of property, and are not, on that 
account, entitled to be viewed with favour by the law”.263 On the other hand, Dixon CJ 
acknowledged that a servitude is a bargained for convenience that is established by 
means of a contract between the servient and dominant owners.264 The court noted that 
the general principle established in the law is that the servient owner can do nothing to 
diminish the use or convenience of the servitude.265 
Furthermore, Dixon CJ noted that the servient owner failed to prove that the current 
location was more burdensome now than what it was originally.266 The servient owner also 
failed to prove that the current location of the servitude prevented him from making any 
useful improvement.267 The court pointed out that the servient owner‟s claim for relocation 
was based on the assertion that the present location of the roadway might hinder the 
servient owner from increasing his profits on the sale of the land.268 The court seemed 
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sceptical about such a slim basis for relocation and observed that one distinct 
disadvantage of the present location of the servitude that might satisfy the “more 
burdensome” requirement under Article 777 was that it prevents lots in the proposed 
subdivision from having a full depth of about 150 feet.269 These lots would be less 
desirable because the original location of the servitude would diminish their depth below 
that figure.270 The court stated that it was doubtful that when the servitude was initially 
created, the servient owner contemplated the use of his property as a suburban 
neighbourhood.271 The potential for land development only arose once circumstances 
changed.272 Lovett states that the abovementioned statement is remarkable because of 
the implication that the court will do something about it.273 Despite the court‟s 
unwillingness to act to alleviate the servient owner‟s “personal inconvenience”, the court 
held that the servient owner ought to be “entitled to relocate the servitude where it 
diminishes the depth of the lots in the proposed subdivision below the figure required for 
the most advantageous use of the property”.274 In conclusion, the court authorised the 
relocation of the servitude by remanding the case to the trial court in order for the trial 
court to reconsider the proposed relocation within its new parameters.275 The court held 
that the burden created by the servitude should be measured by the servient owner‟s 
reduced profit margin in his aim to resell the subdivided lots.276 
As Lovett277 rightfully mentions, the “social utility maximising considerations” that have 
been taken into consideration to justify the relocation rule was reduced to nothing more 
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than a developer‟s reduced profit margin. Lovett278 asserts that the servitude in the Ogden 
case that was situated along a rustic, tree-lined, mile-long road, might have provided the 
dominant owner with recreational or picturesque benefits that a market analyst might 
overlook. Lovett279 argues that despite the interests of the dominant owner, the courts still 
allowed the relocation of a servitude as long as an alternative route could be granted that 
was equally convenient to the dominant owner. Lovett uses the abovementioned example 
to illustrate the tendency of liability rules to undervalue or to ignore the subjective values 
that property owners attach to the things they possess.280 
A question that arises is how decision makers can further improve the flexible legal 
approach in order to prevent it from becoming “a vehicle for one private individual to 
capture all of the economic gain of a non-consensual transaction”.281 According to Lovett, 
the possible answer to this question is to give courts the power to award a premium or 
bonus compensation.282 Lovett refers to the Mill Acts.283 These statutes authorised a 
private riparian owner to erect a dam “which backed up the water behind it in order to 
create a „head‟ for the operation of a mill”284 that would create a public benefit while at the 
same time limiting the remedies of upstream land owners whose property was flooded to 
monetary damages rather than injunctive relief.285 As Lovett286 states, the Mill Acts287 
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created a pliability rule because it takes away the upstream property owner‟s traditional 
right to enjoin the flooding nuisance and substitutes damages as the only remedy. 
Additionally, Lovett288 asserts that the following two limitations were essential to the 
effective operation of this pliability rule. In the first instance, the law required the 
downstream user to obtain prior governmental authorisation before he could obtain 
protection under the Mills Acts.289 The purpose of the abovementioned requirement was to 
ensure that the scope of the dam was appropriate and to ensure that a public benefit 
would result from the forced exchange of property rights.290 Secondly, “the upstream 
owner was awarded premium compensation, typically 150% of the fair market value of the 
lost property”.291 The premium compensation regime assured that the surplus created by a 
forced exchange was divided evenly.292 
According to Bell and Parchomovsky, another advantage relating to the premium 
compensation scheme is that when a privileged taking deprives the owner of the property 
of his or her entitlement, the scheme provides meaningful compensation.293 However, 
Lovett notes that the need for premium compensation from Bell and Parchomovsky‟s 
perspective diminishes the need for compensation in the case of the flexible legal 
approach pertaining to the unilateral relocation of servitudes, because the flexible legal 
approach does not completely deprive the servitude holder of his entitlement.294 The aim 
of the criteria contained in the flexible legal approach, namely that an existing servitude of 
right of way may only be altered provided that the servient owner will be materially 
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inconvenienced in the use of his property if the status quo is maintained, that the 
relocation will not prejudice the owner of the dominant tenement, and that the servient 
owner pays all costs incurred in the relocation of the servitude,295 diminishes the need for 
premium compensation.296 In the US Supreme Court decision of Head v Amoskeag 
Manufacturing Co297 the court reiterated the justification for a refined pliability rule 
approach in the easement location setting:298  
“When property, in which several persons have a common interest cannot be fully 
enjoyed in its existing condition, the law usually provides a way in which they may 
compel one another to submit to measures necessary to secure its beneficial 
enjoyment, making equitable compensation to any whose control in the property is 
thereby modified.”299  
Lovett300 refers to Winingder v Balmer301 to illustrate a premium compensation award in a 
context that is similar to the relocation of servitudes. Winingder lived in a house built over 
eighty years ago. The house was located on the common property line of the property 
belonging to Balmer. At the time when Winingder purchased the house, there was no 
fence along the common property line, except the remains of a broken down chain link 
structure. When Balmer purchased the property on the land adjacent to Winingder‟s 
property, she was aware of the fact that Winingder‟s home encroached on the common 
property line. Maintenance work was performed at Winingder‟s home. The maintenance 
workers used the access through the Balmer property, with Balmer‟s knowledge and 
without complaint. Winingder‟s husband initiated negotiations with Balmer. They sought to 
achieve an acceptable plan for the development of Balmer‟s property, or in the alternative 
they sought to purchase a strip of the property along the common boundary line, but the 
negotiations were unsuccessful. Balmer erected a fence running the length of the common 
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property line. The fence that was erected by Balmer blocked off a rear window and a side 
window of Winingder‟s home. It also blocked access to Winingder‟s utilities, hot water 
heaters and air conditioning units. The trial court applied article 670 of the Louisiana Civil 
Code to solve the dispute.302 The trial court granted a legal servitude in favour of the 
Winingder estate.303 The court required Winingder to pay Balmer the value of the servitude 
and the cost of moving the fence and gate erected by Balmer.304 The trial court resolved 
the case by applying Article 670 of the Louisiana Civil Code.305 Article 670 provides a 
classic pliability solution to the dispute because it allows a court to grant the owner of an 
encroaching building a praedial servitude to maintain his building where it stands, provided 
that the building was constructed in good faith, that the owner did not complain within a 
reasonable time after the owner knew or should have known of the encroachment and that 
the encroacher pays compensation for the value of the servitude taken and for the damage 
that the neighbour has sustained.306 The court granted the plaintiff a servitude over the 
defendant‟s property along the common border line. Furthermore, the court held that 
Balmer had to remove the fence and awarded the defendant damages as compensation 
for the servitude.307 
Lovett308  states that the court‟s decision to grant a declaratory order for the payment of 
compensation implies recognition that forced transfers of private property interests will at 
times necessitate additional measures of compensation where strong personal and 
subjective interests are at stake. Lovett309 is correct in stating that several goals will be 
accomplished when courts are given the power to award some premium compensation in 
situations where the relocation of a servitude is required. One of these goals is that it will 
most probably provide incentives to servient owners to bargain on how the servitude ought 
to be relocated rather than risking the possibility of being subjected to a compensation 
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penalty.310 It would also give servitude holders protection against servient owners who are 
reluctant to share the expected net surplus to be gained by the relocation of the 
servitude.311 In addition, the third refinement of the flexible legal approach could also help 
compensate the dominant owner for the loss of any subjective values associated with 
servitutal rights.312 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was to evaluate whether it is justifiable for courts to overturn a long 
established precedent relating to servitudes based on the grounds of convenience and 
equity. This chapter investigated whether the Linvestment court‟s reasons for reaching its 
decision are sufficient and convincing. The main issue that the chapter aimed to address 
was to determine the correct legal approach, namely to adhere to the traditional common 
law rule which prohibits the unilateral relocation of the servitude by the owner of the 
servient tenement unless consent has been obtained from the owner of the dominant 
tenement; or the flexible legal approach that allows the unilateral relocation of a servitude. 
It also aimed to illustrate how the flexible legal approach can be improved in order to strike 
a balance between the interests of the different parties to the servitutal contract. 
In this chapter, the general arguments in favour of and the criticism against the traditional 
common law and the flexible legal approach have been evaluated. The traditional common 
law position is preferred by some academics because the traditional common law 
promotes certainty in landownership. Furthermore, it is assumed that when a servitude is 
created, the grantor grants the right to the dominant owner to use his property, including 
the assurance of the permanent localisation of the servitude. The traditional common law 
rule balances the restrictions placed on both parties to the servitutal relationship. The final 
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argument in favour of the traditional common law position is that a servitude is nothing less 
than a fixed and judicially unchangeable property right. 
Some academics prefer the flexible legal approach because it does not put the servient 
owner at the mercy of the owner of the dominant tenement.313 The servient owner can 
relocate only if the dominant owner suffers no damage.314 In terms of the traditional 
common law approach, the dominant owner can demand and in theory expect to get 
almost all the surplus value created by any relocation, while if the development made 
possible by relocation of the servitude increases the value of the servient tenement, the 
owner of the servient tenement will be better off by the amount of that increase.315 
French316 argues that the flexible legal rules are designed to accommodate the interests of 
both the servient owners and dominant owners and to allow each of the owners to 
maximize the utility of his or her property without damaging the other. 317 
As an alternative, law and economics theory was utilised as a guideline to determine when 
the traditional common law approach and when the flexible legal approach ought to be 
applied by policy makers. Calabresi and Melamed‟s property and liability rule paradigm is 
one of the paradigms used to frame the debate about the relocation of servitudes. This 
paradigm illustrates how entitlements can be protected by property and liability rules. 
Furthermore, it also illustrates when policy makers should apply property and liability rules 
to protect entitlements. The trade-off suggests that property rules318 should be the 
preferred remedy when transaction costs are low, because they facilitate mutually 
beneficial bargaining between private parties.319 By contrast, liability rules should be 
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preferred when transaction costs are high because liability rules320 allow the court to 
coerce exchanges when bargaining is not possible.321 However, there are risks involved 
when a legal system switches from property to liability rule protection.322 One of the risks 
that arise is that liability rules may create an undervaluation of entitlements in cases where 
entitlement holders are sentimentally attached to their entitlements.323 
Thereafter, Bell and Parchomovsky‟s pliability rule paradigm was discussed. Their pliability 
paradigm provides insight as to what the structure of the legal rule regarding the relocation 
of servitudes should look like in order for the rule to strike a balance in the rights of both 
the dominant and servient owner. The flexible legal approach pertaining to the unilateral 
relocation of a specified servitude of right of way can be regarded as a classic pliability 
rule.324 It is clear from the insights of Bell and Parchomovsky‟s that when a legal rule such 
as the flexible legal approach is structured in accordance with the pliability paradigm, it has 
the effect of fully capturing the protection of entitlements in the legal system.325 Pliability 
rules protect legal entitlements where the protection of entitlements can shift between 
property and liability rules as long as some requirements have been met.  Pliability rules 
can be regarded as dynamic in nature, while property and liability rules can be regarded as 
static. 
If the normative reasons used to justify the application of a pliability rule paradigm are 
taken into consideration, then the inference may be drawn that the grounds on which the 
court in Linvestment CC v Hammersley326 based its judgment, namely fairness, justice and 
equity, are to a certain extent credible, since the law cannot remain rigid and needs to be 
continually changed in order to meet changing conditions. This judgment is also sensible 
from a practical point of view. Lovett is correct when he states that the flexible legal 
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approach is pragmatic because it helps courts to understand servitudes as evolving 
relationships between parties with concurrent interests in the same land and not merely as 
inflexible property rights.327 
However, there is room for improvement. The flexible legal approach can be and should 
be refined in its implementation in the direction of a well-defined pliability rule consistent 
with the vision of Bell and Parchomovsky. Lovett328 proposed three pliability rule 
refinements to the flexible legal approach. First, he states that the flexible legal approach 
should be improved by creating a two-step triggering mechanism which can be used to 
strengthen the property rule protection phase of the pliability rule.329 This two-step 
triggering mechanism will be formulated by establishing a definite time period during which 
the location of the servitude cannot be altered without obtaining the necessary consent 
from the owner of the dominant tenement.330 According to Lovett,331 this improvement 
would respond to the efficiency-oriented criticisms of the flexible legal approach, because 
if the property rule protects the dominant owner‟s entitlement for a defined period of time, 
then it provides the dominant owners with a measure of certainty and predictability.332 
Lovett‟s333 second proposed improvement to the flexible legal approach includes two 
elements. According to Lovett, once the period during which the relocation of a servitude is 
prohibited expires, the location of a servitude should only be changed without the 
dominant owner‟s consent if the servient owner obtains a declaration from a court that 
states that the utility and fairness criteria of the flexible legal approach have been met.334 
The third pliability rule improvement that could be attached to the flexible legal approach 
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would grant the court the discretion to award compensatory damages.335 According to 
Lovett,336 he designed this refinement to bring more efficiency and fairness to the 
relocation of servitudes and modification decisions. Furthermore, Lovett337 states that this 
third pliability rule refinement responds to the critique that liability rules may discourage 
individuals from learning how to bargain with each other. In addition, Lovett submits that if 
a servient owner complies with all the requirements of the flexible legal approach and the 
court awards no damages, then the servient owner will capture the entire gain from the 
transaction without having to share it with the dominant owner, which might not have 
happened if the parties settled the dispute by themselves by means of bargaining.338 
The three refinements that Lovett proposes to improve the flexible legal approach relating 
to the relocation of servitudes are definitely viable. If his three refinements are embedded 
in the legislative or judicial rules regulating the relocation of servitudes, then the new rule 
will certainly become a leading example of the value of pliability rule modelling as a mode 
for entitlement protection design.339 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
6.1 Introduction 
In Linvestment CC v Hammersley1 (Linvestment), the court referred to historical and policy 
considerations and relied on comparative law to reach the conclusion that even specified 
servitudes of right of way may be relocated unilaterally, against the wishes of the owner of 
the dominant property, if it is in the interest of fairness, equity and justice.  
The aim of this thesis was to investigate whether the methodology used and the reasons 
provided by the court in Linvestment to reach its conclusion, namely that unilateral 
relocation of a specified servitude of right of way is possible in South African law, are 
convincing and sufficient. The point of departure was that the Linvestment judgment 
changed the common law on the basis of insubstantial historical and comparative 
argument, although the policy reasons for the decision are more convincing.2 This thesis 
begins with a discussion of the Linvestment case in view of the traditional legal position 
regarding the relocation of a specified servitude and then proceeds to a comparative 
study, a constitutional analysis and a policy analysis. This conclusion is a discussion of the 
main findings on the legal issue pertaining to the unilateral relocation of a specified 
servitude of right of way. 
 
6.2 Linvestment CC v Hammersley and South African law 
The aim of chapter 2 was to discuss the traditional legal position regarding the unilateral 
relocation of a specified servitude of right of way as it was applied in South African law, 
prior to the decision in Linvestment. The traditional legal principle regarding the relocation 
of servitudes as stated in Gardens Estate Ltd v Lewis3 was that a specified or definite 
servitude could only be relocated by mutual consent between the parties to the contract 
constituting the servitude. Chapter 2 illustrates how the court in Linvestment overturned 
this long-established precedent relating to servitudes based on the grounds of 
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convenience and equity. Since the Linvestment judgment, the legal position regarding the 
unilateral relocation of a specified servitude of right of way is that the location of a 
specified servitude of right of way may be altered unilaterally by the owner of the servient 
tenement. This unilateral relocation requires that the servient owner will be materially 
inconvenienced in the use of his property if the status quo is maintained, that the 
relocation will not prejudice the owner of the dominant tenement and that the servient 
owner pays all costs incurred in the relocation of the servitude.4 
Chapter 2 briefly analyses the legal historical arguments that the court in Linvestment 
relied on to justify its departure from the common law. The court in Linvestment relied on 
the 1816 draft code of law by Professor JM Kemper to justify its departure from the 
common law rule.5 The legal historical arguments provided to justify the conclusion that a 
specified servitude of right of way may be relocated unilaterally are problematic. Firstly, 
Heher AJ should not have relied on the 1816 draft civil code of Professor JM Kemper, 
because it never formed part of the received 17th and 18th century Roman-Dutch law of 
South Africa. Secondly, the Code Civil brought an end to Roman-Dutch law in its country 
of origin.6 Therefore, the draft civil code was no longer Roman-Dutch law in the sense that 
South Africa inherited it because it formed part of the post-Napoleonic development of 
Dutch law.7 Thirdly, the draft civil code of Professor JM Kemper was never official law in 
the Netherlands.8 Purely on historical grounds there was therefore insufficient reason for 
the departure from the established position as it was set out in Gardens Estate Ltd v 
Lewis. 
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6.3 Comparative analysis 
The court in Linvestment9 further justified its departure from earlier precedent with 
reference to the international tendency to follow a more flexible legal approach. The 
problem with the methodology of this decision is that the court used secondary sources to 
support its comparative argument. This was done without any discussion of their 
comparative value or context.10 In the absence of more detailed and contextual information 
it is difficult to assess the weight of the comparative sources referred to in the decision. 
Unlike the Linvestment judgment, chapter 3 aimed at providing a more contextual 
comparative analysis of the Dutch, German, US, Scots and English legal position 
pertaining to the unilateral relocation of a specified servitude of right of way. The purpose 
of the comparative section is above all to ascertain why and how the foreign jurisdictions 
referred to either retained or abolished the stricter approach to unilateral relocation of a 
specified servitude of right of way. 
Dutch and German law as well as some states in the US illustrate the widespread practice 
that favours a flexible approach to the relocation of servitudes. In Dutch law, the owner of 
the servient tenement may relocate a servitude unilaterally, provided that the relocation is 
reasonable and that the relocation of the servitude will not diminish the right of the owner 
of the dominant tenement.11 A declaratory order should be obtained from the court, as 
soon as a dispute regarding the reasonableness of the relocation of a servitude arise.12 
The court will only modify the location of a servitude once the owner of the servient 
tenement complies with the fairness criteria of the flexible legal approach13 and if the 
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existence of the initial route is in conflict with the public interest.14 If one evaluates the 
relevant provisions in the Dutch Civil Code, one can draw the inference that the reason 
why Dutch law applies a flexible approach is to accommodate the owner of the servient 
tenement in cases where unforeseen circumstances may necessitate the relocation of a 
servitude.15 
German law pertaining to the relocation of a specified servitude of right of way is similar to 
Dutch law in that the owner of the servient tenement may only relocate a servitude if the 
initial servitude creates more than a mere inconvenience for the servient owner.16  
Furthermore, the German Civil Code states that a right to relocate a servitude cannot be 
excluded by legal transaction.17 If one takes the latter requirement of the German Civil 
Code into consideration, it appears as though the reason for the application of the flexible 
legal approach is to prevent a rigid legal system in which the owner of the servient 
tenement is prohibited from relocating a servitude, especially in unforeseen circumstances 
where it may be unreasonable to expect of the owner of the servient tenement to maintain 
the servitude unchanged. Servitutal rights cannot be inflexible since it needs to continually 
meet the changing needs of society. 
The US federal law does not have a uniform practice regarding the relocation of a 
specified servitude of right of way. Some states in the US follow a strict common law 
approach, while other states follow a flexible approach pertaining to the relocation of a 
specified servitude of right of way. A strict common law approach is applied in some states 
of the US on the ground that the owner of the dominant tenement bargained for a fixed 
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location.18 Therefore, it is important that the owner of the dominant tenement should be 
consulted prior to relocation, because a unilateral relocation of a servitude may reduce the 
utility and value of the servitude for the owner of the dominant tenement.19 Louisiana was 
one of the first states in the US to permit a flexible approach regarding the relocation of a 
specified servitude of right of way.20 The Louisiana rule authorising the unilateral relocation 
of a specified servitude of right of way was adopted by the American Law Institute‟s 
Restatement (Third) of Property (Servitudes) § 4.8 (2000) as the recommended new rule 
for the relocation of servitudes in US law generally.21 Even though some states prefer the 
strict traditional common law approach, some courts in the US began to adopt the flexible 
legal approach.22 Numerous arguments are provided to justify the application of the flexible 
legal approach in the US law.23 The primary goal of the new rule is to accommodate the 
owner of the servient estate to develop his property without interfering with the interests of 
the owner of the dominant tenement.24 The flexible legal approach decreases the risk that 
the servient tenement will be unreasonably restricted from future development.25 In 
addition, the aim of the flexible legal approach is to strike a balance between the interests 
of the owner of the dominant tenement and the owner of the servient tenement.26 
Scots law is less clear regarding the legal position regarding the relocation of a specified 
servitude of right of way.27 The legal approach followed in Scots law can be divided into an 
early common law approach, a later approach and a modern composite approach.28 The 
early common law approach was of a flexible nature and authorised the owner of the 
                                            
18
 See Chapter 3 section 3.4 
19
 See Singer JW Introduction to Property (2
nd
 ed 2005) 222. The term “easement owner” refers to the owner 
of the servient tenement and the term “easement holder” refers to the owner of the dominant tenement. 
20
 Lovett JA “A bend in the road: Easement relocation and pliability in the new Restatement (Third) of 
Property: Servitudes” (2005) 38 Conn LR 1-77 at 42. 
21
 See Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes § 4.8(3) (2000). Comment (f) notes that s 4.8(3) “adopts 
the civil law rule that is in effect in Louisiana and a few other states”. This rule was proposed for the first time 
in a tentative draft of chapter 4 of the Restatement in 1994. See also Lovett JA “A new way: Servitude 
relocation in Scotland and Louisiana” (2005) 9 Edin LR 352-394 at 359. 
22
 Lewis v Young 705 N E 2d 649 (NY 1998); Roaring Forks Club v St Jude’s Co 36 P 3d 1229 (Colo 2001). 
23
 See Chapter 5. 
24
 American Law Institute Restatement of the Law – Property Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes § 
4.8(3) (2000) Location, Relocation, and Dimensions of a Servitude (See Comment f to § 4.8(3)). 
25
 American Law Institute Restatement of the Law – Property Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes § 
4.8(3) (2000) Location, Relocation, and Dimensions of a Servitude (See Comment f to § 4.8(3)). 
26
 French S “Relocating easements: Restatement (third), servitudes § 4.8 (3)” (2003) 38 Real Prop Prob & Tr 
J 1–15. 
27
 See Chapter 3 section 3.5. 
28
 Cuisine DJ & Paisley RRM Servitudes and Rights of Way (1998) paras 12.37-12.80. 
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servient tenement to relocate a servitude unilaterally, provided that the alteration did not 
diminish the interests of the dominant owner.29 The later approach is based on a stronger 
preference for contract oriented certainty, namely that once a servitude is determined by a 
contract, it may not be relocated.30 A strict contractual approach is applied in situations 
where the relocation of a specified servitude of right of way would lead to a destabilisation 
of the owner of the dominant tenement‟s property rights.31 However, there are strong 
arguments in favour of the unilateral relocation of a specified servitude of right of way in 
Scots law.32 Cuisine and Paisley state that the later approach should not be taken to 
suggest that where the servitude is defined in a deed, that evidence of convenience or 
prejudice, arising from a proposed variation is irrelevant.33 Even though a strict contract-
oriented approach is applied in Scotland, the owner of the servient estate may apply to the 
Lands Tribunal for the deviation of the servitude.34 English law regarding the unilateral 
relocation of servitudes is not as flexible and states that the owner of the servient estate 
will have no right to alter or deviate from the line once the location of an easement is 
specified by contract or usage. Alterations may only be allowed if such a right has been 
                                            
29
 See § 987 and § 1010 in Bell GJ & Guthrie W Principles of the Law of Scotland (10
th
 ed 1899) 407, 412; 
Cuisine DJ & Paisley RRM Servitudes and Rights of Way (1998) para 12.37. However, the passages in 
Bankton AM An Institute of the Laws of Scotland in Civil Rights: With Observations upon the Agreement or 
Diversity between them and the Laws of England. In Four Books. After the General Method of the Viscount 
of Stair's Institutions II vii (1751-1753) 17 and 18 seem to conflict with the passages in Bell GJ & Guthrie W 
Principles of the Law of Scotland (10
th
 ed 1899). According to Cuisine and Paisley, the views of Lord 
Bankton may be reconciled with Lord Bell‟s views on the basis that passage 18 indicates that when a 
servitude which was originally exercisable over an indefinite route has a route assigned to it, that route 
cannot be altered unilaterally by the servient proprietor without any justifiable cause. According to Cuisine 
and Paisley, passage 17 may indicate that a justifiable cause for relocating a servitude of right of way is the 
intention to enclose and labour ground through which it runs. See footnote 33 in Cuisine DJ & Paisley RRM 
Servitudes and Rights of Way (1998) 405. 
30
 Hill v Maclaren (1879) 6 R 1363 at 1366. For a discussion of Hill v Maclaren (1879) 6 R 1363 see Lovett 
JA “A new way: Servitude relocation in Scotland and Louisiana” (2005) 9 Edin LR 352-394 at 369. 
31
 Hill v Maclaren  (1879) 6 R 1363 at 1366. 
32
 The minority view is expressed in Hill v Maclaren (1879) 6 R 1363 at 1368. The minority approach 
suggests that the owner of the servient estate may seek a declaratory order from the court to have the 
servitude varied Cuisine DJ & Paisley RRM Servitudes and Rights of Way (1998) para 12.43. 
33
 Cuisine DJ & Paisley RRM Servitudes and Rights of Way (1998) para 12.52. 
34
 In terms of Part I of the Conveyancing and Feudal Reform (Scotland) Act 1970, the burdened servient 
owner can apply to the Lands Tribunal for a variation of a servitutal right. The servient owner can apply to the 
Lands Tribunal even in cases where unilateral relocation at common law is not available. Munro v McClintock 
1996 SLT (Sh Ct) 97 at 101. See Cuisine DJ & Paisley RRM Servitudes and Rights of Way (1998) para 
12.76. The right of the servient owner to have resort to the Conveyancing and Feudal Reform (Scotland) Act 
1970 cannot be restricted or excluded by an agreement. S 7 of the Conveyancing and Feudal Reform 
(Scotland) Act 1970. See Cuisine DJ & Paisley RRM Servitudes and Rights of Way (1998) para 12.77.  
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reserved and if the interference is minor.35 It has not been established whether an 
alteration of a right of way will be prohibited in all cases even if the alteration is equally 
convenient to the owner of the dominant tenement.36 In Greenwich Healthcare NHS Trust 
v London and Quadrant Housing Trust,37 Lightman J stated that a legal rule prohibiting the 
relocation of a servitude may frustrate the beneficial development of servient land. On the 
other hand Lightman J mentioned obiter that a possible reason for the application of such 
a rigid approach regarding the relocation of a servitude, is that the effect of the new rule 
may be that the dominant owner loses his property right to the servitude over the original 
way.38  
The discussion of the position in these foreign jurisdictions can be regarded as fruitful 
because it enhances law reform, showing that the law cannot remain rigid and needs to 
continually change in order to meet changing conditions. The flexible legal approach as 
adopted in Linvestment clearly finds support in a number of foreign jurisdictions, where 
unilateral relocation of specified servitudes are allowed under the conditions and 
requirements indicated above. 
 
6.4 Constitutional analysis 
Although some of the jurisdictions in the comparative law chapter illustrate a preference for 
a flexible approach regarding the relocation of servitudes, the court in Linvestment failed to 
test the constitutional implications that the flexible legal approach may have for the 
dominant owner. Chapter 4 considers the constitutional implications regarding the 
application of a flexible legal approach pertaining to the unilateral relocation of a specified 
servitude of right of way. The aim of the chapter was to evaluate whether the result of the 
Linvestment judgment constituted an arbitrary deprivation of property rights for the 
dominant estate owner that may be in conflict with section 25(1) of the Constitution. A 
second constitutional aspect of the decision in Linvestment is the question whether the 
                                            
35
 Overcom Properties v Stockleigh Hall Resident Management [1989] 1 ELGR 75 CA. Complete removal of 
a promised right may be a derogation from the grant: Saeed v Plustrade [2001] EWCA Civ 2011, [2002] 2 
EGLR 19. See Sparkes P A New Land Law (2
nd
 ed 2003) para 32.03. 
36
 Harpum C, Bridge S & Dixon M The Law of Real Property (7
th
 ed 2008) paras 30-003 – 30-004. 
37
 Greenwich Healthcare NHS Trust v London and Quadrant Housing Trust [1998] 1 WLR 1749 at 1755. 
38
 Greenwich Healthcare NHS Trust v London and Quadrant Housing Trust [1998] 1 WLR 1749 at 1755.  
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decision could constitute an expropriation of property and, if so, whether such an 
expropriation is in conflict with sections 25(2) and 25(3) of the Constitution.  
The structure of the analysis as set out in the FNB case was applied to Linvestment in 
chapter 4 to determine whether the legal dispute in Linvestment constituted a deprivation 
in terms of section 25(1) or an expropriation in terms of section 25(2) of the Constitution.39 
In the first instance, it had to be determined whether the law or conduct complained of 
affected “property” as understood by section 25. In Linvestment the owner of the dominant 
estate was deprived of an aspect of his registered servitutal entitlement, namely the right 
to have a say in the location of the servitude. It can be said that the interest that the owner 
of the dominant estate has over the servient estate is a real interest in property which 
ought to qualify for protection in terms of section 25 of the Constitution.40 
Secondly, it had to be determined whether there was a deprivation of the property. It can 
be argued that a deprivation occurred in Linvestment when the court authorised the 
unilateral relocation of a specified servitude of right of way by a servient owner.41 When a 
right of way that is registered and clearly defined in the title deed is relocated, it has the 
effect of depriving the dominant owner of a right that he held, namely to have a say in the 
location of the servitude. 
Finally, it had to be determined whether the deprivation was consistent with the provisions 
of section 25(1) of the Constitution. Section 25(1) provides that no one may be deprived of 
property except in terms of law of general application and that no law may permit arbitrary 
deprivation of property. It is clear that the common law rule as developed in Linvestment, 
namely that the owner of the servient estate is entitled to relocate a servitude unilaterally, 
                                            
39
 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Comissioner, South African Revenue Service; First  National 
Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 46. 
40
 All servitudes are real rights, since they burden ownership. See Mostert H, Pope A, Badenhorst P, 
Freedman W, Pienaar J & Van Wyk J The Principles of The Law of Property in South Africa (2010) 239. 
41
 In Linvestment CC v Hammersley and Another [2007] 3 All SA 618 (N) para 42 the court a quo held that 
authorising the owner of the servient tenement to relocate a servitude unilaterally, without obtaining consent 
from the owner of the dominant tenement, infringes the rights of the owner of the dominant tenement as 
contained in section 25 (1) of the Constitution. See Chapter 4. 
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is law of general application since the rule aims to strike a balance between the competing 
interests and rights of both parties.42 
A deprivation will be regarded as arbitrary if there is insufficient reason for the deprivation 
or if it is procedurally unfair.43 It can be argued that the policy reasons provided for the 
deprivation in Linvestment44 provide sufficient reason for the deprivation. The purpose of 
the amended rule is to authorise the owner of the servient tenement to deviate from the 
initial servitutal agreement unilaterally and against the will of the owner of the dominant 
tenement, particularly if upholding the initial agreement will have the effect of prejudicing 
the servient owner in an unjustifiable manner. The owner of the servient tenement is 
authorised to relocate the servitude unilaterally if the alternative route does not create an 
inconvenience for the owner of the dominant tenement and if the owner of the servient 
tenement pays all costs incurred in the relocation of the servitude.45 
The court in Linvestment did not specify whether obtaining a declaratory order is a 
prerequisite for the unilateral relocation of a specified servitude of right of way. The 
absence of a declaratory order authorising the relocation of a servitude may be 
procedurally unfair, in that it would allow the owner of the servient tenement to resort to 
self-help.46 In that case the effect of the amended rule could indeed bring about an 
arbitrary deprivation.47 
Since there is a possibility that the deprivation in Linvestment may be procedurally unfair, 
the next step of the analysis was to determine whether the deprivation could be justified 
under section 36 of the Constitution. A deprivation will be justified in terms of section 36 if 
there are no less restrictive means to achieve the purpose of the recently developed 
common law rule. A less restrictive way of achieving the same purpose as the recently 
developed common law in Linvestment would be to require a court order prior to 
                                            
42
 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (2005) 144; Thebus and Another v S 2003 (10) BCLR 1100 
(CC) para 31. 
43
 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Comissioner, South African Revenue Service; First National 
Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 100. 
44
 Linvestment CC v Hammersley [2008] 2 All SA 493 (SCA) para 31. 
45
 Linvestment CC v Hammersley [2008] 2 All SA 493 (SCA) para 35. 
46
 See Chapter 5 section 5.4. Brian v Bowlus 399 So 2d 545 (La 1981) at 549. See also Lovett JA “A bend in 
the road: Easement relocation and pliability in the new Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes” (2005) 
38 Conn LR 1-77 at 57-58.  
47
 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Comissioner, South African Revenue Service; First  National 
Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 100. 
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relocation. In the absence of the requirement that there should be a court order before 
relocation can take place, it can be argued that the deprivation would not be justifiable 
under section 36 of the Constitution. A deprivation will not be regarded as arbitrary if one 
assumes that the relocation of the servitude is authorised by a court order. In that case, 
the deprivation in Linvestment complies with the requirements in section 25(1) of the 
Constitution. Therefore, the next step is to determine whether the deprivation amounts to 
an expropriation for purposes of section 25(2). 
Section 25(2) of the Constitution provides that property may only be expropriated in terms 
of law of general application; for a public purpose or in the public interest; and subject to 
payment of compensation that is just and equitable. The deprivation in Linvestment was 
not aimed at forcibly acquiring property for a public purpose.48 The purpose of the rule is to 
make one party better off without making the other party worse off and to improve the use 
of private land.49 Therefore, the deprivation cannot be characterised as an expropriation. 
 
6.5 Policy analysis 
The aim of chapter 5 was to evaluate whether it is justifiable for courts to overturn long-
established common law principles based on the grounds of justice, equity and practicality. 
Calabresi and Melamed‟s property and liability rule paradigm was one of the paradigms 
used to frame the debate about the relocation of servitudes.50 This paradigm illustrates 
how entitlements can be protected by property and liability rules. Furthermore, it also 
illustrates when policy makers should apply property and liability rules respectively to 
protect entitlements. Calabresi and Melamed‟s property and liability rule paradigm 
suggests that property rules51 should be the preferred remedy when transaction costs are 
                                            
48
 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (2005) 242-269. 
49
 French S “Relocating easements: Restatement (third), servitudes § 4.8 (3)” (2003) 38 Real Prop Prob & Tr 
J 1 – 15 at 5. See footnote 224 in Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (2005) 239. 
50
 Calabresi G & Melamed AD “Property rules, liability rules and inalienability: One view of the cathedral” 
(1972) 85 Harv LR 1089-1128.  
51
 The traditional common law rule regarding the unilateral relocation of a specified servitude of right of way 
can be classified as a pure property rule. 
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low, because they facilitate mutually beneficial bargaining between private parties.52 By 
contrast, liability rules will be preferred when transaction costs are high, because liability 
rules53 allow the court to facilitate exchanges when bargaining is not possible.54 
The pliability rule paradigm of Bell and Parchomovsky55 was also used to frame the debate 
about the relocation of servitudes. Unlike Calabresi and Melamed‟s property and liability 
paradigm, the pliability paradigm provides a clear insight as to what the structure of the 
legal rule regarding the relocation of servitudes should look like in order for the rule to 
strike a balance between the rights of the dominant and servient owners. When a legal 
rule such as the flexible legal approach is structured in accordance with the pliability 
paradigm, it fully captures the protection of the entitlements of the owner of the dominant 
tenement and the owner of the servient tenement.56 The flexible legal approach is 
designed to accommodate the interests of the owner of the servient tenement and the 
owner of the dominant tenement. Furthermore, the flexible legal approach allows each of 
the owners to maximize the utility of his or her property without damaging the other.57 
Pliability rules have the effect of protecting legal entitlements where the protection of 
entitlements can shift between property and liability rules as long as the specified 
requirements have been complied with.58  In contrast to property and liability rules that are 
regarded as static, pliability rules can be regarded as dynamic in nature.59 
If one takes the insights of Bell and Parchomovsky into consideration, then one can draw 
the inference that the grounds on which the court in Linvestment60 based its judgment, 
namely fairness, justice and equity, are to a certain extent credible and convincing. The 
conclusion reached in Linvestment is sensible from a practical point of view. Lovett is 
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 Miceli TJ “Property” in Backhaus JG (ed) The Elgar Companion to Law and Economics (2005) 246-260 at 
249. See Anonymous “The right of owners of servient estates to relocate easements unilaterally” (1996) 109 
Harv LR 1693-1710. 
53
 The flexible legal approach can be classified as a liability rule. 
54
 Miceli TJ “Property” in Backhaus JG (ed) The Elgar Companion to Law and Economics (2005) 246-260 at 
249. 
55
 Bell A & Parchomovsky G “Pliability rules” (2002) 101 Mich LR 1-79. 
56
 Bell A & Parchomovsky G “Pliability rules” (2002) 101 Mich LR 1-79 at 5. 
57
 French S “Relocating easements: Restatement (third), servitudes § 4.8 (3)” (2003) 38 Real Prop Prob & Tr 
J 1-15 at 11-12. 
58
 Bell A & Parchomovsky G “Pliability rules” (2002) 101 Mich LR 1-79 at 5; Lovett JA “A bend in the road: 
Easement relocation and pliability in the new Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes” (2005) 38 Conn 
LR 1-77 at 16. 
59
 Bell A & Parchomovsky G “Pliability rules” (2002) 101 Mich LR 1-79 at 5. 
60
 [2008] 2 All SA 493 (SCA). 
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correct when he states that the flexible legal approach is pragmatic. The flexible legal 
approach assists courts in viewing servitudes as evolving relationships between parties 
with concurrent interests in the same land and not merely as inflexible property rights.61  
However, from a policy and constitutional point of view, the flexible legal approach is 
inadequate. In Linvestment the court did not state whether obtaining judicial consent prior 
to the unilateral relocation of a servitude is a prerequisite.62 If obtaining judicial consent 
prior to relocation is not required, it would allow the owner of the servient tenement to 
resort to self-help.63 The recommendations discussed below illustrate how the pliability 
approach could be further improved, in order to strike a balance between the interests of 
the owner of the dominant tenement and the owner of the servient tenement. 
 
6.6 Recommendations 
Even though the policy grounds that the court based its decision on are welcomed and to a 
certain extent convincing, there is room for improvement. Lovett64 proposed three pliability 
rule refinements to the flexible legal approach. First, he states that the flexible legal 
approach should be improved by creating a two-step triggering mechanism.65 According to 
Lovett, this two-step mechanism can be used to reinforce the property rule protection 
phase of the pliability rule.66 This two-step triggering mechanism requires a definite time 
period during which the location of the servitude cannot be altered without obtaining the 
necessary consent from the owner of the dominant tenement.67 According to Lovett,68 this 
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 Lovett JA “A bend in the road: Easement relocation and pliability in the new Restatement (Third) of 
Property: Servitudes” (2005) 38 Conn LR 1-77 at 77. 
62
 See Chapter 4 and 5. 
63
 See Chapter 5 section 5.4. Brian v Bowlus 399 So 2d 545 (La 1981) at 549. See Lovett JA “A bend in the 
road: Easement relocation and pliability in the new Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes” (2005) 38 
Conn LR 1-77 at 57-58.  
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 Lovett JA “A bend in the road: Easement relocation and pliability in the new Restatement (Third) of 
Property: Servitudes” (2005) 38 Conn LR 1-77 at 6-9, 43-72. 
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 Lovett JA “A bend in the road: Easement relocation and pliability in the new Restatement (Third) of 
Property: Servitudes” (2005) 38 Conn LR 1-77 at 6. 
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 Lovett JA “A bend in the road: Easement relocation and pliability in the new Restatement (Third) of 
Property: Servitudes” (2005) 38 Conn LR 1-77 at 6. 
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 Lovett JA “A bend in the road: Easement relocation and pliability in the new Restatement (Third) of 
Property: Servitudes” (2005) 38 Conn LR 1-77 at 6. 
68
 Lovett JA “A bend in the road: Easement relocation and pliability in the new Restatement (Third) of 
Property: Servitudes” (2005) 38 Conn LR 1-77 at 6. 
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development would respond to the efficiency-oriented critiques69 of the flexible legal 
approach. If the property rule protects the dominant owner‟s entitlement for a defined 
period of time, it provides dominant owners a measure of certainty and predictability.70 
Lovett‟s71 second proposed improvement of the flexible legal approach includes two 
elements. He advocates that once the period during which the relocation of servitudes is 
prohibited terminates, the location of a servitude should only be changed without the 
dominant owner‟s consent if the servient owner obtains a declaration from a court that the 
utility and fairness criteria of the flexible legal approach have been complied with. The 
servient owner has to prove that he will be materially inconvenienced in the use of his 
property if the status quo is maintained, that the relocation will not prejudice the owner of 
the dominant tenement and that he will pay all costs incurred in the relocation of the 
servitude.72 
The third pliability rule improvement that could be attached to the flexible legal approach 
would grant the court the discretion to award compensatory damages.73 Lovett74 states 
that he designed this refinement to bring more efficiency and fairness to the relocation of 
servitudes. Furthermore, Lovett75 states that this third pliability rule refinement responds to 
the critique that liability rules may discourage individuals from learning how to bargain with 
each other. In addition, Lovett asserts that if a servient owner complies with all the 
requirements of the flexible legal approach and the court awards no damages, then the 
servient owner will capture the entire gain from the transaction without having to share it 
with the dominant owner, which might not have happened if the parties settled the dispute 
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 In the US judgment of Stamatis v Johnson 71 Ariz 134, 224 P 2d 201 (1950) 202-203, the court held that if 
the location of a servitude is treated as variable it would incite litigation and depreciate the value and 
discourage the improvement of the land upon which the servitude is charged. This decision has been 
confirmed in Davis v Bruk 411 A 2d 660 (Me 1980) 665. See Chapter 5 section 5.2. 
70
 Lovett JA “A bend in the road: Easement relocation and pliability in the new Restatement (Third) of 
Property: Servitudes” (2005) 38 Conn LR 1-77 at 6. 
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75
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by themselves by means of bargaining.76 If courts are given the power to award a premium 
or bonus compensation, it will prevent the flexible legal approach from becoming “a vehicle 
for one private individual to capture all of the economic gain of a non-consensual 
transaction”.77 Several goals will be achieved if courts are given the power to award some 
premium compensation in situations where the relocation of a servitude is required.78 One 
of these goals is that it will most probably provide incentives to servient owners to bargain 
about how the servitude ought to be relocated.79 Servient owners will most likely negotiate 
about how the servitude ought to be relocated rather than risking the possibility of being 
subjected to a compensation penalty.80 It would also give servitude holders protection 
against servient owners who are unwilling to share the expected net surplus to be gained 
by the relocation of the servitude.81 In addition, the third refinement of the flexible legal 
approach could also help compensate the dominant owner for the loss of any subjective 
values associated with servitutal rights.82 
The flexible legal approach as applied in Linvestment should be refined in its 
implementation in the direction of a well-defined pliability rule consistent with the vision of 
Bell and Parchomovsky. If the three refinements suggested by Lovett are embedded in the 
judicial rules regulating the relocation of servitudes as stated in Linvestment, then the new 
rule will undoubtedly become a leading example of the value of pliability rule modelling as 
a mode for entitlement protection design.83 
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